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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores the role of native activists in the incorporation of new
immigrants. Motivated by concerns that this process would be limited in countries
with no tradition of immigration, it focuses on Spain, Ireland, and Northern
Ireland. Despite similar patterns of growth and in-migration, there are significant
differences in the trajectories of political incorporation. Given Spain's persistently
high unemployment rate, and Northern Ireland's dark history of social conflict, we
would expect to see the most political outreach to immigrants in Ireland, yet we see
quite the opposite. What explains this variation?
Drawing from archival research and interviews, I find that differences in how
native activists respond to immigrants in the present are due to how they settled
past conflicts. In places where past native minority demands for civic inclusion
were accommodated, institutions were changed to be more open to minority
participation. Later, with new immigration, not only may newcomers have access to
civic life through institutions designed for native minorities, native groups may
repurpose the same historical narratives used to address their marginalization in
the past, to prevent the marginalization of new immigrants in the present. While
places that do not have access to this legacy of conflict may attempt to establish
new, migrant serving institutions, because these new structures are often targeted
rather than universalistic, they are vulnerable to retrenchment.
Therefore, while Ireland may have had immigrant-friendly institutions early on,
because these did not have vested native constituencies, their remit was limited and
unstable. Spain and Northern Ireland's recent conflicts meant that their minority-
friendly institutions could not be cut back - and were actually extended - when
confronted with new immigration because they also benefited natives with an
interest in maintaining them.
These findings raise serious questions about approaches to incorporation that focus
solely on programs targeting immigrants. They also suggest that societies with a
3
legacy of conflict may be better equipped to handle incorporation than their more
tranquil counterparts: if the grievances of previously marginalized native minorities
were addressed through the establishment of more inclusive civic institutions, there
can be unintended positive spillover benefits for immigrants down the line.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael Piore
Title: David W. Skinner Professor of Political Economy and Political
Science, Emeritus
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
In November 2011, Darren Scully, a city councilor and the serving mayor of
Naas, a bedroom community outside of Dublin, Ireland, announced that his office
would no longer deal with inquiries from African constituents. In a radio interview,
Mayor Scully noted that having been "met with aggressiveness and bad manners",
he decided that he was "just not going to take on representation from black
Africans" and would therefore redirect queries from African constituents to one of
the other councilors in the district.' This announcement, unsurprisingly, caused a
public firestorm, with migrant rights groups calling for his resignation, and one
Labour Party councilor even going so far as to file a police complaint under the
Incitement to Hatred Act.2 Scully's party, Fine Gael, quickly distanced themselves
from his statements, and the councilor resigned shortly thereafter.
While Scully's actions may seem surprising in isolation, they were indicative
of the growing unease that the Irish political class - and the public - felt when it
came to immigration. From the mid 19th century, when hundreds of thousands of
Irish left the island fleeing starvation, disease, and political unrest, until deep in
the 1980s when the country was forced to undergo a series of painful economic
reforms in the midst of yet another economic crisis, Ireland was a country of
emigration. However, the tide began to turn in the 1990s when the Celtic Tiger
I "Naas mayor refuses to represent black Africans," Irish Examiner, November 22, 2011,
http://www.irishexaminer.com/breakingnews/ireland/naas-mayor-refuses-to-represent-
black-africans-529297.html.
2 Telford, L, "Fine Gael's Daren Scully quits as mayor of Naas over his comments about
'black Africans', Independent (Ireland, November 22, 2011, http://www.independent.ie/irish-
news/fine-gaels-darren-scully-quits-as-mayor-of-naas-over-his-comments-about-black-
africans-26794755.html.
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economy not only attracted attention from foreign investors, but foreign workers as
well. As unemployment fell, the migrant population grew, and by 2006, just before
the collapse of the housing bubble and the global economic crisis that would
devastate the Irish economy, close to 15% of the population was foreign-born,
putting Ireland ahead of the United States (12%) and the United Kingdom (8%), two
countries that were long a refuge for Irish migrant workers.
The Scully affair in Ireland was notable not only because it seemed like such
an extreme response to rapid demographic change, but also because it stood in stark
contrast to events in another rapidly changing 'new destination' European country,
Spain. A few months prior to the Scully scandal, Mariano Rajoy, the leader of the
center-right Partido Popular (Popular Party, heretofore referred to as "Populares' or
'PP'), led a press event to personally introduce a slate of immigrant candidates to
stand in the local elections. 3 That same day, the PP released a video on its website
of migrant candidates that included Juan Antonio de la Morena, an immigrant from
Equatorial Guinea who was the mayor of Villamantilla, a bedroom community
outside of Madrid. The contrast between the situation in Villamantilla and Naas
was startling: both are quiet suburbs outside of their respective capitals, and both
have undergone rapid demographic change over the last decade due to migration,
but in one, 'black African' immigrants were told by the native-born mayor to seek
political counsel elsewhere, while in the other, a black African immigrant was the
mayor.
3 "El PP prepara un acto de Rajoy con candidatos de origen inmigrante" press release,
Partido Popular, April 24, 2011. Available online at: http://www.pp.es/actualidad-
noticia/pp-prepara-un-acto-rajoy-candidatos-origen-inmigrante_4646.html.
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The differences observed when comparing Naas and Villamantilla extend
beyond the politics of sleepy bedroom communities. Over the last two decades,
patterns of migration to Western Europe have shifted significantly. For most of the
post-war era, immigrants primarily settled in the industrial states of Northern
Europe. Today Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy and Portugal, countries that were long
the reserve labor pool for their wealthier neighbors, are themselves grappling with
immigration. Yet despite similarities in migration flows and socioeconomic
conditions, we still see significant variation in how native political actors in these
new destinations have responded to newcomers. In Spain, attempts to form far-
right anti-immigration nationalist parties have failed, despite the highest
unemployment rate in the Eurozone; in Greece, a country also struggling with
crippling unemployment, a new anti-immigrant far-right party, Golden Dawn, won
close to 7% of votes in the 2012 parliamentary elections. The Italian government
appointed a Congolese- born doctor to serve as the country's first integration
minister; in Ireland, the inaugural Minister for Integration was a politician who,
prior to his appointment, referred to Turkish migrant workers fighting against
wage discrimination as "kebobs".4 Perhaps most surprisingly, nationalists in
Northern Ireland and the Basque Country of Spain have emerged as vocal
advocates for immigrant political and social rights - this despite long histories of
ethno-nationalism, and a willing to take up arms against the state to defend their
vision of the 'imagined community' (Anderson 1991). What explains this variation?
4602, Dail Eireann (2005) 1195-1197.
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Question and Scope
This thesis seeks to explain why we see such variation in what I call
incorporative activity, namely actions on the part of native political actors to bring
new immigrants into the polity. I focus primarily on native political actors at the
national level, with particular attention to the behavior of political parties. Parties
are distinct from other political organizations in democracies because they are both
gatekeepers and protagonists. Within legislatures, they negotiate and ratify the
laws governing access to citizenship and electoral eligibility. They also engage more
broadly with the citizenry at large by mobilizing voters for elections and putting
forth the candidates that will sit in the legislature. In other words, they both create
the context for, and are positioned to actively engage in incorporative activities
targeting immigrants. This is not to say that other political organizations are
unimportant; on the contrary, trade unions, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), churches, employers associations, and other assorted groups all may have
an interest in migration-related policies. However, because I am explicitly
interested in political activities and activities specifically meant to channel
immigrants into political life, my analysis focuses on those organizations with a
more explicitly political raison d 'tre; hence why I primarily - though not
exclusively - focus on parties, and to a lesser extent unions, NGOs, and state
officials.5
5 Hochschild et. al. (2013) note that, "it can be hard to distinguish nonpolitical from political
institutions, in part because engagement with nonpolitical institutions such as churches or
mosques can have real consequences for politics" (pg. 15).
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Because 'incorporative activity' is rather broad conceptually, I focus on three
key areas.6 First are actions meant to open or ease the pathway to citizenship.
Although citizenship is not the prerequisite that it used to be for political
engagement - not only are there non-electoral channels of civic participation that do
not require citizenship, a rising number of democracies make allowances for non-
citizen voting - it is still a requirement in most countries to vote in both local and
national elections and to have full political and social rights.7 Second are actions
meant to facilitate immigrant participation in electoral politics, including
recruitment of immigrant voters and candidates, and extension of non-citizen voting
rights. The move to recruit immigrants to participate in elections is a way for
native political organizations to demonstrate that they see immigrants as valued
members of the polity (Andersen 2010), and the recruitment of immigrant
candidates not only sends a signal about inclusion, but it is also a way to garner
additional immigrant interest in elections, as having a co-ethnic on the ballot may
increase turnout for that group (Whitby 2007; Barreto 2007). Third, I measure
actions meant to build the capacity of migrant organizations to make their own
demands on the state, whether through partnerships with native organizations, or
direct financial and/or strategic support. Research on variation in political
integration suggests that these capacity-building actions can increase political
6 These measurements are derived from Kristi Andersen's (2010) analysis of ways in which
native political actors in the U.S. are 'taking on the task' of incorporation: "Encouraging
and facilitating naturalization, promoting voter registration, educating people about issues
and participatory channels, and providing them with resources and motivations to
participate" (2010; 71, italics added). I have consolidated the last two points into 'capacity-
building'.
7 For a discussion of why states choose to enfranchise immigrants, see Earnest 2006.
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incorporation in the long-term (Bloemraad 2005). Note, however, that for the
purposes of this project, I am not focusing on the outcomes from these actions
(increased immigrant electoral participation, rise in naturalization rates, etc.).
Rather, I am interested in the process, namely whether or not native political actors
even attempt to include new immigrants. These attempts matter: past work has
shown that the process of outreach "[affects] understandings of citizenship,
especially of immigrants' legitimate political standing as citizens and of their ability
to participate in the political process" (Bloemraad 2006:4). Even though
immigrants may not enter the political arena, they appreciate the invitation.8
I focus on incorporative activity in 'new destination' countries, places that
were, until recently, more likely to be countries of emigration rather than
immigration. To date, most of the existing explanations for variation in
incorporative activity have been drawn from three sets of countries: 1) large "settler
states" like the United States and Canada, places whose populations were largely
built by immigration, 2) large, wealthy industrialized countries in Northern Europe
that sought out guest workers in the post-war period, and 3) small wealthy
European countries that welcomed asylum-seekers, first from the Balkans and then
further afield, in the 1990s. But today, the patterns and context of migration are
shifting wildly. In Europe, between 1992 when the Maastricht Treaty was signed,
laying out the final-stage criteria for joining the euro, and 2008, when recession
swept across the euro zone and beyond, the countries with the fastest growing
8 Both the parameters and significance of incorporative activity are discussed in greater
detail in Chapter 2.
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foreign-born populations were not the long-standing migrant-absorbing states like
Germany, France, and the US, but rather the smaller countries on the geographic
and economic periphery of Western Europe [Figure 1.1].
Europe's new immigrant-receiving states are decidedly different from the
region's 'old destination' states. First, new destinations lack the kinds of formal
institutions and political organizations that facilitate incorporative activity in 'old
destinations': multi-lingual services, legal clinics, and advocacy groups that were
established to ease the entry of previous waves of immigrants into civic life can in
turn play the same role for new immigrants (Waters and Jim6nez 2005; Mollenkopf
and Hochschild 2010). In addition, new destinations lack the kinds of historical
narratives that facilitate incorporation by normalizing the idea that immigrants
could and should be a part of civic life (Griffith 2008). Narratives are important, as
they can offer guidance or lines of action in times of uncertainty (Zald 1996; Ganz
2012), but unlike their counterparts the United States, political actors in new
destination countries like Portugal and Greece cannot refer to themselves as 'a
nation of immigrants', speak to the success of 'the melting pot', or otherwise look to
the narratives of successful past integration when debating citizenship policies in
the present. Therefore, the social and political context of reception for immigrants
in old destinations and new destinations varies considerably: new destinations have
not been 'primed' by previous waves of immigration, and therefore do not have the
pre-established allies and entry points into civic life available to new arrivals in old
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destinations. 9 Finally, Europe's new destinations are socio-economically distinct
from old destinations as well. Many new destinations are not far removed from
poverty and emigration themselves, and industrial might - if it existed at all - has
been limited to small pockets rather than the economy at large. Therefore, much of
what we know about the process of incorporation in old destinations, a process that
was, in many cases, inextricably tied to mass industrialization, will not hold in
today's new destinations. That said, the lessons learned from Europe's new
destinations may be far more relevant for other emerging immigrant-receiving
countries at and beyond the southern and eastern boundaries of Europe than the
lessons drawn from Northern Europe and North America.
Despite this pessimistic assessment, we do actually see examples of
incorporative activity in new destinations: elected officials have voted to widen
eligibility requirements for citizenship, parties have recruited both migrant voters
and candidates, unions have partnered with migrant worker organizations, and
even local government officials have been involved in efforts to increase the
immigrant presence in political life. However, we also see quite the opposite, even
in seemingly similar political and economic contexts: access to citizenship has been
curtailed, parties, rather than mobilizing immigrants, mobilize the anti-
immigration vote, and capacity-building partnerships between native and migrant
9 This is not to say that the context of reception for new immigrants in old destinations is
necessarily warm and fuzzy, or even welcoming: both Erie (1988) and Jones-Correa (1998)
have noted cases where pre-existing political organizations that mobilized immigrants in
the past may not be enthusiastic about mobilizing present-day immigrants, largely due to
not wanting to upset the status quo balance of power.
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organizations are limited and unstable, at best. What explains this variation across
new destination societies?
Existing studies of political incorporation tend to focus on the role of
institutions (Brubaker 1992; Bloemraad 2005) or the political interests of native
actors (Dahl (1974) 2005; Erie 1988; Jones-Correa 1998) in order to explain
variation in the incorporative activities of native political actors. However, I offer a
theory of incorporative activity that focuses on the interaction of these two key
factors to explain outcomes, highlighting how past cycles of conflict among natives
can lead not only to institutional changes that facilitate incorporation, but can also
affect the behavior and worldviews of the actors that made these demands - both
with unforeseen, but critical consequences for the legal and political citizenship of
future immigrants.
Argument in Brief
Why do some native political actors take on the task of incorporating new
immigrants, while others ignore or actively move to exclude them from civic life? I
argue that these differences in how native political actors in receiving countries
respond to immigrants in the present are due to how they have settled internal
social conflicts in the past. Specifically, I argue that the ability and willingness of
native political actors in new destination countries to take action in order to bring
new immigrants into civic life depends on how these societies have dealt with the
political inclusion of their own native minorities.
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I find that past social conflict over the political exclusion of minorities-
whether religious, ethnic, or cultural - can lead to the development of minority-
friendly political and social institutions, empower political actors with an interest in
minority rights, and establish social narratives oriented towards addressing issues
of marginalization and exclusion. When confronted with new immigration, these
previously marginalized groups may repurpose the institutions and narratives
developed to address their own past exclusion in order to facilitate the political
inclusion of new immigrants. Therefore, countries with a legacy of deep social
conflict may be better prepared to deal with new immigration than their more
stable counterparts.
Past social conflict matters for three key reasons. First, the articulation of
demands for greater political inclusion of minorities forces an alternative social
narrative into the public sphere. Should these demands be accommodated, this
'alternative' narrative becomes mainstream: its ideals are institutionalized into law,
and it gives political actors a way to frame issues of political exclusion in public
debate and discourse. Second, the experience of being marginalized may lead native
minority groups to make joint cause with new marginalized minority groups,
namely immigrants. It also gives these groups a strong incentive to maintain the
institutions designed to protect their rights - and that inadvertently benefit new
immigrants. Third, the inclusive civic institutions that result from minority
demands and cycles of conflict not only have a built-in constituency interested in
maintaining them, but they may see their constituencies expand over time, as other
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native groups and the bureaucrats tasked with maintaining them also develop a
vested interest in their maintenance. Taken together, past cycles of social conflict
leaves some societies with open, minority-friendly civic institutions, native political
actors interested in the political inclusion of minority groups and the maintenance
of these inclusive institutions, and a shared historical narrative to guide public
debates and policy around minority civic inclusion. In other words, in terms of
institutions, allies, and narratives, the legacy of social conflict can leave new
destinations looking a lot like old destinations.
These findings beg the question: do societies really need to go through
historical cycles of conflict in order to successfully facilitate the incorporation of new
immigrant populations? Can political actors interested in incorporation today
simply create their own inclusive civic institutions? Unfortunately, my findings
suggest that civic institutions that emerge in response to migration, and that
specifically target immigrant populations may be vulnerable to retrenchment, as
they have neither the native political constituencies that were both critical to their
creation and are deeply invested in their survival, nor do they have the time to
develop new constituencies that are both sufficiently powerful and interested
enough to protect them from cuts. In other words, because they are targeted rather
than universal, they are unstable: because their targeted immigrant constituency is
new to the political life of the receiving community and may not even have the right
to voter or otherwise participate in civic life, the beneficiaries of targeted programs
cannot defend them from the political axe. We can see this dynamic most clearly in
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attempts towards bureaucratic incorporation, the process by which government
officials or bureaucrats in state-funded agencies become advocates for or direct
partners with, immigrant communities (Marrow 2009). Bureaucratic incorporation
has emerged as a major issue in Europe, as a growing number of countries have
developed integration ministries or equality agencies to represent the interests of
new immigrant groups. The problem with these state-led efforts is that what the
state giveth, the state taketh away: state-created institutions or organizations
designed to serve a narrow immigrant constituency can be swiftly rolled back
should the political winds change. This kind of policy retrenchment is much harder
when institutions or agencies were created to service a much broader constituency:
the more people that are invested in their survival, the harder it is to cut them.
Therefore, bureaucratic incorporation is more likely to succeed when bureaucracies
have a broader mandate than simple migration issues. While this may run counter
to what is currently considered 'best practice' in the migration community10 and it
may raise the ire of migrants rights activists who see their issues as distinct from
the issues of native minority groups and therefore resent being lumped in with
other marginalized groups, in the long run, broader bureaucratic reach may mean
more sustained incorporative activity, especially in new destinations where
immigrant communities do not yet have the political power to protect allied
agencies from retrenchment. Ultimately, open civic institutions are a necessary but
not sufficient condition for incorporative activity. Rather, it is the interaction
10 States are increasingly ranked by their bureaucratic infrastructure targeting migrants;
for example, the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) is a EU-funded project to assess
integration policies across member states.
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between institutions and native constituencies that creates - and perhaps more
importantly, maintains - political space for new immigrants.
Plan of the Thesis
Chapter 2 lays out the empirical puzzle at the heart of this thesis. It provides
an overview of how the context of migration has changed in the post-war era, and
introduces and defines the main outcome of interest, incorporative activity. It goes
on to show that existing explanations of incorporative activity cannot on their own
explain why we see such variation in incorporative activity within new destinations,
even when exploring countries with similar patterns of migration and comparable
institutions and native actors. Given the puzzle at hand, it also articulates my
research methodology.
Chapter 3 offers a theory of political incorporation in new destinations. It
lays out how and why civic institutions and their supporting social narratives that
were developed to deal with past conflict among natives get repurposed in order to
apply to newcomers, and in turn how this facilitates incorporative activity.
Chapter 4 is a historical case study of Ireland. Although we would expect see
significant incorporative activity given its institutions at the time when
immigration began to emerge as a major social phenomenon - most notably its
liberal non-citizen voting laws and relatively generous citizenship regime - this has
not been the case. Instead, Irish political parties have narrowed the previously
wide pathway to citizenship and have not engaged in mass migrant voter
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mobilization, and both state-led and private partnerships with migrant
organizations have been limited and unstable. I show that this is due to how and
why these institutions developed. Ireland began the twentieth century as a
multinational political entity, but, unable to reconcile the two different political
visions for its future, the significant Protestant minority was drawn away through
the partition of the island. Yet despite its newfound independence, Ireland
inherited a set of civic institutions designed for a multicultural society: the inclusive
institutions that existed prior to immigration were a hangover from British rule,
rather than deliberate policy decisions directed at inclusiveness. This historical
legacy explains both why Irish political elites found it relatively easy to close off
access to citizenship, and why political support for migrant capacity-building and
the development of migrant-serving bureaucracies faltered: native political actors,
most notably parties and unions, had little investment (political or economic) in the
development of migrant serving organizations and institutions, and immigrant
communities were too new and unorganized to defend their few access points to
civic life. Therefore, despite its open civic institutions, incorporative activity in
Ireland has been relatively limited and unstable.
Chapter 5 examines incorporative activity in Northern Ireland. In contrast
to their southern counterparts, Northern political actors, and in particular, self-
identified Irish nationalists, have strongly supported immigrant access to and
engagement in civic life: nationalist parties fought against ending birthright
citizenship for migrant children, and there have been a number of strategic and
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financial partnerships between migrant organizations and both native NGOs and
local bureaucracies. I argue that the significant difference in incorporative activity
as compared to the south can be traced to the political development of the region's
civic institutions - both formal and informal - and the political evolution of its
native actors. The past conflict over Catholic civic inclusion, and the violence of the
Troubles had a transformative effect on Northern Irish civil society: the demands
for greater Catholic civic inclusion led to the development of a social narrative of
inclusion and equality that became institutionalized into law through the peace
process to end the thirty-year conflict known as the Troubles. In the wake of the
conflict, many native political actors, and particularly community associations with
roots in the Catholic civil rights movement and the nationalist community, are
sensitive to issues of discrimination and marginalization and use their own
experiences as cognitive lenses through which to understand and respond to the
experiences of new immigrants. Therefore, despite a legacy of violent ethnic
conflict, and ongoing sectarian tension, native political actors in Northern Ireland
have taken on the task of immigrant incorporation, largely by repurposing the
institutions and narratives that came out of their own struggles in order to extend
rights to and open political space for new immigrants.
Chapter 6 moves away from Ireland and turns southward to Spain, another
new destination country. Given their relatively high unemployment rate, the
cultural distance between the native and immigrant population, and its large
undocumented workforce, we might expect to see much lower levels of incorporative
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activity in Spain than in our other cases - but, in fact, the opposite is true. I argue
that Spain's trajectory has been largely shaped by its internal historical conflicts
over the representation of its political minorities, most notably trade unions and
regional nationalists. The violence and hatred of the 1930s and 1940s, and the
repression that these groups faced during the Franco dictatorship not only shaped
the formal political institutions that emerged from the process of democratization,
but also the informal institutions that structure political behavior: the historical
memory of political extremism led to a strong norm of concertation that drove the
post-Franco behavior of political actors, most notably parties and unions. When
confronted with new minority groups in the form of immigrants (many of whom
were racially and/or culturally distinct from native Spaniards), previously repressed
groups were some of the biggest advocates for the political inclusion of new
immigrants - despite their growing political unpopularity. Interestingly, this is not
a simple left-right divide: while it is true that the Franco regime directed much of
its ire at left-wing groups (namely socialists, anarchists, and trade unionists),
socially and economically conservative regional nationalists were also repressed for
cultural and political reasons, and these same conservative Basque nationalists (as
represented by the Basque Nationalist Party or PNV) have not gone the route of
nationalists in Greece, Italy, Finland or Belgium in making a hard turn to the right
on immigration - a significant achievement especially considering the ethnocentric
political roots of the PNV and the modern nationalist movement.
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Finally, Chapter 7 offers an overview of the empirical evidence, briefly
considers how this argument may carry to other countries, discusses the limitations
of the argument, and reviews some of the implications of these findings.
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Figure 1.1
Immigrants as a percentage of the population, 1960 - 2005 (OE CD)
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Chapter 2 - Of Ships and Small Islands: Changing Migration
Patterns and the Challenges of Incorporation in New
Destinations
In the mid-1980s, Ireland was in crisis. After climbing steadily for much of
the decade, by 1987 the unemployment rate peaked at 17%, a level not seen in a
generation. The lack of available employment drove thousands of workers to the
ferry terminals in Dublin and Dun Laoghaire, bound for Liverpool or Holyhead,
where they would disembark and continue by train to London. Some went even
further afield: the New York Times noted that by the end of the decade, there were
at least 130,000 undocumented Irish in the Northeast United States alone.11 These
workers entered the country as tourists and, leveraging the extensive Irish
networks in Boston and New York, let their visas quietly expire as they slipped into
the cash-in-hand pub and construction jobs taken by so many of their compatriots
before them. When asked by Newsweek magazine on October 1987 about this
growing exodus, the then-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland, Brian Lenihan
replied, "we can't all live on a small island" (quoted in Mac Einri 2012).
Exactly two decades later, Conor Lenihan, the son of the aforementioned
Brian, became Ireland's first Minister of Integration, the newly created junior
cabinet position tasked with managing the unprecedented influx of immigrants into
the Republic. When the elder Lenihan made his infamous "small island" remark,
the vast majority (86%) of foreign-born people living in Ireland were UK or US
11 Gold, Allan. "Boston Journal; City's Irish Newcomers Are Illegal, but Not Alien," New
York Times, 1989, online archive [accessed 13 June 2013].
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citizens, and most of these people were of Irish descent (CSO 1986). Once you took
UK or US-born immigrants out of the equation, Ireland's foreign-born population
was only 1.3%. But by 2006, the US-UK share of the foreign-born population had
fallen to 47.7%, Polish were second only to the British amongst the foreign-born
population, and there were more Nigerian nationals living in Ireland than
Americans (CSO 2008). Non-UK foreign-born had increased six times over, from
1.3% to over 8%. In two decades, this 'small island' went from having the highest
level of emigration in Western Europe, to one of the highest levels of immigration,
and the diversity of the immigrant population had changed significantly.
Ireland was not the only country in the region to undergo these kinds of
dramatic demographic changes: the Mediterranean countries of Greece, Spain, Italy
and Portugal also saw increases in immigration during this time. Closer to home,
Northern Ireland, geographically part of Ireland but politically part of the United
Kingdom, also saw its immigrant population double, then double again in less than
a decade, mirroring the rate of change happening next door in the Irish Republic.
This rapid transformation of what have come to be known as 'new destination'
societies, countries that for most of their modern histories have been places of
emigration rather than immigration, raised a series of questions that were new to
the late-developing countries of Western Europe, but old hat for many post-
industrial Western democracies: in a time of mass immigration when society is
rapidly diversifying, would - or could - new immigrants become a part of civic life?
More specifically, given the political and economic constraints facing new
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destination countries, would political incorporation, namely the process by which
immigrants become "a part of mainstream political debates, practices, and decision
making" (Bloemraad 2006:6), even be possible?
In this chapter, I explore the question of political incorporation in new
destinations by tracing the transition of Europe's late-developing states from places
of emigration to countries of immigration. Using a definition of political
incorporation that focuses on the actions of native political actors ('incorporative
activity'), and examining this phenomenon in Ireland, Northern Ireland, and Spain
I show that we can identify instances of incorporative activity - but not how or
where we would expect. Despite Ireland's immigrant-friendly civic institutions and
robust economy, Irish political actors were less engaged in and committed to
incorporative activity than their counterparts in Northern Ireland and Spain. This
variation seems even more puzzling when we take into account Northern Ireland's
recent bloody history of ethnic conflict, and Spain's stubbornly high unemployment
rate.12 I show that this cannot be explained by the existing literature on
incorporation that looks to power interests, political identity, or institutions to
explain variation, thus setting the stage for the following chapter, where an
alternative theory of incorporative activity is offered. I close the chapter with a
brief discussion of methods.
" Even through the boom years of the 2000s, the unemployment rate in Spain never dipped
below 10% (INE 2009).
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I. Incorporation and the Changing Geography of European Migration
The political incorporation of Europe's latest wave of immigrants has to be
understood within the context of broader changes in migration flows both to and
within the region over the last several decades. For most of the post-war period,
immigration was largely the domain of Northern Europe: the need in the 1940s and
50s to rebuild both the infrastructure and the population of societies shattered by
war, combined with a long period of economic expansion that lasted until the oil
crisis of the 1970s, led Germany, the UK, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands to
seek out foreign labor. Many of these workers hailed from the Mediterranean
countries of Southern Europe: thousands of Portuguese, Spaniards, and Greeks fled
economic and political chaos at home in search of opportunities abroad [Figure 2.1].
Similarly Ireland, a Northern European country plagued by the same sluggish
economic performance and poverty endemic to the Mediterranean countries,
underwent a similar exodus: Irish laborers moved to London, Manchester, and other
English cities en masse - well into the 1980s, no less.
However, in the 1990s, the dynamics of migration both to and within Western
Europe began to change. The migrant-sending states, long at the economic and
geographic periphery of the Continent, began showing signs of life: a combination of
domestic reforms - many enacted to qualify for joining the euro - and falling
birthrates drove economic growth, and perhaps more importantly, put downward
pressure on the unemployment rate. By the end of the decade, these countries had
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become increasingly attractive to outside investors. They also became attractive to
migrant workers [Figure 2.2].
The unprecedented influx of foreigners raised familiar concerns about
immigrant political incorporation. This issue has reached the forefront of both
theoretical and political debate, particularly in Europe, due to fears that political
exclusion may lead to social unrest. From a theoretical perspective, the academic
literature on civic participation and social movements has long recognized the
relationship between policymaking and inclusion: Robert Dahl noted that for a
government to be responsive, institutions need to be structured in a way that allows
people to not only form and articulate their political preferences, but to have their
preferences "weighted equally in the conduct of the government" (1971: 2). Without
a 'seat at the table', namely inclusion in political debates and decision-making,
immigrants have no real way to inject their preferences into the political process.
This unresponsiveness can escalate into contentious politics when marginalized
groups feel that there are no 'conventional' channels for having their grievances
heard (Piven and Cloward 1977; Tarrow 1998; Haddad and Balz 2006). For
European policymakers, the significance of long-term exclusion has been visibly
driven home over the last decade by urban riots in a number of the Continent's
capitals, events attributed to the social and political marginalization of immigrants
and their descendants.
For purposes of this study, I am particularly concerned about a lack of
incorporative activity, namely the actions native political organizations take in order
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to facilitate migrant membership in the polity. These actions can be categorized in
three ways: 13
1) Actions aimed at opening or maintaining a pathway to citizenship;
2) Actions meant to facilitate inclusion in electoral politics, whether through
migrant voter outreach or changing electoral rules to allow for non-citizen
participation;
3) Actions meant to build the capacity of migrant organizations to make
their own demands on the state, whether through partnerships with
native organizations, or direct financial and/or strategic support.
In most countries, citizenship is a necessary requirement for voting rights,
hence why opening or maintaining a pathway to citizenship for immigrants is a key
form of incorporative activity. However, a growing number of countries have made
provisions to allow for non-citizen voting in local elections; these efforts are included
as incorporative activities as well. Immigrant electoral mobilization efforts,
whether through the recruitment of immigrant candidates or voters, are also
included, as elections are central to the political life of democracies. Finally,
capacity-building efforts are also included, although analysis of these efforts is
limited to two key areas: state-sponsored activities, and partnerships between
native organizations and immigrant-led community groups. In recent years, Irene
Bloemraad has been one of the biggest advocates for capacity-building activities,
noting that government subsidies for immigrant community groups have a positive
13 Kirsti Andersen (2010) characterizes these actions as 'taking on the task' of incorporation
She actually divides the tasks into four groups: "Encouraging and facilitating
naturalization, promoting voter registration, educating people about issues and
participatory channels, and providing them with resources and motivations to participate"
(2010; 71). However, I group the last two points under 'capacity-building'.
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long-term impact on naturalization outcomes, and that direct partnerships can
teach newcomers the skills they need to be able to directly participate in civic life
(2006).
It should be emphasized that the main focus of this analysis is on the actions
of native political actors because they play an important signaling function for both
fellow native citizens and newcomers. One of the ironies of political incorporation is
that immigrants who join the political fray risk being characterized as 'bad guests'
rather than good citizens (Fanning 2009); indeed the presence of highly mobilized
immigrant communities can lead to backlash from natives who come to see
politically active immigrants and their descendants as a threat to scarce resources
(Dancyngier 2010). However, the behavior of native political actors can have a
positive signaling effect on both natives and immigrants. The attempt to give
migrants access to the public sphere, whether through voting or support for
community organizations, sends a message to immigrant communities that they are
welcome members of the polity; Bloemraad calls these 'symbolic resources' and
notes that they "[affect] understandings of citizenship, especially of immigrants'
legitimate political standing as citizens and of their ability to participate in the
political process" (2006:4). Therefore, the willingness of native political
organizations to incorporate immigrants into politics, whether directly through
electoral mobilization or indirectly through agenda-setting and advocacy, plays a
key role in setting the boundaries of both political debate and the polity - and this
boundary setting is something that immigrants, particularly in new destinations,
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are not in a position (as both newcomers and political novices in the receiving
country) to do.
Finally, it should also be noted that the key outcome of interest here is
movement on the part of native political actors to open a pathway to civic life - not
the results of those actions in terms of individual immigrants. For example, while I
examine if natives move to open or close the pathway to citizenship, I do not
examine whether or not immigrants choose to actually naturalize, and while I
examine migrant voter outreach, I do not measure what effect these programs had
on immigrant turnout.14 In other words, this study is concerned with the process of
incorporation, rather than 'incorporative outcomes' such as naturalization rates,
number of migrant representatives in government, et cetera.
In sum, the scope of this project is limited to a focus on native political actors.
As the phenomenon of interest is political incorporation, I focus on the behavior of
explicitly political organization: mainly parties, but also trade unions and politically
active NGOs. The outcome of interest is incorporative activity, as measured by
actions to open a pathway to citizenship, include immigrants in electoral politics, or
engage in capacity-building efforts that would allow immigrants to better
understand the political system and have both the financial and strategic resources
to make their own demands on the state. While future research on the effect of
incorporative activity would be a welcome contribution to our understanding of this
14 Even if the scope of this specific project were not limited, it would be difficult to measure
the effect of a given treatment (in this case, a voter registration campaign) without some
kind of experiment that tracked and controlled access to political information.
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process, particularly in new destinations, my focus for purposes of this project is on
outreach, not outcomes.
II. The Challenges of Incorporation in New Destinations
Despite the importance of political incorporation to maintaining social and
political stability in the long-term, there are three identifiable stumbling points that
may inhibit political incorporation in new destination countries: 1) a lack of
migrant-serving institutions and organizations, 2) a lack of social narratives that
legitimize the inclusion of immigrants in civic life, and 3) a socio-economic and
political climate that presents distinct barriers to incorporative activity.
Organizations & Institutions
First, unlike their counterparts in 'old destinations' countries with a long-
standing history of migration, immigrants in 'new destinations' lack the pre-
existing migrant-serving organizations and institutions that can help ease entry
into civic life. 15 Migrant-serving organizations facilitate incorporation by not only
helping develop the capacity of immigrant communities to make their own demands
directly on the state, but by advocating for policies and resources that benefit
immigrant communities. While this is not always a frictionless process -'old'
immigrant organizations do not always support new immigrants - old destinations
have dense networks of groups with a long interest in immigrants rights, and
15 It should be noted that the idea that 'old' immigrant organizations may care about
mobilizing 'new' immigrants is contested in the American literature on political
incorporation; see Erie 1988, Jones-Correa 1998.
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political ties to parties and elected officials who make laws affecting those rights;
subsequently, the organizational context for new immigrant arrivals in new
destinations is fundamentally different than in old destinations.
Migrant-serving institutions, on the other hand, can be conceptualized as the
"rules and procedures that are created, communicated, and enforced through
channels widely accepted as official" (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 727). Here we can
think of a number of legal and administrative guidelines that can shape
incorporative activity: rules governing the acquisition of citizenship, voting
eligibility, bilingual or translation service mandates, or grant programs can all help
ease the entry of new arrivals into civic life. As Waters and Jim6nez (2005) note,
"Established gateways have numerous institutions set up to aid immigrants,
including legal-aid bureaus, health clinics, social organizations, and bilingual
services. Previous waves of immigrants have necessitated the establishment of
these institutions, and immigrants who arrive today continue to benefit from them"
(118).
To put this in perspective, let's take the example of a new immigrant from
Brazil who arrived in the Boston area in 2002. She settles in Somerville, an area
that has seen multiple waves of migration over the last century, from Ireland, then
Portugal and Greece, and more recently, from Brazil, Haiti, and beyond. Many local
business owners in Union Square, a key immigrant gateway neighborhood, speak
Portuguese, and she will be able to do her shopping and banking in her native
language. If she has school-age children, bi-lingual services will be available for
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both parents and children. Her local parish will not only be able to connect her to
different social service providers that help new immigrant families, it may bring
many local families together for important church holidays, linking her to other
parishioners who may have memories of their or their parents' experiences of
migration. And if she has a problem with city services and needs to call her local
city councilor, someone in his office will speak Portuguese, and will know who to
direct her to. At a higher level, her Senator has immigrant roots, and his office is
very responsive to the issues and concerns of non-citizens. Taken together, at every
level of social, economic, or political interaction, there are existing organizations,
institutions, actors, and procedures that can not only help ease our protagonist's
entry into social and civic life in the United States, but are explicitly interested in
doing so.
Now compare the experience of a Brazilian immigrant to Boston to that of a
Brazilian immigrant to Galway, a city on the west coast of Ireland. In the 2000s,
Brazilians began arriving in Western Ireland in unprecedented numbers, at first to
fill a need for skilled butchers and meatpackers, but then due to chain migration.
Upon arrival, there were no local businesses to offer formal and informal services in
Portuguese. She had no way of getting information about what is going on in her
child's school because she does not speak the language. If she had problems with
her housing situation, she cannot communicate with her local councilor, and if she
had problems with her visa, there is no guarantee that she will get a sympathetic
ear from the office of her local Teachta Dila (TD), her representative in Ddil
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Eireann (the lower house of the Irish parliament). In sum, our immigrant in
Galway has a completely different experience than our immigrant in Boston: while
the latter enters a well-developed social and political infrastructure replete with
allies and assistance that can help channel her into civic life, the former essentially
has to start from scratch.
Historical Narratives
The second barrier to political incorporation in new destination societies is
the lack of a historical narrative that legitimizes the inclusion of immigrants in civic
life. Narratives, or as Zald calls them, "frames", matter because they help us
"interpret problems, to define problems for action, and suggest action pathways to
remedy the problem" (1996, 265). Ganz takes this definition a step further, noting,
"Narrative is the discursive means we use to access values that equip us with the
courage to make choices under conditions of uncertainty, to exercise agency" (2012,
274). The fear is, because native political actors in new destinations have no
narrative of migration to draw from, they lack a cognitive or political roadmap that
would help them to take on the task of political incorporation.
The role that social narratives play in helping native actors frame new
immigration can be seen in 'old destination' states that have experienced multiple
waves of migration. The United States is a good example: although originally
settled by immigrants, large swathes of the country have not experienced
immigration since their initial period of settlement. Yet current migration patterns
40
have led to the emergence of'new destinations' within the U.S.: over the last
decade, immigrants have shifted away from traditional gateway states like
California towards Georgia, North Carolina, and even the Great Plains, places that
have not seen mass immigration in over a century. Despite this gap, native political
actors in American new destinations are still able to use the shared historical
narrative of being a 'nation of immigrants' in order to make the case for new
immigrant incorporation to skeptical fellow natives. For example, Griffith (2008)
notes that in areas of Great Plains and Upper Midwest experiencing new migration,
"Highlighting continuity to a shared past and established tradition is clearly
intended to make immigration palatable to those who are uneasy about the influx of
foreigners; invoking history in communities and regions experiencing new waves of
immigration also implies that recent immigrants, like those before them, will
eventually assimilate into the dominant culture" (189). In a country like the United
States, communities, and even individuals, can draw from their own histories of
successful migration and incorporation in order to make sense of new immigration.
Today's new destinations do not have that luxury.
The New Context of Incorporation
Finally, in addition to the general issues raised above, there are also a few
aspects of the migration process today as compared to previous eras that present
particular challenges to political incorporation. First, the socio-economic context
has changed considerably. With de-industrialization, large trade unions have
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shrunk both in size and power across much of Western Europe and North America,
and where unions are strong, their membership is primarily in the public sector, an
area of the labor market that is often closed to new immigrants due to language or
naturalization issues. 16 Because unions are so under-represented in the private
sector, particularly so in the low-wage service sector, today's immigrants have lost a
key access point to political life that was open to previous waves of migrant
workers.17
Second, access to citizenship, historically a key stepping stone to
participation in electoral politics, has been severely curtailed. In Western Europe,
many of the immigrants in the post-war era came from overseas colonies and
therefore arrived with citizenship. However, the last two decades have seen a
growing number of restrictions on access to citizenship, particularly for immigrants
seen as culturally distant from the native population; this is particularly true for
Muslim immigrants. (Joppke 2010; Orgad 2010). For the latest wave of immigrants
and their children, access to full political rights may be permanently out of reach.
The establishment of the European Union has, somewhat ironically, also
contributed to the restrictions on access to citizenship. Member states are loudly
critical of countries that they see as having overly generous immigration and
citizenship policies, as access to citizenship in one country grants access to the labor
16 A notable exception is immigrant employment in the public health care sector.
17 This is not to say that, in the past, all unions welcomed immigrants with open arms:
American unions, in particular, have struggled with the issue of immigration (Hill 1996;
Fine and Tichenor 2009). More recently, migrant worker centers have appeared as an
alternative to unions, particularly in sectors of the economy like constructions with a
disproportionate percentage of undocumented workers; see Fine 2006.
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market and social services in all member countries. Subsequently, in recent years
there has been a sort of 'race to the bottom in placing restrictions on not only
citizenship, but on immigration in general. In addition, since they have access to
both the labor market and to local elections, immigrants in EU member states who
are also EU citizens may have little incentive to complain about economic or civic
exclusion. Given that complaints are a major driver of both political participation
and reform - immigrant political engagement is often driven by the perception of
being discriminated against or mistreated in some way (Pantoja et. al. 2001) - this
system of 'tiered' EU/non-EU citizenship deprives immigrant communities of both
political oxygen and power in numbers. It is much harder for non-EU immigrants
to make common cause with EU immigrants over hot-button issues like access
citizenship and residency or unfair treatment in the labor market because
immigrants from EU countries are guaranteed labor and social rights by virtue of
their status as EU citizens.
Finally, this wave of migrants to Europe faces particular challenges to
incorporation because the current political and social discourse across the continent
characterizes attempts to incorporate earlier waves of migrants as a failed process.
Perhaps the most visible example of this was Angela Merkel's 2011 declaration that
multiculturalism 18 "has failed, utterly failed"19 a statement that was echoed by UK
18 What is multiculturalism? Okin defines it as "the claim, made in the context of basically
liberal democracies, that minority cultures or ways of life are not sufficiently protected by
the practice of ensuring the individual rights of their members, and as a consequence these
should also be protected through special group rights or privileges" (1999). Politically,
multiculturalism means that there is a tension around living in societies where the cultural
beliefs and practices of immigrant communities are perceived to be at odds in some way
43
Prime Minister David Cameron 20 and French President Nicolas Sarkozy. 21 Urban
riots and terrorism, often carried out by second and third generation immigrants,
have cemented this view in the eyes of the public, who increasingly vote for far-right
parties with harshly anti-immigrant agendas. 22 The specter of the far-right has
often pulled centrist - and even left-wing - parties further to the right (Bale et. al
2010; Yilmaz 2012), leading to a rash of legislation over the last decade restricting
immigration, whether through strict numerical limits on entry or screening for
cultural compatibility. These political battles have not gone unnoticed in new
destination countries, where they have been heavily covered in local media.
Therefore, although immigration may be a new phenomenon in countries like
Spain, Portugal and Ireland, a new destination country is not a tabula rasa: the
political discourse around immigration in neighboring countries has filtered into
both discourse and policy in new destinations, and this may affect how native
political actors perceive the issue of immigration at home.
with the beliefs and practices of the native majority. Most of the tensions around
multiculturalism in Europe revolve around the question of Islam, and the long-term
compatibility of Muslim immigrants and largely secular natives.
19 Siebold, Sabine, "Merkel says German multiculturalism has failed," Reuters October 16,
2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/16/us-germany-merkel-im migration-
idUSTRE69F 1K320101016.
20 "David Cameron on Immigration: full text of the speech," Guardian (UK), April 13, 2011.
21 "Multiculturalism has failed, says French president," AFP, February 10, 2011.
22 In recent years, far-right anti-immigration parties have been voted into office in Sweden,
Finland, the Netherlands and Greece.
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III. Repopulating the Small Island: Migration in Ireland and Northern
Ireland
Given this gloomy outlook, we would expect to see limited, if any,
incorporative activity in new destinations. However, the situation on the ground is
more complicated when we explore the situation in the country that underwent the
most dramatic shift from emigration to immigration over the last two decades:
Ireland.
The political, economic, and social history of Ireland has been most
profoundly shaped by out-migration for the last two centuries. The most pivotal
event that shaped the demography of the island was the Great Famine of the mid-
1840s: between 1841 and 1861, starvation, disease, and emigration drove the
population down from 6,528,799 to 4,402,211, a collapse so dramatic that by 2006
the population still had not recovered.2 3
The other key event that drove major demographic changes on the island was
its partition in the 1920s into a newly independent twenty-six county state and a
six-county province that remained part of the United Kingdom. Starting in the 17th
Century with the Plantation of Ulster, the process of deliberately resettling
Protestants (primarily from Scotland) in Ireland's northernmost province, the
population of the island was split between a largely impoverished Catholic majority
and a Protestant minority. For over two centuries, Ireland was a multicultural
23 According to the Central Statistics Office of Ireland, the population of Ireland was
4,588,252 in 2011. All figures are for the twenty-six counties that make up the present-day
republic, and are available through the CSO website with interactive tables "Beyond 20/20":
http://census.cso.ie/census/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx?CS referer=&CS ChosenLan
g=en.
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entity within the United Kingdom: the 1911 census (the last before independence)
put the total population of the island at 74% Catholic and 25% Protestant, with
most of the Protestant population concentrated in the northeastern counties.24
However, the differences between these two groups were more than cultural,
they were political: Ireland was not just multicultural, but multinational. As the
movement for Irish political autonomy accelerated in the late 19th century, the
Protestant population of the island became alarmed by the prospect of being a
minority within a Catholic majority state ruled from Dublin, not London.
Unionism, the predominately Protestant movement to remain part of the United
Kingdom, emerged as a political force on the island and in the British Parliament.
Rising violence on the island and political battles in London eventually led to a
compromise that would completely reshape the demographics of the island: Ireland
would be split into a Catholic-majority 'Free State' and a Protestant-majority
'Northern Ireland'. By the time the dust settled in 1926 (the first census after
partition), the population of new Irish Free State (later known as the Republic of
Ireland; heretofore referred to as 'Ireland' or 'the Republic') was over 92% Catholic
and 7% Protestant (CSO 1926), while Northern Ireland was 33.5% Catholic and
66.5% Protestant (Government of Northern Ireland 1926).
Partition also had a lasting economic impact on Ireland. Belfast, the largest
city in the newly created Northern Ireland, was home to the island's textile mills
24 "Protestants" includes Church of Ireland (Protestant Episcopalians), Presbyterians,
Methodists, and Baptists. Most of the historical census data for the Republic has been
reformatted to reflect the geography of post-partition Ireland, so pre-partition data was
recreated by merging information from the Central Statistical Office of the Irish Republic
and the Government of Northern Ireland 1926 census report.
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and later its shipyards; with partition, the Free State lost, with a stroke of a pen,
what little industry it had. In the wake of partition, autarkic economic policies in
the Republic stunted growth for decades. High birthrates, in part fueled by
conservative Catholicism, put enormous pressure on the labor market, and a weak
economy generated additional waves of emigration in the 1950s and 1980s [Figure
2.3]. By 1987, the Irish unemployment rate stood at 17%, and thousands of Irish
citizens were leaving for the UK, Australia, and the United States.
However, due to a series of events in the 1980s and 1990s, this human tide
began to turn. In the Republic, the economic crisis of the 1980s sparked the
beginning of a series of reforms that led to a period of unprecedented
macroeconomic stability. First, the development of 'social partnership', a tripartite
bargaining agreement between the government, employers, and Irish trade unions,
ushered in an era of labor peace, contributing to Ireland's burgeoning reputation as
a business-friendly place to invest. In addition, trade-oriented economic reforms
that started in the 1960s but gained momentum in the 80s and 90s meant that
Ireland had one of the lowest corporate tax rates in the newly created euro zone.
Finally, the convergence process to join the euro led to tighter fiscal controls at
home, curbing some of the excesses of Ireland's notoriously clientelist political
culture. Combined, these policy changes ushered in an unprecedented period of
economic expansion that, in a parallel to the 'Asian Tiger' economies of the 1990s,
came to be known as the 'Celtic Tiger'. This era of economic reform and vitality won
Ireland the attention of investors from around the world, in particular the United
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States. It also put Ireland on the radar of a heretofore unthinkable group: foreign
workers.
From 1981 to 2006, the foreign-born population of Ireland increased at an
unprecedented rate, rising from 6.7% in 1981 to 14.7% in 2006 [Table 2.1]. The
change seems even more dramatic when you take UK-born citizens out of the
analysis: in 1981, only 1.3% of the Irish population was born outside of Ireland or
the UK; by 2001, this figure stood at 4.7% and by 2006, this figure had nearly
doubled to 8.2%. The acceleration in the migration figures from the mid-2000s
onwards was largely due to Ireland's decision to allow workers from the new EU
accession states of Central and Eastern Europe to have immediate access to their
labor market [Table 2.2a, 2.2b]. 25
Interestingly, starting in the 1990s, Northern Ireland saw a similar shift.
Not surprisingly, for much of the latter half of the twentieth century, Northern
Ireland was not on the radar of investors or migrant workers due to the thirty-year
civil conflict known as 'the Troubles'. 26 However, in April 1998, key government
and political officials signed the Good Friday Agreement, also known as the Belfast
Agreement (heretofore referred to as the 'GFA' or 'the Agreement'), bringing a
formal end to the Troubles and laying out a new set of political institutions to
25 While EU member states could defer work permits for citizens from new member states
for up to seven years, Ireland, the UK, and Sweden allowed immediate labor market access
for the new accession states of 2004. In Ireland, this decision was driven by the very tight
labor market and record low unemployment.
26 A popular, if non-confirmable, anecdote in Belfast claims that the situation in the 1970s
was so bad that a boatload of Vietnamese refugees brought to be resettled in Northern
Ireland refused to leave their ship; they were not keen to step into the middle of a new
maelstrom of violence having just left one behind.
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manage both day-to-day governance and the explosive social and political dynamics
of the region. Economic activity, which was sluggish during the years of the
conflict, began to increase and, as in Ireland, this made the region more attractive
to both investors and foreign workers. Subsequently, the heretofore largely
negative net migration rate slowed in the 1990s and turned positive in the 2000s
[Figure 2.4].
Between 1996 and 2002, the foreign-born population of Northern Ireland
doubled, and from 2002 to 2006 it doubled again, then again by 2010, when it
reached an estimated 80,000 people [Figure 2.5; Table 2.3a] (NISRA 2011).27 As in
the Republic, much of this growth was fueled by the influx of Central and Eastern
European workers [Table 2.3b]. Like Ireland, the United Kingdom also opened its
labor market to citizens of the new accession states in 2004, and the Eastern
European population alone rapidly rose from almost nothing in 2003 to 39,000 in
2009 (NISRA 2010). As in the Republic, this rapid shift began to generate concern
over if - and how - these new arrivals would become a part of civic life.
IV. Incorporative activity in Ireland and Northern Ireland: a curious case
of divergence
Given Northern Ireland's recent history of violent ethno-nationalist conflict,
and Ireland's explosive economic growth during this period, we might expect to see
more incorporative activity in the Republic than its more volatile northern
neighbor. Yet the opposite is true along multiple measures: while Irish nationalists
27 In Northern Ireland, figures for the foreign-born population exclude those residents who
were born in the Republic.
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in the Republic moved to end birthright citizenship, nationalists in Northern
Ireland fought to maintain a pathway to citizenship. While parties on both sides of
the border have not engaged in mass migrant voter outreach efforts, migrant's
rights and minority political inclusion are more integrated into the platforms and
politics of Northern parties than their Southern counterparts. Finally, and most
dramatically, while strategic and financial partnerships between immigrant
communities and native political actors have been limited and unstable in the
Republic, in Northern Ireland this has not been the case [Table 4].
Citizenship
A key point of divergence in incorporative activity between political actors in
the North and in the Republic was over the issue of birthright citizenship. The
1998 Good Friday Agreement and subsequent legal changes created an unusual
situation where the citizenship rights of the Irish Republic extended beyond the
borders of the state to include Northern Ireland. 28 This was to allow members of the
Catholic-Nationalist-Republican (CNR) community in Northern Ireland, who by and
large politically support the reunification of the island as an independent republic,
to have political membership - i.e., citizenship - in Ireland, even though they were
born as British citizens. 29
28 Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitutions were changed as part of the Good Friday
Agreement to include the following: "It is the entitlement and birthright of every person
born in the island of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, to be part of the Irish
nation. That is also the entitlement of all persons otherwise qualified in accordance with
law to be citizens of Ireland. Furthermore, the Irish nation cherishes its special affinity
with people of Irish ancestry living abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage".
29 The constitution also had to be changed because Article 2 laid claim to the entire island of
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Given that immigration was a non-issue for most of the twentieth century in
Ireland, the 1998 birthright citizenship clause in the constitution was not highly
controversial. However, with an increase in immigration, and in particular,
asylum-seekers from sub-Saharan Africa, there was growing public debate as to
whether or not the asylum system was being abused in order to take advantage of
the citizenship loophole. Claims appeared in the press that immigrant mothers
were arriving in Dublin in the latter stages of pregnancy with the explicit goal of
having an Irish-born child, in a form of so-called "citizenship tourism".30 Although
these claims were contested, the government proposed a referendum on a
constitutional amendment to end birthright citizenship. Polling ahead of the
referendum showed wide public support, and the actual initiative passed with over
78% of participants voting 'yes' to ending birthright citizenship. 31
Despite the political popularity of the citizenship initiative, there was clear
divergence on the issue, most notably among the political parties most closely tied
to Irish nationalism - or more specifically, republicanism - Fianna Fiil and Sinn
Ireland: "The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the
territorial seas." A core component of the GFA was the issue of consent: in this case,
Ireland gave up its claim to the North, which under the new post-GFA institutions, can only
be reunited with the rest of Ireland with the consent of the people who live there (i.e. a
referendum).
30 See McDowell, Michael, "Proposed Citizenship Referendum" Sunday Independent, March
14, 2004; Brennock, Mark, "McDowell changes argument on referendum," Irish Times,
April 9, 2004; "Ireland: Citizenship Tourists," Economist, June 3, 2004,
http://www.economist.com/node/2734580. These claims were eerily similar to those made in
U.S. immigration debates over 'anchor babies', children allegedly born in order to give
undocumented parents a toehold in American society; see Julia Preston, "Anchor Baby: A
Term Redefined as a Slur," New York Times. December 8, 2004.
31 Irish referendum results are available online at:
http://www.referendum.ie/archive/display-ballotid=76&page=0.php.
51
F6in. 32 For over two centuries, the specific objective of the republican movement
has been to establish an independent Irish republic that encompasses the entire
island of Ireland. Both parties have their roots in the fight for independence and
the multiple schisms that followed: Sinn F6in dominated Irish politics in the run up
to independence in the 1920s, but key leaders split from the party over the issue of
partition and later formed Fianna F6.il, which styled itself 'the republican party'.
Sinn F6in later re-emerged as a political force in the North during the Troubles,
when Northern republicans began to consider politics as an alternative to violence.
In addition, both parties have historical ties to various iterations of the Irish
Republican Army (IRA): leading Fianna Fiil figures were involved with the IRA in
the war for independence, and the Provisional IRA, which emerged out of Belfast in
the 1960s, had strong ties to the re-emergent Sinn F6in of that era. Ultimately,
more than any other parties in Irish history, Fianna Fail and Sinn Fein are
identified with republicanism and the willingness to take up arms in order to
establish their vision of an Irish republic, a vision that often defined the Irish
nation in strict ethno-cultural terms as both Gaelic and Catholic. 33
32 The republican movement can be split into two camps: constitutional republicanism,
which sees legal change as the key means for establishing a thirty-two county republic, and
physical force republicanism, which sees the use of violence as a legitimate means of
meeting political ends.
33 It should be noted that there is a great deal of disagreement among those who self-
identify as republicans over the mantle of modern-day republicanism. While this is a
legacy claimed by many Fianna Fiil supporters, more radical republicans would look
askance at the party's conservatism, and a subset sees both the Irish and the British
governments as illegitimate - the only legitimate representation of the Irish people is
through the original 32-county Daiil, not the current version, which only covers the twenty-
six counties of the Republic.
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Yet despite this shared history, Fianna Faiil and Sinn F6in took very different
positions on the citizenship referendum. Bertie Ahern, the then-Taoiseach (prime
minister) and leader of Fianna Faiil, argued that people with no connection to
Ireland were abusing the citizenship laws, and his Justice Minister, Michael
McDowell (a member of the Progressive Democrats), was even more vocal in his
support of the legislation, and personally advocated for it both in the Diil and with
the public. 34 However, Sinn F6in was actively opposed to the referendum: its
representatives in the Diil spoke out against it, and the head of the party, Gerry
Adams, personally campaigned against it. 3
This divergence on the citizenship issue was notable for several reasons.
First, Sinn F6in's vocal opposition to the referendum was surprising, given their
political ambitions in the Republic. While in Northern Ireland, Sinn F6in is the
largest nationalist party and the second largest party in the province36 , in the
Republic, it is an opposition party that, until recently, consistently lagged behind
both Fine Gael (historically the Republic's second-largest party) and the Labour
Party. Given the popularity of the Citizenship Referendum proposal among both the
general population and Sinn F6in voters, coming out in favor of it might have been
an easy way to build political support, but the party took the opposite approach.
Therefore, Sinn F6in's opposition to the referendum seemed to work against its
34 Department of the Taoiseach. 2004. "Voting YES will mean Ireland will continue to have
one of the most liberal citizenship laws in Europe". Press release. May 26.
35 Sinn F6in, "Gerry Adams calls for No vote in citizenship referendum," press release, May
31, 2004.
36 In Northern Ireland, parties in the regional parliament have to identify themselves as
Unionist (i.e. they want to remain part of the UK) or Nationalist (they want to see a united,
independent Irish republic).
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campaign to expand its base in the Republic, rather than in its favor, a surprising
move for a party that is widely acknowledged - even by their detractors - to be
savvy, ruthless campaigners and political organizers.
In addition, the divergence over the citizenship referendum was notable
because of the grounds on which republican parties supported or opposed the
proposal. For Fianna Fiil, the overarching narrative was largely procedural: the
citizenship statute was a loophole in the law that people were exploiting, and it was
in the best interest of the state - and of local health care provision - to close it. For
Sinn F6in, the issue was not one of legal strictures, but rather one of discrimination.
In a public statement, Sinn F6in argued:
We are urging people to vote NO to the Government's flawed, ill-conceived and what
we believe is ultimately a racist referendum. We are unequivocal in that opposition.
We are opposed to both the content and the processes involved.. .And we utterly
reject the Government's contention that this proposal is either necessary or desired.
We stand by the 1916 Proclamation which declares that we should "cherish all the
children of the nation equally". This referendum and the dishonest arguments put
forward by the Government are a fundamental betrayal of that proclamation and
indeed are also against the spirit and intent of the Good Friday Agreement. 37
Given the issues at stake, citizenship is a key issue for which we would
expect to see ideological and political coherence from republican parties. However,
not only was this not the case, but the party with the most recent ties to violent
republicanism is the one that was the most opposed to ending birthright citizenship
- and they did so despite the fact that the amendment had support from a majority
of voters, both within and outside of the party. It is puzzling, and more than a little
3 Sinn F6in, "Citizenship referendum a violation of Good Friday Agreement and a betrayal
of the 1916 Proclamation," Sinn Fein Press Release (May 21, 2004).
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ironic, that the most ardent defendant of a pathway to citizenship for immigrants
was the party that had also been the most ardent defendant of the use of appalling
violence in the name of Irish political and cultural identity.
Electoral Politics
The second key area of incorporative activity involves attempts by native
political actors to get new immigrants involved in electoral politics. Actions in this
regard include migrant voter registration and mobilization campaigns, and
movement to extend suffrage to non-citizens. Suffice to say, incorporative activity
in this area has been relatively limited and sporadic on the part of parties on both
sides of the border, but to some extent community organizations and local
bureaucrats have tried to make up the difference.
Ireland is notable because it has some of the most open electoral institutions
in the world for non-citizens: any adult who has been resident in the state for at
least six months before election day is eligible to vote in or stand for local elections.
This right holds regardless of immigration status: even asylum seekers waiting for
the government to process their claims can participate in local elections. Northern
Ireland, on the other hand, allows non-citizens to vote in local elections if they are
citizens of the European Union, a right that is required of all EU member states.
Under UK law, qualifying citizens of the Commonwealth also have voting rights.
However, this still leaves many of Northern Ireland's immigrants without voting
rights.
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Given the limitations on voting rights in the North, and the fact that
Northern Ireland has a higher percentage of non-EU immigrants than the Republic,
we might expect to see more incorporative activity in the South than the North,
since there are more immigrants who are eligible voters. In addition, parties in
Ireland do not have to try to figure out which immigrants are actually eligible
because the voting laws are universal; therefore, they do not have the information
problem that their northern counterparts do. However, Irish parties have been
surprisingly lax when it comes to migrant electoral mobilization. A study of
Ireland's major political parties during the run-up to the 2004 local elections found
that no Irish political party had immigration or migrant-related issues as part of
their party platforms, and parties did not seem to see immigrants as an electorally
relevant group (Fanning and Mutwarasibo 2007). For the next local election cycle
in 2009, the results were mixed. While the two largest parties did hire immigrant
outreach coordinators for the 2009 cycle, migrant community organizations noted
that they primarily targeted Eastern Europeans (who had not demonstrated any
great interest in Irish electoral politics) instead of the 'low-hanging fruit', namely
African immigrants who were keenly interested in politics, especially after a
Nigerian was elected to local office in 2004. These coordinators were let go after the
elections, and it is not apparent if there is long-term interest within Ireland's
largest parties to engage with immigrant communities; as one migrant community
activist put it "when the economy was good and people were coming, the
government's rationale was 'this is new, so we don't know what to do and we can't
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do anything'; now that the economy is bad, the story is "well, they're all going to
leave anyway, so we shouldn't do anything" (NGO12, personal interview, Dublin,
June 2009).
Despite the failings of political parties, there was another key group that
tried to take on the task of incorporation: local bureaucrats. Dismayed by the lack
of party engagement with immigrant communities, the Dublin City Council
partnered with migrant-led organizations to launch an immigrant voter registration
drive and information campaign, but efforts to bring together the political parties
for a migrant community forum failed, and some participants openly despaired of
both the parties and the electoral bureaucracy's handling of the elections. 38
Therefore, in Ireland, to the extent it exists, electoral incorporative activity has
largely been a function of bureaucratic incorporation, whereby local bureaucrats -
who are ostensibly non-partisan actors - take on the task of helping new
immigrants become a part of "mainstream political debates, practices, and decision-
making" (Bloemraad 2006, 6). This finding is consistent with recent work on new
destinations in the United States where local bureaucrats rather than elected
officials took on the task of substantive representation, namely enacting policies
and programs in order to help new immigrants integrate into society (Lewis and
Ramakrishnan 2007; Jones-Correa 2008; Marrow 2009).39 However, this approach
38 Based on interviews conducted by the author in Dublin in 2009 and 2010. The migrant
voter registration campaign issues will be discussed in-depth in Chapter 4.
39 In contrast to descriptive representation, where groups represent themselves, substantive
representation is where one group may act on behalf of another group. The general
assumption in new destinations is that because new immigrants usually lack both
57
is limited: bureaucrats rely on elected officials for funding, and migrant-serving
programs and organizations were the last to receive funding in good times, and the
first to see their program and funding streams cut when the economy began to
falter. Therefore, despite the best intentions of some city government officials in
Ireland, incorporative activity has been limited by political control over financial
resources. In a perverse outcome, the political instability of state-funded migrant-
serving organizations and programs has actually increased immigrant community
antipathy towards the state in some quarters, thus working at cross-purposes with
the government's stated interest in migrant civic inclusion and avoidance of future
social conflict with disenfranchised first and second-generation immigrants.
Incorporative activity around elections has been fairly limited in Northern
Ireland as well. That said, the attempts of some parties to distance themselves
from sectarianism have created 'neutral' political space for the engagement of
immigrant candidates and communities: the Alliance Party, the only party in the
regional parliament that does not identify itself as nationalist or unionist, has
positioned itself as a champion of migrant rights and civic inclusion. However,
because local elections and governance are a relatively new post-conflict
phenomenon in the North - the regional parliament only operated intermittently
between 1973 and 2007 - many politicians are still trying to figure out what their
roles are in local politics, much less the role of newcomers. To the extent that there
is electoral incorporative activity, at least one party (out of the five largest) saw
knowledge about the political system and political rights - although there are exceptions -
native political actors will represent their interests in the political sphere for them.
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putting immigrants on the ballot as a potential means of mobilization, with the
thinking being that the prospect of descriptive representation, and the utilization of
immigrant networks would help to drive turnout for a migrant candidate - and
their affiliated party.40 However, here the onus seems to be on the individual,
rather than the party, to rally supporters - a key distinction given that immigrant
communities know less about the region's politics, the process of voting, and even
the language. Therefore, as with Ireland, party-led immigrant political
incorporation in Northern Ireland has been relatively limited. Interestingly,
immigrant community organizations were aware of the bureaucrat-driven migrant
voter campaigns in the Republic, and indicated in interviews that they wanted to do
something similar in the North, so it remains to be seen if Belfast and Derry will
catch up to Dublin and Galway in developing local processes for electoral
bureaucratic incorporation.
Capacity-building
I define capacity-building in two key ways: financial partnerships with
immigrant organizations, or strategic partnership with immigrant organizations.
Both actions are meant to build the capacity of immigrant organizations to make
their own demands on the state and claim a seat at the table of power. First, the
direct funding of migrant organizations has been shown to increase their political
and social integration over time (Bloemraad 2005). For governments with a stated
40 There is some theoretical support; studies on Latino electoral behavior have found that
strong ethnic identification and/or having a co-ethnic on the ballot can drive turnout; see
Barreto 2007; Barreto and Pedraza 2009.
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interest in this process, making public funds available to migrant-led organizations
is an important form of incorporative activity. Direct strategic partnerships between
native political actors and immigrant organizations can help migrant groups
quickly learn the political ropes, and raise the visibility of these groups to the level
of native organizations.
In Ireland, capacity-building initiatives have been sporadic and unstable.
Financially, support for migrant-led organizations has been relatively difficult to
come by: migrant-led groups have often had to look beyond the government to
private foundations or the European Union for funding, and what little funding is
available locally tends to get filtered to native organizations that show an interest
in migration-related issues, even if addressing migration-related issues is not their
primary mission. The government did put money into setting up several key
organizations meant to support immigrant communities or serve as a bridge
between immigrant and native political leaders, but these strategic partnerships
did not survive the budget cuts that started in 2008 and the change in government
in 2011.41 In addition, turnover issues plagued several key initiatives. For
example, the Office of the Ministry of Integration, which was set up to not only
monitor the immigration situation but to engage in strategic partnerships with
migrant-led community organizations, had three different ministers over its four-
year life span, making both trust and capacity-building difficult.
41 The National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI) was
closed in January 2009, and the Equality Authority, the Irish Human Rights Commission
and the office of the Minister for Integration faced sharp budget cuts. In 2011, the Office of
the Minister for Integration was folded into the Department of Justice and Equality.
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In Northern Ireland, the dynamics of capacity-building have been quite
different. Financially, migrant-led organizations have been able to access
government funding meant to promote good 'community relations', even though this
money was originally earmarked to address relations between Catholics and
Protestants. Northern Ireland also has a dense network of local foundations that
have been willing to fund small community development programs with a focus on
good community relations and bridge-building, and that includes migration-related
issues. Significant strategic partnerships have also emerged, most notably between
trade unions and migrant associations, in order to provide legal and social services
in migrant communities and act as a bridge to local elected officials. While the
situation is not perfect - some immigrant groups are not comfortable using the
banner of sectarianism to deal with the issues of xenophobia and racism - the civic
focus on issues of mutual tolerance, understanding, and inclusion has created the
political space for new immigrant groups to engage in and benefit from partnerships
with native organizations.
V. A Third Case: Spain
Moving away from the tangled history of the British Isles, this project
explores a third case: Spain. Spain, like Ireland, is a new destination country: in
1998, the foreign-born were only 1.6% of the population (INE 2004), but by 2011,
this figure had risen to 13.5% [Table 2.5]. Of all of the late-developing states of
Western Europe, Spain and Ireland experienced the greatest levels of immigration
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in the 1990s and 2000s [Figure 2.6]. And as in Ireland, a huge percentage of the
immigrant population is from countries that share historic, linguistic, and cultural
ties: in 2006, close to 48% of Ireland's foreign-born were from the UK or US (CSO
2008), while in Spain around 40% of the foreign-born population was from Latin
America (INE 2009) [Table 2.6].
Spain also has some other similarities to the Irish cases that make for an
interesting comparison. First, as in Ireland, civil war politics have carried over into
present-day party formation and politics: Spain's two major parties, the Partido
Socialista Obrero Espaioles (the Socialist Worker's Party, heretofore referred to as
the Socialists or PSOE), and the Partido Popular (heretofore referred to as the
Populares, or PP) loosely draw their support from the groups that formed the two
sides in Spain's civil war.4 2 Second, violent separatist nationalist groups have also
been key players in national and regional politics: the IRA in Ireland and ETA
(Euskadi Ta Askatasuna or 'Basque Homeland and Freedom') in the Spanish
Basque Country have forced governments in Dublin, Belfast and Madrid to confront
political violence in the name of an ethno-nationalist community. Radical Basque
nationalists and hardline Republicans in Northern Ireland have a particularly close
political and cultural relationship, and Sinn F6in officials have even participated in
on attempts to bring hardline Basques with ties to ETA into electoral politics.
Finally, both Spain and Ireland are countries where the Catholic Church has
historically played an important role socially, culturally, and politically.
42 The PSOE has close historical ties to liberals, republicans, and trade unionists, while the
PP is linked to Catholic conservatives, monarchists, wealthy landowners and industrialists.
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Taken together, the economic and social context of migration, and some of the
political and cultural similarities between Spain and Ireland would lead one to
expect to see similar patterns of incorporative activity. But this, surprisingly, is not
the case. The first area where we see significant differences between Spain and
Ireland is on citizenship policy. The key difference here is that Spain has, through
multiple amnesties, put access to permanent residency - and subsequently,
citizenship - in reach for hundreds of thousands of immigrants. Since 1990, there
have been several major 'regularizations' in Spain (1991, 1996, 2000, 2001 and
2005), with the largest in 2005 when over 700,000 undocumented immigrants were
granted papers. Regularization is a key step on the pathway to citizenship:
eligibility for naturalization is based on length of residency in the country
(anywhere from two to ten years).
The second key difference we see is in incorporative activity in the area of
electoral politics. This happens through two key channels: opening access to
electoral politics through changing voter eligibility rules, or through direct
campaigns to encourage migrant voting or even migrant candidates. In Ireland,
there is no need for the former, given the open non-citizen voting laws, but there
was limited incorporative activity for the latter. In Spain, native political actors
have been very active in both areas. Under the Spanish constitution, non-citizen
voting rights are reciprocal at the individual country level: for example, if Country
X allows Spaniards to vote in their local elections, citizens of Country X can vote in
Spanish local elections. As a practical matter, until the mid-2000s, non-citizen
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voting rights were generally - though not exclusively - limited to citizens of other
member states of the European Union. However, the Spanish government enacted
bilateral agreements with several key immigrant-sending states, and by the 2011
elections, nationals of nine non-EU countries were eligible to participate: Colombia,
Peru, Paraguay, New Zealand, Iceland, Cape Verde, Chile, Ecuador, and Bolivia.
These countries were selected based on whether or not their laws allowed for (or
could be changed to include) non-citizen voting for Spanish citizens, and/or if they
were major migrant sending states to Spain. Because it is based on democratic
reciprocity, the system does not cover all immigrants: migrants from authoritarian
states, or places without free and fair elections, are not eligible for Spanish local
voting rights because Spaniards (and arguably natives!) in these kinds of regimes
would not be allowed to vote. This means that while non-citizen voting is not
universal, between 60-70% of Spain's immigrant population is eligible to vote [Table
2.7].43
Capacity-building is an area where Spain stands out from Ireland - and even
Northern Ireland. In Ireland, and in the North, access to financial resources for
migrant-led organizations is generally through pre-existing native organizations.
But in Spain, migrant-led organizations have access to a pool of money from the
national government specifically set aside for their use (Integra). The national
government has also directed financial support to Spain's seventeen comunidades
autonomas ('autonomous communities') and municipal governments for migrant
43 A notable exception here is the Moroccan population, which is the second largest
immigrant group in Spain: approximately 14% of the foreign-born population in Spain for
most of the last decade (INE 2007, 2011).
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outreach and integration programs. In addition, since the 1990s the government
has sponsored an integration forum consisting of elected officials, immigrant and
native NGOs, employer associations, and trade unions in order to weigh in on
immigration-related legislation.44 This strategic partnership creates a statutory
seat at the table of power for migrant organizations, and helps build to both social
and political networks between migrant organizations and native political groups.
Are there critical difference between Spain and Ireland that may account for
the variation in incorporative activity between the two countries? There are three
that should be taken into consideration: Spain's high levels of illegal immigration,
its large Muslim population, and the structure of its political institutions.
First, Spain, unlike Ireland, is a "border country": it lies at the edge of
Europe in close proximity to much poorer neighbors. Prior to the 1990s, this meant
Spain was a transit country for Moroccans and sub-Saharan migrants heading to
France, Belgium, and beyond, but as its economy improved, Spain transitioned from
being a gateway to somewhere else in Europe to being a destination in and of itself.
Therefore Spain has experienced much higher levels of illegal immigration than
Ireland, which is protected by geography; in 2004, the undocumented population in
Spain was estimated to be 700,000, over 20% of the total immigrant population.
Nevertheless, Spain's government has moved to include these immigrants in civic
life through its regularization programs, rather than exclude them. The behavior of
4 Interestingly, the structure of the immigration forum in Spain is similar to the
bargaining structure of Ireland's much-vaulted 'social partnership' model for managing
industrial relations and social policy. Social partnership was established in the 1980s, but
is all but dead due to the current economic crisis.
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the Spanish government stands in sharp contrast to its Irish counterpart. In
Ireland, when immigrants were seen as trying to game the system by arriving
under the guise of asylum in order to establish residency and work45 , the pathway
to citizenship was narrowed. In Spain, when thousands of immigrants arrived
under the guise of tourism in order to work - even without the proper work or
residency permits - the government saw fit to regularize them.
Second, while over 40% of its immigrant population is culturally similar to
the native population, Spain has a relatively large percentage of immigrants from
predominately Muslim countries. Not surprisingly, given Spain's proximity to
North Africa, 17% of the foreign-born in Spain are from the Maghreb (INE 2011).
Given that Muslim immigration is a politically toxic issue across much of Europe,
we would expect to see limited incorporative activity from Spanish political actors,
especially those concerned about gaining favor with the public. But, again, this has
not been the case: North African organizers are part of the trade union leadership,
PSOE officials have pushed to extend local voting rights to Moroccan immigrants
living in Spain, and in Catalonia, the region of Spain with the highest levels of
Muslim immigration, North Africans are even involved in Catalan nationalist
politics.
Finally, the structure of Spanish political and electoral institutions differs
significantly from Ireland. The main difference is that while Ireland is centralized,
the Spanish government is extremely decentralized. This may provide some
5 Or not work - one key stereotype of asylum seekers is that they are just seeking to leech
off of the (relatively limited) welfare state.
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incentive for native actors to engage in incorporative activity, due to the fact that
there are presumably more entry points into politics in a federal system - local
government has more responsibility for services, there are local, regional, state and
national elections, etc. However, it is not clear if this is an advantage when it
comes to the behavior of native political actors in regards to political incorporation
because it may be outweighed by the structure of Spanish party system. Spain's
parties use a strictly controlled candidate list, rather than open primaries or
individual-level voting. Mollenkopf and Hochschild (2010) note that party list
systems serve to inhibit the political incorporation of immigrants into electoral
politics, and the more individual-oriented voting in the US creates more space for
minority engagement, and in particular minority candidates, for their aspirations
are not held hostage by party dons. Therefore, it is difficult to determine a priori
when and how electoral institutions matter for incorporative activity: while we may
expect to see more incorporative activity in Spain due to its decentralized structure,
on the other hand we may expect to see more incorporative activity in Ireland
because candidates and voters are not bound by a party list system.
Overall, the majority of the differences that exist between Spain and Ireland
are those that would lead one to expect to see more incorporative activity in Ireland
than Spain. Yet this is not the case at all. For every measure of incorporative
activity, Spanish political actors have gone beyond their Irish counterparts [Table
8]. Given that the socio-economic context does not seem to explain these
differences, are there alternative explanations?
67
VI. Explaining Variation in Incorporative Activity
Given the similarities between the cases, what explains the variation in
incorporative activity? There are three identifiable groups of explanations: 1) the
power interests of political actors, 2) the identities of political actors, and 3) the civic
institutions that shape political engagement.
Political Power Interests
The most basic explanation for why some political actors choose to
incorporate new immigrants is because they would derive some kind of political
advantage from doing so. The classical argument is that groups that are seeking to
gain power will look to mobilize unorganized groups in order to build their power
base (Dahl (1974) 2005; Schattschneider 1960; Erie 1988; Banks 1991; Frege et al
2003; Krings 2009). By organizing unorganized groups, political actors, particularly
those who are outside the halls of power, may be able to leverage a 'seat at the table'
for themselves through more voters or more members, namely new immigrants.
However, the interest-based approach is problematic, for several reasons.
First, over the last twenty years, small opposition parties in Europe have been able
to build their vote share by mobilizing against immigrant communities, not
reaching out to them: this has proven to be a winning electoral strategy for Golden
Dawn in Greece (also a new destination country), the Swedish democrats (SDs), the
True Finns in Finland, and Vlaams Belang in Belgium (among others). And despite
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the fact that trade union membership has declined precipitously - particularly in
the private sector - unions have been slow to mobilize the fast-growing migrant
labor pool. This is despite the fact that many migrants - including undocumented
migrants - are friendly to labor unions and may have even have extensive
experience with union and political organizing in their home countries (Delgado
1993). Taken together, there is limited empirical evidence to suggest that power
interests explain differences in incorporative activity.
Political/Organizational identity
Some political actors may take on the task of incorporation - even when it
seems to be somewhat irrational - due to their organizational identity. This
identity can be based on the group's founding principles (Milkman 2006), ideology
(Putnam 1971; Sewell 1985; Poletta and Jasper 2001), self-defined mission (Marrow
2009) or place on the political spectrum (Hooghe et al 2002), but the main idea is
that identity explains why sometimes political actors may behave in ways that do
not seem rational based on existing power dynamics: their behavior is instead
driven by a need to adhere to ideology, not the accumulation of power.
However, the identity explanation is problematic in that it does not
necessarily allow us to make predictions about how a group will respond to
immigration. The behavior of republican parties in Ireland around the citizenship
referendum is a prime example: we would expect, given their shared political
history and identity as republicans, to see Fianna Faiil and Sinn F6in on the same
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page when it came to citizenship - especially given that republicanism is
fundamentally about the relationship between the imagined community of the Irish
nation and the state. Citizenship, therefore, is critical to republicanism - hence the
insistence on giving anyone on the island who identified themselves as members of
the Irish nation access to citizenship through the Irish state even if they did not live
under the jurisdiction of that state. Yet on this most fundamental of issues, there
was profound disagreement within the same ideological movement, with Sinn F6in
opposing efforts by Fianna Fiil to end birthright citizenship.
Another issue with the identity approach is that identities are not fixed over
time. Again, the evolution of Sinn Fein is instructive. When the party was founded
in the early 20th century, its leader, Arthur Griffith, was a strident advocate of a
particularly ethno-cultural stream of Irish nationalism - yet, a century later, the
party's current leader, Gerry Adams, stood in front of the Daiil with a megaphone
and proclaimed his support for immigrant families with Irish-born children that
faced deportation. Somewhere along the line, Sinn Fein - which means 'We
Ourselves' in Irish - shifted from a very closed idea of "ourselves" to a more
expansive notion of the Irish nation. The Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) in Spain
underwent a similar transformation: Sabino Arana, a founder of the party, saw
Basques as a separate and superior race to other Spaniards, but later party officials
distanced themselves from Arana's position. In both Ireland and the Basque
country, the idea of what it means to be a nationalist, and who can be a member
that community has been remarkably flexible over time, and reducing actors to
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these political labels tells us little about how they see themselves or their place in
national and civic life.
Ultimately, the identity argument cannot tell us why similar organizations,
with similar missions and identities still respond so differently to immigration. The
inability to predict how a labor union, social democratic party, or nationalist
organization will respond to immigration suggests that it is not necessarily the
organization's place on a political spectrum that matters, but rather something
about how they construct their own identities within that system that may tell us
something about how and why they choose to take on the task of migrant political
incorporation.
Civic Institutions and Incorporative Activity
Civic institutions are the rules that govern political engagement. These
institutions shape political life in a number of ways: they not only affect who has
access to the polity, but how they can make their voices heard in the public sphere.
Civic institutions are no different than any other kinds of institutions in that they
do not just coordinate behavior, but are "power-implicating instruments that
unevenly distribute resources and constitute collective actors" (Mahoney 2010, 3).
Civic institutions can redistribute power resources through the funding of civic
organizations, or the inclusion of certain actors in decision-making processes, and
can constitute collective actors through delineating what determines an interest
group, an eligible voter, or even a citizen.
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The most basic function of civic institutions is to shape who can be a member
of the polity. The first step in this process is usually acquisition of legal citizenship:
a majority of countries make being a legal citizen - i.e. being entitled to a passport,
the right to freely enter and leave the country, etc. - a requirement for political
participation, especially when it comes to electoral politics. These laws serve a
gatekeeping function: they draw clear boundaries of membership, and that
membership carries privileges. Therefore changes to rules governing legal
citizenship have implications for incorporative activity: because they delineate the
boundaries of the polity, they may shape the incentives of political parties, who may
not want to spend political capital on non-citizens that cannot reward them at the
ballot box. We would then expect to see more incorporative activity in places where
there is more open access to citizenship.
Electoral institutions can also influence incorporative activity, for they not
only dictate who can run or vote, but how those votes are counted and distributed.
Lijphart (1999) notes that civic institutions can be described as majoritarian or
consensus-based:
[The consensus model] does not differ from the majoritarian model in accepting that
majority rule is better than minority rule, but it accepts majority rule only as a
minimum requirement: instead of being satisfied with narrow decision-making
majorities, it seeks to maximize the size of these majorities. Its rules and
institutions aim at broad participation in government and broad agreement on the
policies that the government should pursue. The majoritarian model concentrates
political power in the hands of a bare majority - and often even merely a plurality
instead of a majority, as Chapter 2 will show - whereas the consensus model tries to
share, disperse, and limit power in a variety of ways (pg. 2).
Lijphart goes on to note that in diverse societies, consensus-based
institutions such as proportional representation, coalition-building, and corporatist
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state-society relations are all means of ensuring that there is broader social and
political consensus when decisions are made than there would be if only a bare
plurality of voters or citizens were required. Therefore, we would expect to see more
incorporative activity when civic institutions are consensus-based, rather than
majoritarian.
However, recent comparative research on political incorporation challenges
the notion that Europe's consensus-based institutions are better for immigrants.
Mollenkopf and Hochschild (2010) note that, under systems of proportional
representation, the party list systems used to draw up the ballots are often the
responsibility of party barons rather than members; subsequently, it is much easier
for parties to ignore or block out migrants from party politics in Europe than the
United States. In the US, 'renegade' candidates can do an end-run around party
bosses in the primaries, and if they make it to the general election, the party rulers
will have to support them anyway. In addition to parties, it is not clear that having
the kinds of consultative 'tripartite' bargaining institutions that bring together the
government, unions, and employer associations actually work to the benefit of new
immigrants: as Erie (1998) noted, political organizations that are entrenched in
power have little incentive to engage in incorporative activity, and recent research
on unions and immigrants shows that when unions are more embedded within the
state, the less interest they take in mobilizing new immigrants (Gorodzeisky and
Richards, forthcoming).
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The institutional argument does not seem to hold when we look at our cases.
When migration first began in the 1990s, Ireland was one of the few Western
countries with birthright citizenship, its electoral institutions were some of the most
open in the world to non-citizens, and "social partnership", the consultative body
that governed Irish industrial relations and social policy was not only in full swing,
but was considered an ideal'third way' model for organizing interests in Western
democracies. Yet despite all of Ireland's purported institutional advantages,
Spanish political actors were far more willing and able to take on the task of
incorporation than their Irish counterparts. The institutional argument becomes
even more puzzling when one takes into account the fact that Ireland and Northern
Ireland actually share key civic institutions - most notably, citizenship - yet there
is still significant variation in incorporative activity. Therefore, while it would be
hard to argue that institutions are irrelevant when it comes to incorporative activity
- certainly when Spain opened up immigrant voting to new groups, it unleashed a
torrent of political activity targeting newly enfranchised immigrants - civic
institutions on their own are not sufficient to foster incorporative activity.
VII. Methods
The variation in incorporative activity across Spain, Ireland and Northern
Ireland presents a clear empirical puzzle. In order to shed light on an explain this
puzzle, I have chosen to design historical comparative case studies of new
destination societies in Western Europe. Comparative studies have been growing in
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importance within the field of migration studies; as Bloemraad (2011) notes, "It is
hard to know what is special, or odd, about a particular outcome or process without
a comparative reference point" (pg. 1151). More broadly, comparative historical
analysis is a long established approach for the researcher who wants to understand
processes of institutional change over time (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003;
Mahoney and Thelen 2010).
For this project, I took an inductive approach, building my theory through the
research process. I spent sixteen months collecting data in Spain, Ireland and
Northern Ireland, relying on both national legislative and organizational archive in
order to create historical case studies, as well as interviews with over one hundred
political elites in Dublin, Belfast, Madrid and Bilbao. 46 I made multiple trips to each
site, building and refining my theory as the process of learning about each new case
enhanced my understanding the prior one. I held the four types of organizations for
my analysis constant across all of my cases, meeting with 1) elected politicians and
party activists, 2) community activists (natives and immigrants), 3) bureaucrats,
and 4) trade union officials. I also attended public meetings, conferences,
demonstrations and strikes, and observed firsthand some of the tensions between
the direction of political elites and the sentiments of their mass publics. I
supplemented my collection of archival documents, government data, interviews,
and field notes with data from secondary literature, including historical analyses
and press reports.
46 Please see Appendix A for a detailed description of my fieldwork and interviews.
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VIII. Conclusion
Dramatic changes in patterns of migration over the last two decades have
revived old fears about the political incorporation of immigrants, albeit within a
new social and economic context. As I have shown in this chapter, while some of the
concerns about incorporative activity in new destinations may be unwarranted,
existing arguments do not sufficiently explain what is happening in Spain and
Ireland, Europe's two most visible cases of late developing states that turned into
destination countries relatively recently. Native parties have in some instances
taken on the task of incorporation, even at significant political risk to themselves,
groups that share ideological roots and political objectives have differed in their
approach to new immigrants, and while the openness of civic institutions to
immigrants may have some bearing on incorporative activity, it seems to be only a
sometimes necessary and clearly insufficient condition. What then explains the
clear variation in incorporative activity in Europe's new destinations? In the next
chapter, I offer an alternative argument that does not solely focus on institutions or
actors and their motivations, but rather looks to the origins of institutions, the
construction of political identities among native actors, and the interaction of the
two to explain why and how native political actors are both willing and able to take
on the task of incorporation.
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Figure 2.1:
Net Migration Rate, Late Developing States Five-year cycles, 1955-2010
(OECD 2010)
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Figure 2.2:
Immigrants as a percentage of the population (OECD)
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Figure 2.4: Net migration rate, Northern Ireland, 1973-2008 (NISRA 2010)
Figure 1: Estimates of long-term not migration - Northern Ireland (197314 - 200819)
10,000 -
8,000 -
0 ,00
4,000
2,000
0
-2,0002
-4,000
4 -6,000
-8,000
-10,000
-12,000
-14,000
Migration gain
-2
Phase 2 Phase 3
- Migration loss
I I 1 ~ 4 9 i ei
v le 0 0 0 0 W~
Year
80
Phase I-
-
-
Figure 2.5: Foreign-Born Population of Northern Ireland, 1997-2010
(NISRA 2011)
Figure 5: LFS-based Estimates of non-UKIRoI Born Persons (January 1997 to June 2010)
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Figure 2.6:
Foreign-born population in Spain and Ireland 1960-2005 (OECD)
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Table 2.1:
Foreign-born as a percentage of the population, Ireland47
% Foreign-
% Foreign- born minus
Year born UK citizens
1981 6.7% 1.3%
1986 6.3% 1.3%
1991 6.5% 1.6%
1996 7.5% 2.1%
2001 11.4% 4.7%
2006 14.7% 8.2%
47Data in this table is from the CSO "Beyond 20/20" website, that allows you to build tables
online from census data:
http://census.cso.ie/census/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx?CS referer=&CS ChosenLan
g=en.
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Table 2.2
Table 2.2a: Foreign-born population of Ireland by region of birth, 2006 (CSO
Interactive)
Percentage of
the Foreign-
Region of born
Origin Population population
UK 271,781 44.4%
Europe (not
including UK
and Ireland) 194,225 31.7%
USA 25,181 4.1%
Africa 42,764 7.0%
Asia 55,628 9.1%
Other 23,050 3.8%
TOTAL 612,629 100.0%
84
Table 2.2b: Top sending-states as a percentage of the total non-Irish national
population (CSO Interactive) 48
% of non-
Irish
national
Country Population population
United
Kingdom 112,548 26.8%
Poland 63,276 15.1%
Lithuania 24,628 5.9%
Nigeria 16,300 3.9%
Latvia 13,319 3.2%
USA 12,475 3.0%
China 11,161 2.7%
Germany 10,289 2.4%
Philippines 9,548 2.3%
France 9,046 2.2%
48Note the distinction between the foreign-born population, and the non-Irish national
population. On Question #5 of the Irish census, respondents are asked, "What is your place
of birth? Give the place where your mother lived at the time of your birth. If IRELAND
(including Northern Ireland), write in the COUNTY. If elsewhere ABROAD, write in the
COUNTRY" (#5) and "What is your nationality". On Question #6, respondents are asked,
"What is your Nationality? If you have more than one nationality, please declare all of
them". Respondents then have the choice to check "Irish", "Other NATIONALITY, write in"
with space to answer, and/or "No nationality". Therefore, while foreign-born is clearly
defined, it is left to the respondent to define nationality. This explains the huge fall-off
between the UK-born population in Ireland (271,781), and the number of people who self-
report as having UK nationality (112,548): many people who were born in the UK are of
Irish heritage, and would likely define themselves as Irish nationals despite their foreign
birth. A similar drop-off happens when you compare figures for the U.S.-born population
and the U.S. non-Irish national population.
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Table 2.3:
Foreign-born population of Northern Ireland
2.3a: Foreign-born population of Northern Ireland 1998-2010
Foreign-
born as a
Total Foreign-Born % of the
Year Population Population population
1998 1677769 19000 1.1%
1999 1679006 21000 1.3%
2000 1682944 15000 0.9%
2001 1688800 18000 1.1%
2002 1697500 24000 1.4%
2003 1704900 22000 1.3%
2004 1714000 34000 2.0%
2005 1727700 26000 1.5%
2006 1743100 39000 2.2%
2007 1761700 55000 3.1%
2008 1779200 57000 3.2%
2009 1793300 61000 3.4%
2010 1804800 79800 4.4%
2.3b: Foreign-born population of Northern Ireland by
2010)
region of birth, 2007 (NISRA
Country or Region of Northern Ireland
Birth 2007
Ireland 36.2%
Other Europe 30.9%
Eastern European Accession
States (% of total migrant
population) 24.5%
Rest of the World 33%
TOTAL 100.0%
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Table 2.4:
Incorporative Activity in Ireland and Northern Ireland
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Electoral Engagement Capacity-building
Immigrant Organiza- Organiza-
Pathway to Non-Citizen voter tional tional
Country Citizenship voting rights mobilization Funding Inclusion
Limited
Republican party-led
party fought activity;
for bureaucratic
restriction incorporative Limited and Limited and
Ireland in 2004 Pre-existing activity unstable unstable
Republican
party fought Limited to EU Limited
against and directly;
Northern restriction Commonwealth extensive
Ireland in 2004 citizens Limited indirectly Extensive
11
Table 2.5:
Foreign-born as a Percentage of the General Population, Spain, 1998-2010
(INE 2013)
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Table 2.6:
Region of Origin, Foreign-born population, Spain (2011)
% of foreign-born
Region Population population
Europe 1721474 38%
Americas 1821215 40.2%
Africa 767587 17%
Maghreb 606104 13.4%
Asia 216244 4.8%
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Table 2.7:
Foreign-born population by ten most represented sending countries,
Spain (2011)
% of Foreign-
born
population in % of Foreign-born
Country 2002 population in 2011
Romania 5.2% 14.9%
Morocco 14.2% 13.6%
United
Kingdom 6.1% 6.5%
Ecuador 14.6% 6.4%
Colombia 9.2% 4.8%
Bolivia n/a 3.4%
Italy 2.5% 3.4%
Germany 4.9% 3.3%
Bulgaria 2.0% 3.0%
China 1.9% 2.9%
90
Table 2.8:
Incorporative Activity in Ireland, Northern Ireland and Spain
Electoral Engagement Capacity-building
Non-
Citizen Immigrant
Pathway to voting voter Organizational Organizational
Country Citizenship rights mobilization Funding Inclusion
Limited
party-led;
bureaucratic
Restricted in Pre- incorporative Limited and Limited and
Ireland 2004 existing activity unstable unstable
Restricted
via 2004 Limited Limited directly;
Northern decision in to EU extensive
Ireland Ireland citizens Limited indirectly Extensive
Expanded in Expanded Party-led
Spain 2000s in 2000s mobilization Extensive Extensive
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Chapter 3 - Constituents Without Citizenship? Immigrant
Political Incorporation in New Destinations
Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it
under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered,
given and transmitted from the past.
- Karl Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte
Incorporative activity, namely actions taken on the part of native political
actors to include immigrants in civic life, is increasingly seen as a difficult, if not
impossible process. Whether due to the structure of institutions, the interests or
identities of native political actors such as parties and unions, or the characteristics
of migrants themselves, there are fears that immigrants, particularly those in
Europe, are forever doomed to be objects of, rather than active participants in,
political life. These concerns are particularly grave when it comes to 'new
destinations', places where immigration is a relatively new phenomenon, as the
literature suggests that they are unlikely have the institutional resources, the
interested civic organizations, or the shared historical narratives to both guide and
motivate native political actors to take on the task of incorporating new
immigrants.
Given this gloomy outlook, we would not expect to see a great deal of
incorporative activity in today's new destinations - yet surprisingly we do. Native
political parties have launched immigrant voter registration drives, moved to open
access to citizenship, and provided both material and strategic support to
immigrant community organizations. However, this activity is not uniform: we also
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see examples of native actors who are either indifferent to the immigrant presence
in the civic sphere, or who actively work to exclude immigrants from civic life. This
variation is not explained by differences in institutions, socio-economic conditions,
or the power interests and identities of native political actors. Why do we see such
variation in incorporative activity across new destinations?
I argue that how societies settled social conflicts over demands for greater
civic inclusion from native minority groups- whether ethnic, religious, or political -
in the past has unintended consequences for new immigrants and political
incorporation in the present. In places where minority demands for greater
inclusion were accommodated, institutions were changed to be more open to
minority participation, and activist groups not only gained political experience but
become powerful political insiders over time. Later, when immigration emerges as
a social and political phenomenon, not only may these newcomers have access to
civic life through the 'inclusive institutions' originally adopted to address the civic
exclusion of native minorities, minority activist groups may serve as political
advocates and allies for newcomers. Therefore, the impact of past social conflict on
present incorporative activity is two-fold: conflict may not only lead to the creation
of minority-friendly inclusive institutions, but the experience of fighting for those
institutions gives native political actors an incentive to repurpose them for 'new'
minority groups, namely immigrants. In this way, the legacy of social conflict
among natives in 'new destinations' may, quite unwittingly, lead to the development
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of the kinds of institutions, political allies, and social narratives that facilitate
political incorporation in 'old destinations'.
However, when minority demands were ignored or - worse yet - actively
quashed, there was little to no institutional evolution, and minority activist groups
remained politically weak. Subsequently, with new immigration, there are neither
the institutional entry points nor the mobilized partners on the ground to help
channel new arrivals into the political arena. Even when migrant-friendly inclusive
institutions or migrant-serving organizations are established in response to
immigration, a lack of politically vested native constituencies leaves them
vulnerable to political cuts and retrenchment. Therefore, inclusive institutions are
a necessary but not sufficient condition for incorporative activity: it is the
interaction between institutions and native constituencies that creates - and
perhaps more importantly, maintains - political space for new immigrants. These
findings suggest, counter-intuitively, that those societies with a legacy of deep social
conflict may be better equipped to deal with the political incorporation of new
immigrants than their more stable counterparts: if the grievances of previously
marginalized native minorities were addressed through the establishment of more
inclusive civic institutions, there can be unintended positive spillover benefits for
'new' minorities down the line - namely, immigrants.
This chapter builds the argument in five sections. In Section I, I explore how
and why institutions matter for civic inclusion. Drawing from both the literatures
on institutional change and social movements, in Section II I explain how the
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process of changing these institutions can affect both the formal'rules of the game'
that govern civic life, and the informal rules as well. Section III demonstrates how
this legacy of conflict also shapes the willingness and capacity of native political
actors to take on the task of incorporation. In Section IV, I briefly discuss the
limitations of institutional reform through bureaucratic channels, and Section V
walks through some of the limitations and implications of the argument.
I. Institutions and Inclusion
Civic institutions are the 'rules of the game' that govern state-society
relations. These rules can be formal or informal. Helmke and Levitsky offer a
working definition for both:
"We define informal institutions as socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are
created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels. By
contrast, formal institutions are rules and procedures that are created,
communicated, and enforced through channels widely accepted as official" (2004:
727).
Formal institutions can shape both political interactions and political
outcomes: the laws that shape who is allowed to vote (Baub6ck 2005), the way votes
are tallied (Lijphart 1999), districts are constituted (Hero 1992; Cameron et. al.
1996; Brunell 2006), political candidates are selected (Pennings and Hazan 2001),
and public resources are directed (Campbell 2003; Bloemraad 2005). They also can
affect the way that the political interests and aspirations of the population are
counted and considered.
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Informal institutions can also shape state-society relations because the
'unwritten' rules about the social status of groups can have an effect on the
responsiveness of political actors to their issues and concerns. For example, the
ascribed status of minority groups - whether caste, race, or ethnicity - can often
doom them to having their preferences weighted less favorably or not at all, not only
because they are a numerical minority, but because of long-standing social and
cultural norms that relegate some groups to 'second-class citizens' even without
explicit directives from the state. The example of indigenous people is illustrative:
Nagengast & Kerney's (1990) research in Mexico found that the dominant social
narrative that claimed indigenous Mixtecs preferred living in poverty as an
expression of their 'culture' served to absolve both the public and the government
from considering corrective action. Therefore, being considered social outsiders can
relegate some groups to political outsider status as well, a status that is widely
understood, even if it is not formally recognized by the state.
Taken together, formal and informal institutions can create political
outsiders, those groups who, due to their small numbers or low social status, find
that their political preferences are consistently under-considered and undercounted.
Over time, this marginalization can both undermine the legitimacy of these
institutions and threaten social order: when marginalized groups feel that there is
no way to have their grievances heard through 'normal' politics, they may turn to
contentious politics - namely, street protests, riots, or even violence (Piven and
Cloward 1977; Tarrow 1998).
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However, institutions are not fixed. When groups are disadvantaged by
formal or informal institutions, corrective action is possible: governments can
implement a number of safeguards in order to insure that a variety of groups have a
say in political life. Many of these fall under the umbrella of what Lijphart (1999)
calls 'consultative institutions': quotas or reserved seats for minority groups in
parties or legislative bodies, affirmative action programs in schools and the
workplace, redirection of both financial and strategic resources to under-
represented groups, and/or independent monitoring and oversight requirements for
state agencies can help to smooth out inequalities driven by disadvantaged social
and political status. These reforms can not only strengthen the position of minority
groups, but they can also strengthen faith in democratic practice: in consultative
systems, electoral turnout is higher, and those who are on the losing end of elections
are more satisfied with democracy than their counterparts who vote in majoritarian
systems (Lijphart 1999). This final point is key. Even if minority groups cannot
always get their way, they can certainly have a say - and that in and of itself is
hugely significant, as it may serve to preserve the legitimacy of institutions and
maintain social calm. Therefore, although civic institutions can create winners and
losers, institutional reforms may not only bring political outsiders into the fold, but
also can help to maintain the legitimacy of a nation's democracy in the eyes of its
minority groups - even if these groups do not get their way all of the time.
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II. Institutions, Social Conflict, and Change
At the point when institutions are seen as having completely failed a
particular group, or have lost their legitimacy altogether, that group may seek to
change them. The social movements literature suggests that this perceived failure
point is key to driving reform efforts: Piven and Cloward (1977) note that "the social
arrangements that are ordinarily perceived as just and immutable must come to
seem both unjust and mutable" (pg. 12) in order to provoke collective action.
However, challenging the structure of existing institutions requires both
recognizing the problem and offering an alternative; in other words, it requires
"framing" the situation in a different way. As Zald notes, "Frames help interpret
problems, to define problems for action, and suggest action pathways to remedy the
problem" (pg. 265, italics added). Another way to think of frames is as social
narratives. Patterson and Monroe (1998) define narratives and highlight their
importance in explaining political behavior:
[Narrative] refers to the ways in which we construct disparate facts in our own
worlds and weave them together cognitively in order to make sense of our
reality... Insofar as narratives affect our perceptions of political reality, which in
turn affect our actions in response to or in anticipation of political events, narrative
plays a critical role in the construction of political behavior. In this sense, we create
and use narratives to interpret and understand the political realities around us. We
do this as individuals and we do it as collective units, as nations or groups (pg. 215).
However, narratives are not just frameworks for understanding, but action: as Ganz
notes, narratives give people the means "to make choices under conditions of
uncertainty" (2012; 274).
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That said, change not only involves crafting alternative narratives, but
engaging in direct conflict with the state as well, and the more dramatic the
changes put forth, and the more threatening these are to the status quo, the more
resistance advocates may face. Seeking institutional change, particularly for long-
marginalized groups, can be a high-risk activity, particularly if what starts as
peaceful protest escalates to riots, street violence, or even civil war. If marginalized
groups are successful, however, the alternative social narratives they develop and
articulate become institutionalized, both formally and informally. Zald (1996)
notes, "The frames of winning movements get translated into public policy and into
the slogans and symbols of the general culture... Successful movements have their
tactics and frames appropriated by other movements; they become exemplars
providing training ground and models."
How does this tie into incorporative activity? As described in Chapter Two,
the literature identifies three fundamental challenges that new destinations face
when trying to incorporate new immigrants into civic life: a lack of historical
narratives that legitimize migrant civic participation, a lack of migrant-friendly
institutions, and a lack of migrant-serving organizations. Put differently, and
paraphrasing Zald, new destinations lack 1) a framework with which to interpret
and understand immigration as a civic phenomenon, locate areas of exclusion, and
plan strategies of action to address exclusion, and 2) the native political actors who
are willing to draw from their experiences with 'old immigration' to deal with the
challenges of new immigration. Taken together, new destinations lack what Ann
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Swidler would call a "repertoire", namely, a "'tool kit' of habits, skills, and styles
from which people construct 'strategies of action"' (1986: 273). When it comes to
migration, 'old' destinations that have experienced multiple waves of immigrants
have been able to develop this tool kit over time, and under different socio-economic
conditions that were often more conducive to incorporative activity than those that
exist in today's new destinations: today's new destinations do not have large mills
and factories able to absorb thousands of new immigrant workers, and new arrivals
to Europe today face much steeper barriers to citizenship than European
immigrants to the Americas faced a century ago.
However, in societies with a history of resolved social conflict, there is a "tool
kit" that exists, albeit a different one. First, immigrants arrive in a situation where
political institutions were designed in order to insure minority representation in
civic life. These institutions may even have enforcement mechanisms that put the
onus on the state to monitor and, if necessary, directly address the civic inclusion of
minority groups. Therefore, societies with a legacy of past social conflict may have
their own set of 'inclusive institutions'. Second, the social narratives developed
during past conflicts can be used to frame - i.e., to interpret, locate, and suggest
lines of action - the situation of, and the response to, the newest minority group in
society: immigrants. Together, the institutional and social legacy of past conflict
gives native political actors both the legal and cognitive framework to engage in
incorporative activity targeting new immigrants, despite the fact that actors have
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no experience dealing with migration issues, and institutions were put in place to
address native minorities, not newcomers.
But what of situations where reform efforts are unsuccessful? In societies
with a legacy of social conflict that resulted in failed social movements and the
maintenance of the status quo, civic institutions may remain closed to minority
groups. This means that the alternative social narratives that activists put forth in
making their demands were not widely institutionalized, and subsequently carry no
broader social or political currency and are not a point of shared meaning for
natives. Therefore, while native political actors may be sympathetic to the plight of
new immigrants, they are in no position to engage in incorporative activities, as,
arguably, they are not themselves incorporated into political life. Without the 1)
adaptation of alternative, more inclusive social narratives, or 'frames', that can be
repurposed for new immigrants, 2) the civic space for immigrants created by
institutional reforms targeting native minority groups, and 3) the empowerment of
formerly marginalized groups through successfully gaining access to civic
participation, we would expect to see limited, at best, incorporative activity.
III. Native Political Actors and Social Conflict
However, the presence of inclusive institutions and social narratives designed
to deal with old social conflicts among natives does not necessarily mean that native
actors will choose to utilize them in order to benefit new immigrants. Why would
native political actors choose to 'repurpose' institutions and narratives in order to
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include new immigrants in civic life? The answer: social conflict that results in
change not only has an effect on institutions and narratives, but it also has an effect
on the actors that pushed for and benefited from these changes.
First, policy changes are recognized as not only changing institutions, but
changing "social groups and their political goals and capabilities" (Skocpol 1993:58).
Because institutions channel resources and structure interactions - in other words,
shape power dynamics - the redistribution of government resources and attention
can affect both the political standing and interests of targeted groups. In effect,
institutions can create their own constituencies. For example, in her work on social
policy in the United States, Andrea Campbell found that the establishment of the
Social Security program increased senior citizen interest in politics: once the
material well being of seniors as a group became tied to policy, that group became
determined to protect this new institutional setup from retrenchment (2003).
Second, engagement in social conflict, and in particular, engagement in high-
risk activism can also affect future political behavior. Here the work of Doug
McAdam (1990) is illustrative: in his study of young college students who applied to
participate in the 1964 Freedom Riders campaign in Mississippi, political work that
was extremely risky given the violence and volatility of the time, Adams found that
those applicants who did go on to participate were, in the long term, more likely to
be directly engaged in political activism than their counterparts who applied, were
accepted, but did not actually join the campaign.
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Taken together, we can understand why native political actors may willingly
take on the task of incorporation. First, native actors have the means - i.e. a
"toolkit" - to do so: civic institutions that were the result of past social conflicts are
open to immigrants, and the legacy of conflict gives them a framework that they can
repurpose in order to apply to newcomers. Goffman calls this process "keying",
namely applying one framework to another situation in order to make sense of it
(1974:44). However, these formerly marginalized native actors may also have the
incentive to repurpose these institutions: their experience with marginalization,
their experience with political activism, and their interest in maintaining minority-
friendly institutions can all drive native actors to engage in incorporative activities
targeting new immigrants. By moving to repurpose institutions in order to include
immigrants, native actors may not only be acting out of a sense of shared
experience, but out of self-interest: by extending the remit of existing institutions,
native actors are also expanding their constituencies, and thereby increasing the
likelihood that attempts to cut or roll back inclusive institutions will face a broader
pool of opposition.
IV. Institutional Change Without Social Conflict?
In new destination countries where social conflict is neither a recent nor
relevant phenomenon, faced with new immigration, can institutions be changed to
be more inclusive? Certainly policymakers hope so; the establishment of
consultative institutions and organizations is seen as a critical component of the
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integration process by both international benchmarking bodies like the Migration
International Policy Index (MIPEX) in the European Union, and among community
activists and political officials across many immigrant-receiving countries.
The problem with these kinds of bureaucratic changes is, they do not have
the transformative effect on both informal institutions and native political actors
that institutions that are the result of social conflict do. Institutional change by
bureaucratic means may be less painful politically, but it does not force a broader
political and social debate about minority exclusion or the effect of institutions on
different groups - i.e. there is no challenge to the dominant social narrative around
civic exclusion and political marginalization. As these institutional changes do not
come about via mobilization and agitation, there may also not be a native political
interest in their design, their outcomes - or even their existence. This lack of a
native constituency can leave new migrant-serving institutions vulnerable to
retrenchment: with new immigrants either completely absent from or new to civic
life, and few to no native political allies, migrant-serving institutions created
through bureaucratic channels (rather than direct conflict), may be easy targets for
cutbacks - or elimination altogether.
The only possible alternative to this outcome may be temporal: if inclusive
institutions are established bureaucratically in order to help facilitate the
incorporation of new immigrants, this may, per Skocpol's argument about the
transformative power of policy change, provide enough motivation and support to
immigrant communities that they become able to fend off retrenchment. The
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question is, can these 'new constituencies' emerge quickly enough, and have enough
political strength, to maintain new institutions? Thus far, the answer seems to be
"no": immigrant organizations have been unable to defend institutions that were
newly created to specifically address migration issues. Where these migrant-
targeting institutions have survived has been where they have included both
migrant an native organizations, thus broadening the interest constituency in
maintaining their existence.
Ultimately, it is difficult to see how changing formal institutions through
bureaucratic means, without a broader change to the informal institutions (namely
the social narratives that help people interpret and understand the current
situation with migration) or the distribution of resources, will lead to incorporative
activity on the part of native actors. This seems especially true if these new
institutions are designed to primarily benefit new immigrant populations: there will
be no native constituency that can emerge over time, because the constituency for
the institutions may be limited. Therefore, those societies with a history of social
conflict may actually be better positioned than their more tranquil counterparts to
take on the task of political incorporation - this despite well-meaning activists,
politicians, and bureaucrats who want to facilitate the development of what they
see as migrant-specific inclusive institutions with a minimum of fuss or fighting.
We can also consider the implications for incorporative activity in a new
destination if there is a history of past social conflict, but no institutional change.
Would we expect to see incorporative activity from native actors then? What
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happens if demands are made, but ultimately are ignored or squashed? While
institutions may remain stable, Zald argues that failed social movements "provide
networks of affiliation and reservoirs of experience drawn on by later movements
with loose similarities" (1996:271). Marginalized groups, through the failed process
of making demands, may still face exclusion, but they do have access to a network of
other groups who may also remain excluded from civic life. However, as these
groups are not really incorporated into political life themselves, they are not in the
best position to take on the task of incorporating new immigrants.
V. Discussion
By focusing on both formal and informal institutions, and the interaction
between institutions and native minority groups, I offer a theory for why we do
actually see political incorporation in new destinations, even when we may not
expect to. I argue that the key to understanding variation in incorporative activity
targeting immigrants in new destinations in the present is due to how these
countries have dealt with social conflicts around the marginalization of native
minority groups in the past.
I make this argument, however, with several caveats. First, the analysis
focuses primarily on the behavior of native political elites, rather than mass publics.
This may seem troubling to some, because elite views on immigration may differ
significantly from those of the greater public. However, in the case of new
destinations, I think that focusing on elites is appropriate: political elites play a
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central role in repeating and reinforcing social narratives (Chong and Druckman
2007) and in new destinations where there is no prior historical narrative around
immigration to draw from, this is extremely important.
Second, I am not arguing that societies with a legacy of deep social conflict
are necessarily going to provide a warmer and fuzzier migration experience for new
immigrants. While political elites may call for inclusion, day-to-day street
interactions between natives and new immigrants may be tense, or even
confrontational; elite level tolerance does not necessarily mean that there is no
street-level racism or xenophobia. In fact, a recent study of immigration and social
conflict in Europe finds that the more capacity that immigrants have to engage in
local politics and the more responsive elected officials are to immigrant
communities, the more natives begin to turn on immigrants, as they come to be seen
as competition for scarce resources (Dancygier 2010). That said, having elites who
publicly support immigrants, or who come out and condemn racist and xenophobic
activities, can send an important signal to immigrant communities, and, as noted,
these signals do have value.
Finally, I acknowledge that there may be an additional temporal aspect to my
argument: at what point are social conflicts so buried in the past that their
institutional legacies no longer carry significant meaning for either native minority
groups or society at large? Past social conflict may operate in a fashion similar to
Weber's ([1930] 2005) description of the Protestant ethic: in the same way that the
institutions of modern capitalism survive despite the death of the original'spirit of
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Christian asceticism', inclusive institutions may persist while the social narratives
that they are founded on, and that give them legitimacy, fade away. Whether this
fading away takes place over a generation, or over the centuries, is unclear, but if
societies have inclusive institutions without engaged, vested constituencies or
legitimizing social narratives, it is plausible that these too may be subject to
retrenchment. 49
Given that politicians are so desperate to avoid social conflict, the argument
that past social conflict may contribute to present incorporative activity may seem
quite counter-intuitive. However, when we take into account the role of institutions
in shaping the distribution of power and resources, the importance of social
narratives in legitimizing the civic inclusion of marginalized groups, and the roots
of the motivation that drives native political actors to repurpose these institutions
and narratives in order to benefit newcomers, we can see how the process of
engaging in and resolving social conflict can orient 'new destination' societies in a
way that appears to be quite similar to 'old destinations'. Without the institutional
and social legacies of past social conflict to draw from, new destination societies
may find themselves with a very limited toolkit from which to build and sustain
incorporative activities targeting new immigrant communities.
49 Here I am thinking of the Dutch pillarization system, which was originally created to
preserve social harmony in a society divided by social and religious spheres, but that
collapsed in the second half of the twentieth century. The final vestiges of this system
were, ironically, struck down in the face of Muslim immigration: a system that was once
seen as contributing to social order came to be seen as contributing to it, as 'protected'
spheres came to be seen as isolating and ill-suited to a modern multi-cultural society.
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Chapter 4 - Old Nation, New Nationals: Political Incorporation
in the Republic of Ireland
-- But do you know what a nation means? says John Wyse.
-- Yes, says Bloom.
-- What is it? says John Wyse.
-- A nation? says Bloom. A nation is the same people living in the same place.
-- By God, then, says Ned, laughing, if that's so I'm a nation for I'm living in the same place
for the past five years.
So of course everyone had a laugh at Bloom and says he, trying to muck out of it:
-- Or also living in different places.
-- That covers my case, says Joe.
-- What is your nation if I may ask, says the citizen.
-- Ireland, says Bloom. I was born here. Ireland.
- Excerpt from Ulysses by James Joyce
The question of what constitutes the Irish 'nation' is one that has bedeviled
the island for centuries. Are the Irish those who live in Ireland? Those who were
born on the island? Irish speakers? Can the nation be joined, or can one only be
Irish by virtue of one's lineage? Can one have a British passport, or be Protestant
(or in the case of Joyce's protagonist, Leopold Bloom, Jewish), and still be Irish?
And, perhaps most importantly for Ireland's modern political history, to what
extent should the boundaries of the Irish state reflect the presence of the 'imagined
community' of the Irish nation?
The attempts to answer these questions through both constitutional means
and armed violence have held broad implications for the development of Ireland's
political institutions, national identity, state-society relations, and even
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demographics. But what nobody could have known was that these historical battles
and compromises fought out over the course of the twentieth century would bear
heavily on Ireland's ability to come to terms with its new, surprising twenty-first
century identity as a country of immigration.
Even thirty years ago, the idea that Ireland would someday become an island
of mass immigration would be seen as laughable, as extraordinarily high levels of
emigration have been the norm for most of the last 150 years. Between 1841 and
1861 the island lost close to a third of its population to famine, disease, and
emigration, and for decades afterwards, mass emigration acted as a social, political
and economic safety valve for this poor, tumultuous country that had one of
Europe's highest birthrates. 50 But as the Irish economy stabilized and then took off
in the early 1990s - a phenomenon known globally as the 'Celtic Tiger'- the country
of emigrants became a country of immigrants, and by the mid-2000s, Ireland's
foreign-born population rivaled that of its neighbors. 51
This rapid influx of newcomers led to concerns familiar in neighboring
countries: would - could? - new immigrants become a part of civic life? More
specifically, would Ireland's native political actors take on the task of political
incorporation? Despite the fact that it had no historical narrative of migration to
draw from, nor were there pre-existing organizations and institutions set up
specifically to help immigrants incorporate into civic life, Ireland, perhaps more
than any other new destination country, seemed well positioned to welcome its new
50 By 2011, after over a decade of mass migration, Ireland's population still had not
recovered to its 1841 level.
51 By this, I mean foreign-born as a percentage of the population.
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immigrants. First, in 1998, birthright citizenship was enshrined in the constitution
as part of the post-Troubles political reforms, putting Ireland on par with the
United States, a nation built on immigration, for its naturalization policies. This
meant that unlike many of her neighbors, Ireland would not have a second
generation of immigrants without access to citizenship and all associated political
rights - a clear recipe for social unrest. Second, unusual among most democracies,
Ireland had universal non-citizen voting rights for local elections, meaning that
there were few institutional barriers to entry for immigrant electoral participation -
and for their mobilization by native political actors. Finally, the economic context of
migration in Ireland was extremely favorable: from the mid-1990s until the
economic crash of the late 2000s - i.e. the main period of immigration -
unemployment was at a record low, and Ireland's rate of growth was one of the
highest in Europe. New immigrants were not competing with natives for jobs, but
rather, they were filling new jobs created as the economy expanded. Given these
parameters, we would expect that the booming economy would dampen potential
native complaints about migrant workers - and lessen the impetus to enact
restrictive legislation targeting immigrants.
Yet despite all of these institutional and economic advantages, incorporative
activity on the part of native political actors, and the major parties in particular,
has been uneven. Strategic partnerships between native and immigrant
organizations have been, at times, fruitful but usually unstable, and funding
limited. Electoral incorporation has improved somewhat, but has been neither
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universal nor have ties between parties and immigrant groups been sustained.
Most dramatically, access to birthright citizenship for the children of immigrants
was ended via referendum in 2004, an effort that was led by the parties in
government. Therefore, despite its open civic institutions, strong economy, and an
immigrant population that was neither culturally distant nor disinterested in
politics, incorporative activity in Ireland has been sporadic and limited - at best - on
the part of native political actors. While political parties drove much of the
(in)action around incorporative activity, incorporative efforts have been limited and
relatively ineffectual on the part of unions as well. To their credit, native
community organizations have been trying very hard to build stronger links
between immigrant and political organizations - often with the assistance of local
bureaucrats - but because many of these groups depend on government funding for
their support, despite the best of intentions, incorporative activity has waxed and
waned with the fortunes of both the economy and key actors in the government.
Why, despite the seemingly favorable conditions, have so many Irish political
actors seen fit to leave immigrants at the margins of civic life? First Ireland's civic
institutions can be misleading. Ireland's surprisingly open electoral and citizenship
institutions were not developed to accommodate new immigrants. Rather they were
put in place as part of the process behind settling the 'national question', namely,
separation and independence from Great Britain. Therefore, when these
institutions came under pressure from new immigration, they had relatively few
native political actors who were willing or able to defend them from retrenchment.
112
In addition, there was no predominant social or historical narrative that most
native actors could draw from in order to justify their existence. This was especially
obvious during the debate over birthright citizenship: unlike a country like the
United States where political actors can look to a long history of migration and jus
soli citizenship as part of our civic fabric, in Ireland, these kinds of narratives do not
exist. Finally, while new immigrants did have some emergent native political allies,
these efforts at outreach were swamped by Ireland's broader culture of political
clientelism and populism. In Ireland, the unwritten rules of political interaction -
the importance of face-to-face contact, social networks, and personal relationships -
are more important than the formal rules, which is largely why, at first glance,
Ireland seems so well-primed for incorporative activity, but the reality of the
situation is far different. In Ireland's case, informal institutions and political
expediency take precedence over both formal institutions and political ideology;
subsequently, what looked like an ideal situation from afar turns into quite a
difficult environment for incorporative activity upon closer inspection.
Taken together, the Irish case offers several key lessons. First, open civic
institutions are not enough to facilitate incorporative activity on their own, and in
order to be sustainable over time, they need political allies who both care about
their existence and are willing to fight in order to maintain them. Second, ideology
and political identity are not enough for us to be able to make predictions about
incorporative activity: even actors that look to the same political traditions may
react quite differently when it comes to political incorporation. Finally, while they
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may have the best of intentions, local bureaucrats may not be able to compensate
for a lack of interest in incorporative activity from more explicitly partisan groups:
while bureaucracies do have some autonomy, at the end of the day, they are both
accountable to elected officials and, like civic institutions, vulnerable to budget cuts,
reorganizing, and retrenchment.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section one explains how the
competing visions for Ireland's political status as a nation-state led to the
development of open civic institutions, but a very closed political and social
narrative of the Irish nation that was later codified in the 1937 constitution of the
republic. Section two shows that even with the new constitution as a guide, the
national question repeatedly raised its head, and the Irish government had to re-
evaluate both its internal and external relationships, leading to the development of
surprisingly open civic institutions. Section three traces the rise of immigration in
the 1990s, and the reaction of native political actors. Section four briefly explores
alternative explanations for Ireland's lack of incorporative activity, and introduces
the case of Northern Ireland, which is the focus of Chapter 5.
I. Defining the Irish Nation
Ireland began the 20th century as a multi-national entity that was part of the
United Kingdom. Political battles - and increasingly street battles - over 'the
national question', namely, Ireland's political status vis-A-vis the UK, led to the
partition of the island into a twenty-six county, Catholic-majority, independent
Irish Free State and a six-county Protestant-majority province, Northern Ireland,
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that remained part of the UK. The newly created Free State, despite now being
relatively homogeneous, inherited the British-era political institutions that were
designed to maximize the representation of diverse political views among a
heterogeneous population. However, a split amongst Irish nationalists over the
terms of independence led to a realignment of both the emerging party system and
Irish civil society, and a more closed, restricted vision of a Gaelic, Catholic Ireland
became the dominant political and social narrative on the island. With
constitutional reform in 1937, this vision became codified into law. Therefore, the
new Irish state emerged with both citizenship and electoral institutions that were
designed to be pluralistic and friendly to minority groups - foreigners in particular -
but a dominant social and political narrative that set very 'bright' boundaries of the
Irish nation as an 'imagined community'.
Defining the 'imagined community'
The "Irish Question", namely, the nature of Ireland's political and economic
relationship with the United Kingdom, has long presented a challenge to the British
(and later, the Irish) government. While under British jurisdiction, one political
strategy that emerged in the attempts to control the largely Catholic island was to
populate it with a less restive population. Starting in the 17th century, waves of
Protestants, including Presbyterians from Scotland, were granted land in Ireland,
particularly in the Northern province of Ulster, where the long-powerful Gaelic
clans were stripped of their holdings. With this resettlement, relatively
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homogeneous Ireland became a multi-cultural entity along sectarian lines.
Cleavages between religious groups were deepened by the Penal Laws, which
restricted Catholic and Presbyterian electoral participation, land ownership, and
religious education, while favoring members of the Reformed church (Church of
Ireland). Tensions between these groups accelerated during the 1700s with the
emergence of rural secret societies organized along religious lines: groups such as
the Whiteboys, Peep O'Day Boys, and the Catholic Defenders were organized to
both protect isolated communities against sectarian violence and to punish
landlords and other authority figures who were seen as greedy and usurious.
Notably, the formation of secret societies in order to address both state-led
repression and sectarian violence, is a phenomenon that would occur repeatedly in
Irish politics for the next three centuries.
While skirmishes on the island escalated, events beyond Ireland began to
influence how local actors saw their situation. Most significantly, Irishmen
dissatisfied with British rule found a new model for state-society relations in the
ideals of the French Revolution, and that country's attempts to establish a secular
republic. Inspired (and aided) by the French, in 1798 the United Irishmen launched
the first major uprising with the express intent of establishing an independent,
Irish republic. Interestingly, this rebellion was a multicultural affair: the United
Irishmen was founded by Protestants, and one of the key leaders of the rebellion,
Theobald Wolfe Tone, became known as one of the founding fathers of Irish
republicanism - and he was Protestant as well.
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Although this uprising failed, it served as the catalyst for institutional
change. In 1801, the British Parliament passed the Acts of Union, which redefined
the relationship between Ireland and Great Britain. The Irish Parliament was
abolished, and Ireland was instead allocated a number of seats in the British
Parliament, thus shifting both political control and the battle over the island's
status from Dublin to London. This shift did little to sooth an increasingly restive
population, however, and Ireland experienced a series of conflicts and contentious
social movements over the next century whose demands grew increasingly strident
and nationalist.52
Home Rule
The lack of Irish control over Irish political affairs was a point of contention
across the island. The question remained, however: to what degree should Ireland
establish her autonomy, and by what means? While some favored autonomy within
the UK, others wanted full independence. While some were willing to accept terms
for independence that would leave Ireland as part of the Commonwealth with the
British monarch as the head of state, others wanted to break completely with both
Britain and monarchy in order to establish a republic. And while some who favored
independence wanted to pursue it through constitutional means (namely, legislation
in the British Parliament), others were willing to take up arms in order to establish
52 The major social movements of the 19th and early 20th century can be split into three key
eras: 1) the Catholic emancipation movement in the 1820s, which led to an end of the ban
on Catholics serving in Parliament, 2) the Home Rule movement in the late 1800s, which
sought the devolution of power back to Dublin (but kept Ireland as part of the UK), and, 3)
the push for independence in the 1910s and 20s.
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an independent Ireland. This final tension, between 'constitutional' and 'physical
force' approaches to meet political ends is one that would have dire, bloody
consequences for the entire island of Ireland for much of the twentieth century.
The competing claims over Ireland's political status resulted in the growth of
competing political parties and organizations. The Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP),
pushed for Home Rule, meaning that while Ireland would remain part of the UK, it
would have its own Parliament, and would control its own affairs in all areas but
foreign relations. On the other side of the political divide, the predominately
Protestant Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) emerged in response to the IPP, as many
Protestants, and in particular Ulster Protestants, were deeply opposed to Home
Rule. Fearful of being a minority in an independent, Catholic Ireland, "Home Rule
is Rome Rule" was a constant refrain; indeed, the fears of what this would mean for
unionists led to the creation of the Ulster Covenant, a pledge to resist Home Rule
drafted by unionist leaders in 1912, and subsequently signed by over 470,000
people. Interestingly, this feeling was not universal among Protestants: the
foremost leader of the Home Rule movement and the Irish Parliamentary Party in
the late 1800s, Charles Stewart Parnell, was, like Wolfe Tone, a Protestant.
The IPP dominated political discourse around the 'national question' from the
1880s until the early 1900s, when it began losing ground to the resurgent
republican movement. Republicans rejected home rule and sought to leave the UK
completely: not only did they want an independent Irish state, but they wanted to
break with the Commonwealth (and subsequently, the monarchy) in order to
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establish a republic. Sinn F6in ("We, ourselves") was founded in 1907 as an
amalgamation of various organizations, and positioned itself as the main party of
Irish republicanism. Inspired by rising nationalist movements abroad, the party's
founder, Arthur Griffith, looked not to the British Parliament for a solution to the
'Irish problem', but further east, to the struggles of tiny Hungary to free itself from
the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In 1918, just before the pivotal Parliamentary
elections, he wrote:
Fifty-seven years ago the London "Times," writing of the struggle then waging, said
of the Hungarians -
They wish to be Hungarians, and not Germans, and they have no desire to be
dragged by Austria into German politics and be compelled to spend their
money and lives in pursuit of objects in which they have no interest.
This is to-day the position of the people of Ireland. They wish to be Irish, and not
English, and they have no desire to be dragged by England into British politics and
be compelled to spend their money and their lives in pursuit of objects in which they
have no interest (1918, xii).
Griffith was not the first republican to look abroad for inspiration: Wolfe Tone and
the United Irishmen were not only inspired by the French republicans of the 18th
century, but they even used France as a base to launch the 1798 uprising.
However, Griffith's use of the Hungarian case to both frame and pose a solution to
the 'Irish problem' - in other words, using the situation of another struggling,
disenfranchised group to highlight the struggles of the Irish people - is notable, for
this is a tactic that would be powerfully deployed by Irish republicans time and time
again, particularly in Northern Ireland.
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Parties were not the only groups emerging to take a position on the 'national
question' during this era: paramilitary organizations grew in strength and support
as well.5 3 The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the Irish Volunteers, the Irish
Republican Brotherhood (IRB) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) all saw the use
of violence as legitimate in pursuit of their political goals, whether maintaining
political union with Britain, as in the case of the UVF, or establishing an
independent Irish republic (the position of the IRB and the IRA). Foreshadowing
what would be a lasting issue in twentieth-century Irish politics, there were close
ties between paramilitary organizations and political parties: Edward Carson, the
founder of the UVF, was a member of the British Parliament and a leader of the
Ulster Unionist Party, and on the other side, many members of the IRB and IRA
became members of Sinn F6in as well.
Finally, the rising nationalism of the 19th and early 20th century not only
manifested itself through political life, but through the establishment of social and
cultural institutions as well. The Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA), which featured
Irish sports such as hurling and Gaelic football (as opposed to 'foreign' sports such
as soccer and rugby), the Abbey Theater, featuring works by Irish playwrights, and
the revival of the Irish language through groups such as the Gaelic League all
contributed in their own way to furthering the demands for an Ireland free of
5 Even before the late 19 th and early 20th century battles over the 'national question,
Ireland had a well-established history of secret societies that were willing to use
intimidation and violence to meet their objectives.
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British control. 54 Many of these groups had close ties to leaders in the republican
movement; for example, Eamon de Valera, now considered one of the founding
fathers of the modern Irish state, was active in the Gaelic League, the IRB, the IRA
and Sinn Fein.
These tensions boiled over in 1916 with the Easter Rising, when republican
rebels seized several buildings and outposts in Dublin and declared the "Irish
Republic as a Sovereign Independent State". Patrick Pearse, a member of the Irish
Republican Brotherhood read a proclamation in front of the General Post Office in
Dublin, declaring Ireland to be an independent republic. Although he drew only a
few curious glances, the text of the Proclamation was quite radical, not just due to
its declaration of independence, but for its focus on equality (it was specifically
addressed to "Irishmen and Irishwomen") and civil liberties:
The Republic guarantees religious and civil liberty, equal rights and equal
opportunities to all its citizens, and declares its resolve to pursue the happiness and
prosperity of the whole nation and of all its parts, cherishing all the children of the
nation equally, and oblivious of the differences carefully fostered by an alien
government, which have divided a minority from the majority in the past.
Although the rebellion did not receive widespread support and was quickly
put down by the British Army, public opinion began to shift in favor of
republicanism, and Sinn Fein went on to win a majority of the Irish seats - 73 out
of 105 - in the 1918 Parliamentary elections. However, although they won the
seats, they did not take the seats: this abstentionist policy, which still holds today,
was because republicans saw the British Parliament as the unlawful arbiter of Irish
54 Indeed, the GAA banned the use of the national stadium, Croke Park, for the playing of
"foreign games" until 2005.
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political life and as a distraction from the formation of a distinctly Irish political
identity.55 Instead, Sinn Fein announced that they were forming their own Irish
parliamentary body, Daiil Eireann, and they, not the Parliament, were the lawful
representatives of the Irish people.
Alarmed by the under-representation of Unionists in local government and
the rise of Sinn F6in as the dominant political force on the island, the British
government passed the Local Government (Ireland) Act in 1919. This act changed
voting procedures in Ireland, switching from a majoritarian voting system to a
system of proportional representation. Under the old 'majority rules' approach, in
the 1918 elections, unionists outside of Ulster were only able to win one seat in the
House of Commons, despite the fact that they had over double-digit support in parts
of Dublin and Cork. With the specter of Home Rule looming, southern Unionists
feared that they would be forever excluded from political life under the existing
electoral rules. Proportional representation would ensure that unionist
representation in local government at least somewhat reflected unionist support
among local voters. In legislative debates over the issue (a debate that Sinn F6in
did not participate in, due to their policy of abstentionism), Lieutenant-Colonel
Guinness made explicit reference to the effect that proportional representation
would have on minority rights:
In Ireland we want to give representation to the ratepayers, who in many cases have
not had their interests property considered, and we are quite convinced, judging by
the Sligo experience [Sligo experimented with proportional representation several
55 Sinn Fein's abstentionist policy is another example of the influence that the Hungarian
nationalist movement had on early 20th century republicanism, and Arthur Griffith in
particular.
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years prior], that we shall get a far more just representation of minorities under
proportional representation than under the present system. 56
However, it is difficult to separate anxiety about being a political minority
from the anxiety over being a political minority in a system where republicanism
dominated. Guinness went on to note that:
The Nationalist organization in the South has for many years monopolised
representation, and this fact will be aggravated, as against Unionist opinion, very
much in the future, because it is well known that Mr. John Redmond exercised a
very strong influence in favor of toleration in local politics - an influence which is in
no way accepted by his Sinn F6in successors. 57
Finally, in 1920, the 'Irish question' came to a head. Ulster unionists flatly
rejected both Home Rule and independence, while republicans were unwilling to
accept anything except independence at that point. The compromise: Ireland would
become an independent member of the commonwealth with the British monarch as
the Head of State, but residents of the six-counties designated as Northern Ireland
in the Home Rule legislation would vote on whether or not they wanted to join the
newly created Irish Free State or remain part of the United Kingdom. The 'decision'
to opt-out, however, was a fait accompli: it would not be made on an all-Ireland
basis, but would rather be left to the potential citizens of Northern Ireland - an
entity whose boundaries were drawn to ensure a unionist majority, and would
therefore guarantee that the vote for partition would be affirmative.
The resolution of the Irish question became even more contentious when the
terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, which granted Irish independence, became known
in the South. To the horror of many republicans, because Ireland would remain
56 114 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5 th ser.) (1919) 99-183.
57 Ibid.
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part of the British Commonwealth, upon taking office, legislators would be required
to take an oath to the King. This, along with partition, was anathema to hardline
republicans in Sinn F6in, but despite their objections both the British Parliament
and the Daiil (the new Irish parliamentary body), approved the treaty. With that,
the party system atomized: the 'anti-treaty' faction of Sinn Fein, led by Eamon De
Valera, walked out of the Daiil, and many took up arms against the new Irish state,
launching the short but bloody Irish Civil War. The 'pro-treaty' faction of the
Republican movement, while fending off attacks from anti-treaty forces, set about
establishing the new institutions of the Irish state.
Institutionalizing the Imagined Community: Conflict and Constitutional
Reform (1922-1937)
Irish independence has been often described as a process of simply painting
the mailboxes green: there was a surprising degree of institutional continuity pre
and post. 58 However, the reforms of the era did in many ways reflect the
aspirations and concerns that were the key drivers of the push for independence.
They also reflected many of the logistical and demographic issues created by
partition, an issue that would continue to bedevil both the British and Irish
governments for most of the twentieth century.
With the partition of the island, the new twenty-six county Irish Free State
was far more homogeneous: whereas the 1911 census that included all of Ireland's
58 As a point of explanation: the old Royal Mail boxes were red. However, this assessment
is not without merit: Articles 75 and 77 of the 1922 constitution essentially grandfathered
in both the old court system and all public officials.
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32 counties found that 24% of the Irish population was Protestant, by 1921, this
figure had dropped to 7% for the newly created Free State (CSO 1926).
Nevertheless, there was still a strong unionist political presence in and around
Dublin, and South Dublin in particular, home to many of the Anglo-Irish elite. This
left the government to deal with two fundamental questions: in a newly created
state where people held different national identities, how would citizenship be
defined, and how could membership in the polity be determined? Subsequently,
many of the clauses in the new constitution around issues of citizenship and civic
participation were clearly written with an eye towards both the remaining Anglo-
Irish population and the 'lost' nationalist population in the North. Article 3 of the
Constitution of the Irish Free State (1922) granted citizenship to anyone who:
...at the time of the coming into operation of this Constitution, who was born in
Ireland or either of whose parents was born in Ireland or who has been ordinarily
resident in the area of the jurisdiction of the Irish Free State (Saorstat Eireann) for
not less than seven years, is a citizen of the Irish Free State (Saorstat Eireann). 59
However, in a nod to the segment of the population that identified politically with
Great Britain, Article 3 also gives people who were in the state at the time of its
creation the right to not accept Irish citizenship.
The new constitution not only addressed the concerns with being a
multinational state, but also reflected many of the demands and concerns voiced
over the last century of rising nationalism. Asserting the primacy of Gaelic culture,
Irish was established as the national language, although English is also
acknowledged (Article 4). In addition, the protection of freedom of conscience and
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59 Article 3.
religious expression and education (Article 8) were a reaction to centuries of anti-
Catholic discrimination. Finally, in a bid to curb paramilitarism and extrajudicial
activity on the part of groups like the IRA, the constitution gave the newly formed
Oireachtas (Parliament) the 'exclusive right' to organize and maintain state security
forces (Article 46).
The 1922 Constitution and the subsequent administrative decisions were
primarily the work of the pro-treaty forces that remained in government, now
organized into a new party, Cumann na nGaedheal ("Society of the Gaels").
However, after several years in the political wilderness, anti-treaty forces began to
reorganize themselves, and in 1926, De Valera and other former members of Sinn
F6in formed Fianna Fail ('Soldiers of Destiny'). De Valera laid out Fianna Fail's
key initiatives in his first address to the party, namely, removing the loyalty oath
from the constitution, unifying republicanism, and improving the economic
condition of the population. Beyond the specifics grievances of the anti-treaty side,
however, he also seemed to lay out the party's approach to policy and voter
outreach:
The duty of Republicans, to my mind is clear. They must do their part to secure
common action by getting into a position along the most likely line of the nation's
advance. If you want to know what the direction of that line of advance at the
moment is, ask yourselves what line a young man would be likely to take - a young
man, let us say, with strong national feelings, honest and courageous, but without
set prejudices or any commitments of his past to hamper him - who aimed solely at
serving the national cause and bringing it to a successful issue.60
60 De Valera, Eamon, "Address to the Inaugural Meeting of Fianna Fail," La Scala Theatre,
Dublin, (May 16, 1926).
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What is noticeable here is that there is a complete lack of policy - instead, party
members are asked to divine where voters want to go, not where they want to take
voters. This would also emerge to be one of the key critiques of modern Irish party
politics, and Fianna Faiil in particular: parties were indistinguishable in terms of
policy or where they belonged on the political spectrum. Bereft of traditional left-
right ideology, the primary mechanisms for organizing politics were therefore
populism and nationalism.
Dubbing themselves 'the Republican Party', Fianna Fiil contested elections
in 1927, and five years later won enough seats to form their first government. With
that victory, De Valera was well positioned to re-orient Ireland's political and legal
institutions, and the main vehicle through which he established his vision for Irish
society was through a new constitution, known as Bunreacht na hEireann
(heretofore referred to as 'BnE' or ' the Constitution'). This constitution differed
from its 1922 counterpart in several notable aspects. First, in a rebuff to partition,
Article 2 laid claim to the entire island, not just the twenty-six designated as
independent. This did not go over well with unionists. In addition, citizenship was
no longer explicitly granted through birthright in the constitution; rather, Article 9
gave the power to make citizenship laws to the legislature. It did, however,
maintain access to citizenship for anyone born on any part of the island (north or
south) prior to the enactment of the constitution. Finally, De Valera's constitution
was much more specific than the 1922 version when it came to social policy, and
included sections on the family and religion. These were contentious in some
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quarters: Article 41 made mention of the special role of women 'in the home', and in
another move that would not endear Fianna Faiil to Protestant unionists, Article 44
explicitly recognized the "special position of the "Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman
Church as the guardian of the Faith". While it went on to acknowledge other faith
communities, including the Church of Ireland and Presbyterians, many Protestants
- and progressive republicans - were unhappy about the precedence given to
Catholicism, while some hardline Catholics were unhappy that Roman Catholicism
was not officially named the state religion in the constitution.
It is notable that many republicans were opposed to De Valera's constitution,
for he was the republican leader who rejected the Anglo-Irish treaty - and the
democratically elected Dail - precisely because they were seen as incongruent with
republican values. Yet De Valera's objection to the Anglo-Irish treaty for being
'insufficiently republican' is the very criticism that was leveled at his constitution: it
departed from the liberal, egalitarian ethos espoused by the 1916 Proclamation, and
was instead a conservative, religious, and overtly nationalist document. If nothing
else, the tensions around the 1937 Constitution highlighted the clear points of
divergence within the Church of Republicanism. While some preached adherence to
a more liberal vision of the modern Irish Republic, others who identified as
republicans held a more nationalist, ethno-centric ideal of civic and national life.
Given that differentiated treatment of the Irish by the British state was largely due
to ethno-cultural differences, and this differentiated treatment is what fueled both
the Gaelic cultural revival and the political mobilization of the late nineteenth and
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early twentieth centuries, it is not surprising that it is hard to separate
republicanism and ethno-nationalism.
Bunreacht na hEireann was put to a referendum and was approved by 56% of
voters. Yet despite these changes, some aspects of Irish political life remained the
same. Most important were the electoral institutions. As described in the previous
section, in 1919 the British ended the plurality voting system (also known as
'winner take all' or 'first-past-the-post', hence 'FPTP') whereby whoever collected
the most votes for a district won that seat, and replaced it with a system of
proportional representation (PR), whereby within a given district, votes would be
allocated to parties based on the percentage of the overall votes they received. This
system not only remained in place after independence and with the new
constitution (Article 16), but was extended to national elections as well. The new
constitution also guaranteed multi-member electoral districts: each constituency
would have at least three representatives.
The fact that Ireland maintained a PR system is critical to its political
development over the twentieth century because differences in political outcomes
between a FPTP/single member district and a PR/multi-member district are stark.
First, per Duverger's Law, FPTP simply require a plurality: whoever gets the most
votes wins. This institution tends to produce two-party political systems, for small
parties have little hope of ever gaining a majority of votes. The UK and the United
States are prime examples. 6 1 On the other hand, since under PR, parties can gain a
61 The recent success of the UK's Liberal Party notwithstanding.
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number of seats in direct proportion to the votes they receive, the system tends to
encourage the formation of multiple parties, including smaller niche parties that
can sometimes tip the balance of power in a legislature and may therefore play an
outside role in agenda setting.62
To observe the practical implications of this theory, consider the case of the
Irish Labour Party in Dublin versus the UK Labour Party in London. In a district
in North Dublin, Labour garners 40% support in polling ahead of the election, and
in a district in North London, UK Labour also garners 40% polling support. Under
Irish voting laws, this district has multiple members - let's say five - so if Labour
has the support of 40% of voters, they are likely to win 40% of the five available
seats - so two seats. Under the UK system, our fictitious North London district
only has one representative, so there is only one available seat. Voters cast their
ballots, and while the Labour candidate wins 40% of the votes, they lose the seat to
the Conservative candidate, who wins 60% of the votes. Therefore, UK Labour will
never have representation in that North London district, whereas in our North
Dublin district Irish Labour will have representatives in the legislature - despite
the fact that they did not win a majority of votes. Looking at our districts, you can
also see why Ireland has experienced the rise and fall of a number of small parties
over the years while the UK has not: under proportional representation, even
62 One notable example of a system where PR gives disproportionate power to small parties
is Spain. While the two main left-wing and center-right parties dominate, regional parties
from the Basque Country and Catalonia have a presence in the national legislature as well,
and because the two large parties do not usually have enough seats to form a government
on their own, they often need to team up with a regional party, which then trades its
support in return for greater concessions on regional autonomy.
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winning as few as five or ten percent of votes can allow for small parties such as the
Greens or the Liberals to gain seats in a legislative body. The inclusion of a wider
swathe of political parties (and hence viewpoints) is why political scientists have
highlighted PR systems as being optimal for diverse societies (Lijphart 1999):
minority political interests may not always win elections outright, but they can still
be included in government, and it is the lack of inclusion that is at the root
contentious politics in diverse societies.
However, making things more complicated, Ireland also introduced the
single-transferrable vote system (STV), whereby voters rank candidates on the
ballot according to their preference, and those preferences are then tallied and
distributed across candidates. Therefore, under a PR-STV system, multiple small
parties can flourish, but because voters give preferences to individual candidates, it
is also relatively friendly to independent candidates as well: people interested in
running for office do not have to do so under the auspices (or constraints) of a
political party. Combined, PR-STV sets few formal barriers to electoral
engagement, whether on behalf of upstart political parties or motivated individuals,
and on the flipside, voters facing multiple options are likely to find candidates who
represent their views - and if not, they can throw their hat into the ring themselves
without much difficulty.
Taken together, the 1937 constitution had two interesting, and competing
undercurrents that could affect state-society relations. On the one hand, as
described above, the electoral institutions put into place were created to optimize
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the number of viewpoints that could emerge and be represented in parliamentary
politics. Combined with universal suffrage, Ireland's electoral institutions
represented what Dahl calls "polyarchy', namely an electoral regime that is "highly
inclusive and extensively open to public contestation" (1971, 8). But on the other
hand, on questions of identity and social policy, the constitution seems more closed:
while the references to the Irish language were not surprising, the preeminence of
the Catholic Church, the nods to "morality" in the regulation of individual behavior,
and the highlighting of women's role in the home, rather than in public life, set off
some alarm bells, not just among the Anglo-Irish but even among more liberal
republicans as well. Taken together, the constitution was expansive in its approach
to electoral institutions yet restrictive in its views of national identity and social
policy - and these tensions would have long-term ramifications for both the ongoing
Irish nation-building project and how Irish political actors - and parties in
particular - would respond to immigration. 63
63 Indeed, these tensions were often stoked by cultural representations of 'Irishness' even
within republican-aligned cultural institutions. Arthur Griffith, the founder of Sinn F6in,
famously led protests against J.M. Synge's play The Playboy of the Western World for being
both indecent and insufficiently political. The play painted a rather unflattering portrait of
the rural Irish, who were fetishized by some nationalists as the embodiment of national
virtues. Ironically, Playboy was staged at the national theater in Dublin, which was co-
founded by W.B. Yeats specifically to feature the work of Irish artists. Although Yeats
supported the republican movement - indeed, some of his most famous works were inspired
by this period in Irish history - he despaired of the militant ethnocentrism of some
republican leaders and the public. The conflict between the idealized narrative of the noble
Irish and literary critiques of Irish politics and culture surfaced again in 1926 after the
Abbey debut of Sean O'Casey's The Plough and the Stars: the unflattering portrayal of some
participants in the 1916 Easter Rising and the depiction of politically indifferent Dubliners
sparked shouts and hissing from the audience, prompting a now-elderly Yeats, mindful of
the Playboy riots, to reportedly leap onto stage and shout in response, "You have disgraced
yourselves again! Is this going to be a reoccurring celebration of Irish genius?" (Miller 1972
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II. Re-setting the boundaries of the Nation (1937-1998)
Eamon DeValera's 1937 constitution was a declaration of both the nature and
boundaries of the Irish nation. However, Ireland would be forced to re-consider
these issues over the course of the 20th century. Poverty at home drove high levels
of emigration well into the 1980s, and the dispersion of Irish people around the
world helped to reframe the narrative of the Irish nation as one that looked to the
bonds of blood and history to determine membership. Yet at the same time, conflict
in the North forced the Irish government to reassess the relationship between the
boundaries of the state and the nation on territorial grounds. Therefore, in the
period between the institutionalization of the principles laid out in Dev's
constitution, and the onset of mass migration, Ireland expanded its access to both
jus soli and jus sanguinis citizenship.
At the same time Ireland had to reassess the laws of legal citizenship, it also
had to reconsider the laws of political citizenship, namely the rules and regulations
that determined membership in the polity and state-society relations.
Independence and partition did not end ties with Britain: thousands of British
citizens still lived in Ireland after independence and at a time when land rights
partially determined electoral rights, widespread British land ownership and
intermarriage between British and Irish citizens made determining who had a right
to vote an administrative headache for local officials.
quoted in Yale University Modernism Lab, available online at:
http://modernism.research.yale.edu/wiki/index.php/The-Plough and the Stars.)
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Finally, the Irish government had to reassess their socio-economic policies.
While self-sufficiency and economic development were key priorities of De Valera's
brand of republicanism, Ireland's persistently high emigration rates served as a
visible rejoinder to the government's social and economic policies. Starting in the
1950s, generational turnover amongst political elites meant that new leadership
increasingly looked to the European common market abroad and reform at home to
stabilize both the economy and the population. Yet cycles of tepid growth and
severe recession were common into the 1980s, forcing a complete restructuring of
both fiscal policy and state-society relations. Wary of the strife in neighboring
Britain over Thatcher's economic and labor reforms, the Irish government instead
chose a consultative approach, giving unions, and later NGOs access to the
policymaking process through 'social partnership', a tripartite bargaining regime
involving negotiations between the government (led by the Office of the Taoiseach),
the main employer's association, the Irish Business and Employers Confederation
(IBEC), and the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), with additional
consultation from community organization and farmer's groups.
These changes along multiple fronts meant that, despite no history of
immigration - indeed, the high levels of emigration during this period would make
mass immigration almost unthinkable - and a post-partition population that was
extraordinarily homogeneous, by the late 1990s, Ireland had, quite by accident,
some of the most minority-friendly civic institutions in the world. Birthright
citizenship and non-citizen local voting rights meant that immigrants and their
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children had greater access to political membership than the majority of their
counterparts in Western Europe - or in most Western democracies, for that matter.
Ireland's system of social partnership institutionalized an inclusive model of state-
society relations that even included the voluntary sector (the non-profit sector), and
at the time was heralded as a model "third way" between Thatcherism and
Scandinavian-style corporatism. Collectively, Ireland's electoral and civic
institutions were what Lijphart (1999) calls consultative, ideally designed to allow
multiple actors access, and to allow even small minority groups to have their voices
heard and weighted in public affairs. This is the situation that confronted new
immigrants when they began arriving en masse in the 1990s - and this situation is
also why the response of natives to that arrival would seem so surprising.
Defining the Nation
Since the foundation of the Irish state, citizenship rights have been part of
the Irish constitution and codified in law. The 1937 Constitution shifted the issue of
citizenship to the legislature, noting, "The future acquisition and loss of Irish
nationality and citizenship shall be determined in accordance with law". This
meant that, despite the changes of 1937, the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act
of 1935 was the law of the land. Article 2(1)(b) of the act notes that:
"The following persons shall be natural-born citizens of Saorstat Eireann, that
is to say:
(a ) every person who was born in Saorstit Eireann on or after the 6th day of
December, 1922, and before the date of the passing of this Act, and
(b ) every person who is born in Saorstait Eireann on or after the date of the
passing of this Act,
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The Act also allowed for children whose births were registered in Northern
Ireland to have access to citizenship, although they were required to make a
statement of intent to maintain their citizenship when they became twenty-one.
The next major change to the law came in 1956 with an updated Irish
Nationality and Citizenship Act that explicitly proclaimed "Every person born in
Ireland is an Irish citizen from birth".64 Despite these subtle changes in the
wording of citizenship regulations, there were two constants: access to Irish
citizenship for people born in Northern Ireland - which the Irish government
claimed under Article 2 of the 1937 constitution 65 - and access to Irish citizenship
for the children of Irish people living abroad - a clear nod to the centrality of
emigration in Irish political and social life.
The issue of citizenship returned to the political agenda however, due to the
escalating conflict in the North. In 1969, the region collapsed into a bloody
sectarian conflict that came to be known as the Troubles. At stake were two key
issues that had remained contentious since partition: the role of Catholics in
electoral politics and civil society, and Northern Ireland's political status vis-a'-vis
the UK and the Republic. Put somewhat differently, Northern Ireland was a multi-
national statelet that had yet to come to an agreement between nationalists and
unionists over 1) how these different groups could engage in local politics and 2)
" Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, 1956, No. 26 (1956), 11.6(1).
65 Specifically, the original version of the constitution read: "The national territory consists
of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas" (Article 2).
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how changes could be made to Northern Ireland's political status vis-a-vis Great
Britain without resorting to violence.
Because republicans on both sides of the border wanted to see Northern
Ireland reunited with Ireland, any resolution to the conflict necessitated the
involvement of the Irish government and concessions in Irish law. Yet Article 2 of
the 1937 constitution refused to recognize British claims to Northern Ireland,
instead affirming, "The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its
islands and the territorial seas". This was a major sticking point in the peace
process: unionists felt threatened by Ireland's claims over what they saw as 'their'
territory. Ultimately, negotiators reached a compromise: the Republic would
remove its claim to the entire island from its constitution (pleasing Unionists), but
it would insert a clause that would guarantee that anyone born anywhere on the
island had the right to join the Irish nation via citizenship - even if they were born
north of the border (thereby pleasing Nationalists). Subsequently, as part of the
peace process, Article 2 was stripped from the constitution, and a new clause was
added, guaranteeing birthright citizenship for anyone born on either side of the
border:
It is the entitlement and birthright of every person born in the island of Ireland,
which includes its islands and seas, to be part of the Irish nation. That is also the
entitlement of all persons otherwise qualified in accordance with law to be citizens of
Ireland. Furthermore, the Irish nation cherishes its special affinity with people of
Irish ancestry living abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage.
What is interesting about the new Article 2 is that it manages to be both a
statement of jus soli and jus sanguinis citizenship: it acknowledges membership
through both place of birth and blood. In addition, whereas before citizenship
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matters were determined via legislation, with the new GFA clause - a change that
over 90% of voters approved of - it was now enshrined in the constitution, which
could only be changed with a public referendum, not by politicians. Unlike
citizenship policies in settler states, however, this change had nothing to do with
immigration; rather, they were the result of the ongoing political debate over the
'national question'. And any concerns about what this constitutional change would
mean for potential future immigration were trumped by broader concerns that the
delicate peace process should not be sidetracked or potentially derailed by
introducing a debate about immigration into what was already a contentious
negotiation.
Defining the Electorate
Beyond the question of legal citizenship was the issue of political citizenship:
who could participate in civic life, and under what terms? This question became
increasingly urgent at the local level because of the complicated rules governing
eligibility to participate in local elections including calculations about property
taxes, marriage, and occupancy.
Subsequently, in the early 1960s, debate over eligibility for local elections
reached the Oireachtas, where it was proposed that local voting rights simply be
based on residency, rather than citizenship. The government's position was put
forth by the Minister for Local Government in a Committee on Finance hearing held
as the law was being written:
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In the case of local elections, it is proposed to allow every person aged 21 years or
more who normally resides or occupies property in the area of a local authority to be
registered there as a local government elector, irrespective of whether or not he is an
Irish citizen. At present a person who is not an Irish citizen can be registered as a
local government elector only if he has occupied property in the area of a local
authority for six months, or is the wife of such an occupier, and is a British subject.
The number of non-citizens who will receive the local government franchise as a
result of the proposal will be small, but considerable simplifications in registration
procedures will result from the change [italics added]. 66
These comments suggest that the law was made universal for administrative
purposes, rather than any desire to incorporate the small non-British foreign-born
population that existed in Ireland at the time. The new electoral rules went into
effect under the Electoral Act of 1963, whereby anyone over the age of 21 who was a
regular resident or had six months residency was declared eligible to register to
vote in local elections, regardless of their citizenship status.67
The Economy and Civil Society
Ireland's feeble economy also forced a re-think of both internal and external
state-society relations over time. First, the weak labor market plus high birth rates
insured that Ireland had one of Europe's highest rates of emigration, long into the
post-war period, a source of shame for many people who felt that the country should
be able to provide for its own.68 Second, high unemployment and the weak economy
66 The exact statute can be found on the Oireachtas website at:
http://debates.oireachtas.ie/dail/1963/02/27/00058.asp.
67 Electoral Act, 1963, Number 19, (1963), 5(2)a.
68 Many, but not all. During an interview with Newsweek magazine in the 1980s, Fianna
Fiil minister Brian Lenihan, in response to a question on the emigration issue reportedly
responded, "Sure, we can't all live on a small island".
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were also a source of political tension for those who stayed, and by the 1980s,
strikes and protests were increasingly common.
In 1943, Eamon De Valera, then the Taoiseach (prime minister) of Ireland,
gave a radio address that came to be known as "The Ireland That We Dreamed Of'
speech.
The ideal Ireland that we would have, the Ireland that we dreamed of, would be the
home of a people who valued material wealth only as a basis for right living, of a
people who, satisfied with frugal comfort, devoted their leisure to the things of the
spirit - a land whose countryside would be bright with cosy homesteads, whose
fields and villages would be joyous with the sounds of industry, with the romping of
sturdy children, the contest of athletic youths and the laughter of happy maidens,
whose firesides would be forums for the wisdom of serene old age. The home, in
short, of a people living the life that God desires that men should live. (quoted from
Coogan 1966, 72)
However, by the 1950s, this dream of a rural, happy, God-fearing Ireland had
become a nightmare. Ireland's autarkic economic policies, high birthrate, and lack
of industry spelled economic disaster: over half a million people emigrated over the
decade, close to 16% of the population (Glynn 2012). Other Fianna Fiil ministers
recognized that for a small, agricultural country to survive economically, it needed a
better strategy than exporting workers. With De Valera's retirement from the office
of Taoiseach and the appointment of Sean Lemass, Ireland began the first in a
series of policy changes meant to reorient the economy outward. In 1959, tariffs
were abolished, and tax breaks were offered to foreign companies looking to invest
in Ireland. In the 1960s, Ireland improved its economic relations with Britain, and
in the 1970s, it joined the European Economic Community (EEC).
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By the 1980s, however, the economy was back in free fall again: the
unemployment rate reached 17%, and industrial action paralyzed the country.
Interestingly, neighboring Britain was undergoing similar upheaval at the time: a
high unemployment rate and faltering heavy industry lead to massive worker
strikes across the country. In Britain, the solution was Thatcherism: the
government refused to negotiate with the unions, and broke the back of the labor
movement. Ireland, however, tried a different approach: in an arrangement that
came to be known as "social partnership", the country established a tripartite
bargaining structure that allowed for the government (through the Office of the
Taoiseach), the employers association IBEC, and key worker organizations (the
main trade union federation ICTU and several farmers' associations) to sit down
and negotiate social policy and wages every three years. Over time, this
arrangement also included a "fourth" leg of civic associations who weighed in on
social policy. The core organizing principle of the model was to create a deliberative
institution where key stakeholders could collectively address not only wage
concerns but economic policy as well, and as it developed, social partnership came to
be seen as an alternative to Thatcherite politics (Roche 2007; Baccaro and Lim
2007).69
The cooperation and wage moderation fostered by the social partnership
agreements not only promoted greater cooperation between key Irish interest
groups, but also facilitated Ireland's entry into both the European Union and the
69 The deliberative nature of social partnership has been called into question; see Teague
2006; Donaghey 2008.
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euro zone. In 1992, Ireland signed the Maastricht Treaty, and thus began laying
the economic and policy groundwork to attempt to qualify for the euro. In the mid-
1990s, Ireland met the necessary benchmarks for euro zone membership, and in
1999 it officially adopted the single currency. However, with the signing of the
Maastricht Treaty, Ireland also committed itself to European citizenship, namely
the free movement of citizens of member states to other states. This freedom of
movement included full access to the Irish labor market for any EU citizen, a clause
that, perhaps more than any other, would have unforeseen consequences for
immigration.
Conclusion
Between the signing of Bunreacht na hEireann in 1937 and the Good Friday
Agreement of 1998, Ireland underwent a series of social, economic, and political
changes that few could have foreseen: unprecedented economic growth due in large
part to Ireland's openness to foreign investment, peace in Northern Ireland, and an
emergent 'third way' model of industrial relations all served as key indicators of
Ireland's progression from an agrarian, nationalistic, inwards-looking society to a
modern European state. Yet despite these advances, there were still deep and
unresolved inconsistencies in Irish political life. The most critical was on the issue
of citizenship. The 1998 constitutional amendment to the citizenship laws was
quite liberal in that allowed for both birth and blood-based access to citizenship (jus
soli and jus sanguinis), but its establishment had little to do with institutionalizing
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a consciously expansionist and inclusive view of citizenship and nationhood. Rather
it was a new, more politically acceptable way to make an old claim: that the island
of Ireland was for the Irish, so despite the creation of the border, anyone on the
island had access to membership in the nation. Therefore, in the case of Ireland's
'liberal' citizenship regulations, there was a strongly nationalist historical narrative
that underpinned what was a seemingly open policy.
III. New nationals, new problems (1998 - 2010)
With the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, and the successful
constitutional referendum to reform citizenship law, Ireland had, so it thought,
defined and encoded in law a twenty-first century vision of the Irish nation. Few
could have suspected that over the next decade the country would be forced to
reopen this question of 'what is the nation' - not due to conflict in the North, but
rather due to immigration. Fewer still would have predicted, given the nature and
context of that migration and the openness of Ireland's civic institutions, that the
answer to that question would be so restricted.
The consultative nature of Ireland's political institutions might lead us to
expect significant incorporative activity: Ireland's electoral institutions and its
approach to social policy were designed to maximize inclusion. Yet we see the
opposite across a number of measures. Native political actors sought to close the
pathway to citizenship for Irish-born children of immigrants. While there was party
outreach to migrant candidates, their migrant voter mobilization was relatively
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limited. And strategic partnerships between native political actors and migrant
organizations were often limited and unstable. Attempts by local bureaucrats to
compensate for the lack of incorporative activity from party officials had some
success, and helped build networks among migrant-led organizations, but funding
issues and high staff turnover plagued the entire bureaucratic infrastructure
implemented in order to deal with immigration. Therefore, while the attempts at
bureaucratic incorporation were at times heroic, these efforts were also necessarily
limited by both the remit of local government and by the fact that funding was still
controlled by elected officials at the national level.
New migration
In 1996, two years before the Good Friday Agreement was signed,
immigration in Ireland was still primarily a British affair: while 7.5% of the
population was foreign-born, only 2.1% of the population was foreign-born and not
born in the UK. This is a key distinction, for many of the UK-born 'immigrants'
living in Ireland self-identify as Irish, not British nationals. This is in part due to
how the Irish census asks about nationality. Question 5 asks about where the
respondent's mother lived when they were born, but Question 6 asks the respondent
to self-identify their nationality, and according to the census data for UK-born
immigrants, there is a significant gap between the two: the number of self-reported
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UK nationals is far below the number of UK-born immigrants. 70 Given the freedom
of movement between Ireland and the UK, this gap is likely attributable to the
children of either Irish migrant workers in England or of nationalists in Northern
Ireland now living in the Republic, a population that would not be considered
immigrants socially or politically. 71 Although this position seems somewhat ironic
given the tortured relationship between Britain and Ireland over the last several
centuries over these very issues of citizenship and nationhood, it is also
understandable given not only the fluidity of movement between the two countries,
but their shared language, history, and to some extent, even popular culture. 72
As the unemployment rate fell in the 1990s, and foreign investment and
economic activity increased, Ireland began to beckon to those beyond its extensive
diaspora. Between 1996 and 2001, the non-UK foreign-born population more than
doubled from 2.1% to 4.7%, and by 2006, it stood at 8.2%.73 The overall foreign-born
rate rose over the same period from 7.5% to 11.4% to just under 15% by 2006. This
put the relative size of Ireland's foreign-born population ahead of that in the UK
70 In 2006, 271,781 respondents reported that they were born in the UK, but only 112,548
reported having UK nationality, meaning that over half of the UK- born 'immigrants' in
Ireland do not identify as UK nationals.
71 Two key clues that even many self-reported UK nationals are of likely Irish descent is the
fact that almost half of the children spoke Irish and close to half reported their religious
affiliation as Roman Catholic (CSO 2008).
72 Despite the fact that Irish is the first official language, the majority of the Irish
population speaks English as a first language. In addition, some aspects of British popular
culture are ubiquitous in Ireland, including support for Premier League football and the
wild popularity of reality television shows like X-Factor and Britain's Got Talent.
73 These years were chosen as they follow the Irish census cycle, which is on the years
ending in one and six for every decade.
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(10.1% foreign born in 2006) - an amazing turnaround for a country that long relied
on Britain to absorb its excess labor (OECD 2010).
Ireland's decade of mass migration can be split into two periods however: pre
and post 2004. That was the year that the European Union added ten new member
states: Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Hungary, Malta, and Cyprus. Of these, only Malta and Cyprus were given full
labor market rights within the EU; the other so-called 'A8' countries of Central and
Eastern Europe would instead be gradually absorbed into Western Europe, as each
existing EU member state was allowed to defer labor market entry to A8 workers
for up to seven years. Of the original member states (the EU-15), only Ireland, the
UK, and Sweden gave A8 workers immediate access to their labor markets. At the
time, the Irish and British governments estimated that relatively few Eastern
Europeans would move to the British Isles: in media reports, the British
government estimated that around 15,000 A8-country workers would move to the
UK (BBC 2006), and Dail transcripts from Ireland make clear that the public
officials who pushed for greater integration with Europe did not think that this
would have any real effect on immigration. Drawing on Ireland's experience, then
Minister for Finance, Brian Cowen, stated:
...I want to deal with the issue that somehow we might become swamped by
unwanted immigrants descending on our shores. Most of the immigrants in Ireland
today are here because the economy needs them. Their skills and energies
contribute to wealth creation and, in the main, they provide for themselves...
The suggestion that huge numbers of unwanted and unneeded people will come in
does not stand up. Let us look at the facts. When Ireland joined the European
Union in 1973 and, later with the advent of the Single European Act, the Maastricht
Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty, large numbers of emigrants did not leave our
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shores for Germany, France, Italy and other countries. We had emigration, but it
was to traditional markets - English speaking countries such as Britain and the
United States. Often this was illegal but there were cultural and familial reasons
for it. The same will prevail in central and eastern Europe. Ireland no longer has
an emigration problem. Most of our citizens can now be employed at home.7 4
However, with the opening of the Irish labor market to Central and Eastern
Europeans, between 2002 and 2011 the Polish population alone rose from 2,124 to
120,461, an increase of 5,671% (CSO 2012). Latvians and Lithuanians were not far
behind; collectively their population increased from less than 4,000 to over 53,000
over the same time period. Given that the total population of Ireland was less than
four million people at the time, this was a particularly dramatic shift.
By 2006, key characteristics of the Irish foreign-born population were
emerging, and were outlined in a 2008 report by the Central Statistics Office (CSO).
First, migration was primarily an urban phenomenon: 76% of immigrants lived in
cities and urban areas, compared to 58.4% of natives. The immigrant population
was also much younger than the native population, not surprising given the
majority of inflows were migrant laborers of prime working age. The most striking
difference between natives and newcomers however is in education levels: while
around 40% of the native population had a college degree, over half of all
immigrants from outside of the EU and close to 75% of all immigrants from Western
Europe (not including Ireland and the UK) were college educated.75
554, DAil Eireann (2002) 118-20.
75 Education data is for the 15-44 year old age bracket only. Of the main immigrant groups,
Eastern Europeans were less educated than natives.
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There were also key labor market differences between natives and
newcomers. Overall, immigrants were more likely than natives to work in the
'hotels and restaurants' and construction industries. Among immigrant groups,
EU-15 immigrants are overrepresented in "business activities", while non-European
immigrants are overrepresented in health and social work: 20.8% of non-EU
migrants work in this sector, versus 10.8% of natives; many of the latter group work
as doctors and nurses in the Health Service Executive (the HSE, Ireland's national
health care service).
Taken together, the characteristics of Ireland's foreign-born population
combined with Ireland's political institutions would lead one to expect if not mass
incorporative activity, at least minimal political resistance to political incorporation.
Unlike countries like the Netherlands, Belgium, or Turkey, Ireland did not have a
significant Muslim immigrant population - and Muslim immigration has been a key
point of conflict in most migrant-receiving states on the Continent, both for cultural
and economic reasons (Zolberg and Woon 1999; Hirsi Ali 2008; Joppke 2009;
Caldwell 2009). Most Irish immigrant groups were Christian and economically
active, and the non-white, non-European migrant population consisted of highly
skilled professionals. Given Ireland's economic situation, immigrant pool, and open
civic institutions, it is hard to imagine a more optimal situation for political (and
economic and social) incorporation. So what happened?
Citizenship
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The first great challenge to political incorporation arose over the issue of
citizenship. After the passage of the 1998 constitutional amendment as part of the
Northern Ireland peace process, few would have anticipated that the issue would be
back on the political agenda less than a decade later. However, by 2003, the
pressures of migration led some to question the wisdom of a jus soli citizenship
policy. First, over the course of the 1990s, the number of asylum seekers in Ireland
arriving annually increased dramatically, rising from only 39 in 1992 to just under
12,000 in 2002 (Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner 2001; 2004). This
uptick was extremely controversial: some claims emerged both in political debate
and in the popular press that many asylum seekers in Ireland were actually failed
asylum seekers or those immigrants unable to gain access to citizenship from other
European countries, while others claimed that Ireland's asylum seekers were lured
to Ireland by 'soft-touch' immigration enforcement and birthright citizenship which,
with the expansion of the European Union, meant EU citizenship and all of the
rights of residency and access to the labor market that this entailed.
The citizenship issue became the focus of sharpened political debate,
however, due to legal cases involving what some characterized as "citizenship
shopping". The most visible case was one that was actually brought in the UK:
acting on legal advice, a Chinese national, Man Chen, traveled to Belfast to give
birth to her second child in order to both circumvent China's 'One Child' policy and,
according to court documents, obtain Irish citizenship for her child which would
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then allow her to settle wherever she wished in the European Union. 76 When she
tried to settle in the UK, the British government denied the residency application,
and the case went to the Court of Justice of the European Union, which found in
favor of Mrs. Chen and her daughter Catherine. The court noted that as a citizen of
the European Union, Catherine had a right to stay, but as she was a minor, her
mother should have a right to stay as well in order to ensure that Catherine could
live as a EU citizen.
In the spring of 2004, the Minister of Justice for the Fianna Fiil government,
Michael McDowell, announced that the government would be seeking to hold a
constitutional referendum in order to end the birthright citizenship clause in Article
2. McDowell's role in the citizenship debate was an interesting one: as the Minister
in charge of these matters, he was expected to be the mouthpiece of the government
in both Diil debates and in the press. However, McDowell was a member of the
Progressive Democrats (PDs), a small party that went into government with Fianna
Faiil at various points in the 1980s, 90s, and 2000s. The PDs were known for both
their neo-liberal economic policies and their relatively liberal social policies. The
party was founded by former Fianna Fail and Fine Gael politicians who disagreed
with the civil war parties' conservative positions on issues such as contraception
and divorce. They also believed strongly in a low-tax, light-touch regulatory
infrastructure: former party leader Mary Harney famously noted in a 2000 speech
to the American Bar Association that "Geographically we are closer to Berlin than
76 Kunquian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, (2004) European Court of Justice C-200/02.
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Boston. Spiritually we are probably a lot closer to Boston than Berlin".77 Yet despite
their liberalism on social matters, the party was also known for not being
particularly open to foreigners: until 2003, only citizens of Ireland or EU states
could join the party - despite the fact that non-EU citizens were able to vote in local
elections.
The official government proposal, released in April 2004, listed several
reasons for the proposed change. First, the government sought to shift the power to
make citizenship policy to the legislature, rather than being bound by the
constitution. Second, it wanted to stop situations like the Chen case, whereby
people:
...with no other claim to be present in the European Union and no substantial
connection with Ireland are arranging their affairs so as to ensure the birth of a
child in Ireland in order that it will acquire this status and these rights, with an eye
to increasing the chances of the parents of securing for themselves, by association
with the EU national child, some claim to be able to remain within Ireland or the
wider EU territory or some rights within that territory.78
Opposition parties attacked the government's position on procedural,
political, and ethical grounds. Fine Gael, the largest opposition party, took issue
with the way that the government was handling the logistics - and in particular,
the consultative phase - of the referendum and the party leader, Enda Kenny,
raised his concerns in the Dail:
77 Mary Harney, "Remarks by Tinaiste, Mary Harney at a Meeting of the American Bar
Association in the Law Society of Ireland", Blackhill Place, Dublin, July 21 2000.
78 Irish Naturalization and Immigration Service, CITIZENSHIP REFERENDUM: The
Government's Proposals, (April 2004), Available online at:
http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/Govtproposals.pdf/Files/Govtproposals.pdf.
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The government announced yesterday that it intends to hold a referendum on
citizenship on 11 June. I recognize there is a problem of non-national persons
arriving here, particularly late in pregnancy, and I understand it must be resolved.
I have already committed Fine Gael to working constructively towards a solution of
that problem. However, we can only do that if the Government enters into
consultation on the basis of good faith. The Government's record to date does not
instill confidence or belief in that.79
Officials from both Fine Gael and the Labour Party attacked the government
for using the citizenship referendum as an electioneering tactic.
The Tanaiste (Deputy Prime Minister): The Government has decided that since
there will be an election and people will be voting on 11 June, it is the appropriate
time to put this matter to the people and let them decide.
Mr. Allen (Fine Gael): The Government wants to win votes. It is all about votes.
Mr. Rabbitte (Labour): Despite our political differences I have always regarded the
Tanaiste as a decent person in politics and an honourable colleague in the
constituency. It makes my stomach sick to see her lend her party as cover to Fianna
Fail in a transparent ploy to exploit the immigration issue in an election
atmosphere.
Deputies: Hear, hear.80
Labour also questioned the government's assertions that women with late-
term pregnancies were swamping maternity offices just to give birth in Ireland - as
several legislators pointed out, the Minister drew on figures that represented all
non-national women, without drawing distinctions between new arrivals and
women who had arrived as part of the overall wave of migration. Given that the
immigrant population was disproportionately young and of working age, this meant
that the female immigrant population was also disproportionately of childbearing
age, and an increase in the number of immigrant women in maternity hospitals was
79 Dail Eireann, Leader's Questions, vol. 53, No. 4, 7 April 2004.
80 DAil Eireann, Leader's Questions, vol. 53, No. 4, 7 April 2004 (815-17).
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not necessarily a sign of nefarious activity, but rather an expected outcome when
there is an influx of young adult women into the country.
The government pushed back against accusations that the proposal was in
any way racist or an attempt to capitalize on the already-scheduled local elections.
When the Dail took up debate on the issue again, Minister McDowell took pains to
argue that the issue was really about the nature of citizenship:
Citizenship is the means whereby we become members of a moral, cultural, political,
social, economic and legal community based on rights and duties established in law.
Citizenship, then, is not just an entitlement to a passport with a particular symbol
on its cover, although possession of a passport is undoubtedly an important attribute
of entitlement to a particular citizenship. It is a complex of rights and obligations
shared by people of a common nationality, and a symbol of the sovereign nature of
the nation state. 8 1
McDowell's characterization of citizenship in this go-round of the debate was
very much civic: people belong to a community where there are a series of rights
and obligations, and the community of the nation is bound by those shared values.
However, this position was incongruous with Ireland's broader citizenship policy,
which allowed anyone with a grandparent born in Ireland to be eligible for Irish
citizenship, without ever having set foot on Irish soil. It is telling that in the debate
over birthright citizenship, the government never suggested ending its jus
sanguinis policies, even beyond the context of Northern Ireland.
Dan Boyle of the Green Party, who had a unique perspective on the issue,
raised the issue of civic versus birthright citizenship: he himself was born in the
United States, and held Irish citizenship through his parents:
8' Dail Eireann, Twenty-seventh Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2004: Second State
vol. 583, No. 6, 21 April 2004 (1185-1186)
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In the proper context and in an appropriate environment a debate on citizenship
would be very welcome - a debate on the nature of what it means to be a Irish
citizen, what it means to be a citizen in a republic, what are the rights that being an
Irish citizen confers upon an individual and, more important, what are the
responsibilities that individual citizens have to act collectively to bring about the
best possible society here. That is not the debate we are having. That is not the
debate the Government wishes us to have. The government has zeroed in on a very
narrow aspect of the citizenship debate and in so doing has exposed its own cynicism
regarding how it sees Irish citizenship in the 21st century. The debate on citizenship
should not only be about birthright, it should also be about heritage and residency.
In trying to make ourselves seem more like Berlin than Boston on this issue, the
Government has forgotten that on many aspects our citizenship laws are far from
liberal, and that as regards residency, citizenship granted to people who have lived
in this country for a considerable length of time depends solely on the whim of the
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, whereas in other countries such
citizenship is granted after a set period of residency... 82
While all of the opposition parties were annoyed with the government's lack
of consultation and seemingly dubious motives for calling the elections, Aengus 0
Snodaigh, the Sinn F6in spokesperson on Justice, Equality and Human Rights,
issued a statement strongly condemning the government's position as racist and
opportunist:
The proposal to grant some people the right of citizenship by birth but to remove the
right of citizenship by birth from other babies with a different ethnic background is
nothing less than an introduction of citizenship based on race. This goes against
everything Sinn F6in has worked for in building an Ireland of Equals, and is also
contrary to the Good Friday Agreement. We reject the Government's proposal as
dangerously irresponsible.
... The Minister has twisted the facts to fit his ideological agenda. He knows that his
proposal will inflame bigotry and poison the national atmosphere but he is prepared
to do this in the hopes of electoral gain. As it stands, racism in this state has
prompted a rising level of hate crime, which has already resulted in assaults and
deaths. It is the height of Ministerial irresponsibility to politically exploit this issue
and it once again calls into question the fitness of Michael McDowell for his post.83
82 Dail Eireann, Twenty-seventh Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2004: Second State
(Resumed), vol. 583, No. 6, 21 April 2004.
83 "Sinn F6in rejects proposed citizenship law," Sinn Fdin Press Release (March 19, 2004).
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Of the four main parties in government opposition, however, Sinn F6in's
opposition to the citizenship referendum is notable because it put the country's two
self-identified republican parties on different sides of a core issue: membership in
the Irish nation. Although Sinn F6in supporters are often loathe to be lumped in
with Fianna FAil, these are the two parties in Irish politics that have the closest
historical ties to the Irish republican movement of the late 19th and early 20th
century. They also have the closest ties to physical force republicanism, namely the
willingness to take up arms against the state in pursuit of republican ideals: the
founders of Fianna Fail were members of both the IRA and the Irish Republican
Brotherhood, and the current leaders of Sinn F6in were members of, or had close
alleged ties to the Provisional IRA, the armed paramilitary organization that was
deeply involved in the bloody chaos that spread across Northern Ireland,
particularly in the 1970s. 84 Yet there is a key difference: although it contests
elections in the Republic, and has a reliable voting base in Dublin and some of the
counties that border Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein's true power base is in the North.
The main party headquarters is along the heavily Catholic Falls Road of West
Belfast, scene of some of worst sectarian violence of the Troubles, and for many
years it was considered the political wing of the Provisional IRA in Northern
Ireland. Therefore, while Fianna Fail's base consists of republicans who have
dominated national politics for much of the twentieth century, Sinn Fein largely -
84 Sinn F6in and the IRA have undergone a number of iterations over the years, and some of
the deadliest feuds in Irish politics have been the internecine battles between republican
organizations.
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but not exclusively - represents republican communities that were politically and
economically marginalized from the time of partition well into the late twentieth
century. Sinn F6in's focus on equality was a key component of the peace process,
and the narrative of equality in their statements against the citizenship referendum
are reminiscent of the broader 'equality agenda' that shapes state-society relations
in post-conflict Northern Ireland.
Parties in the Daiil were not the only groups who weighed in on the debate: an
array of civil society organizations, both native and migrant-led, voiced their
opinions on the proposed legislation as well. One of the most vocal groups was the
Immigrant Council of Ireland, which noted that the proposal would have a
"profoundly negative impact" on the lives of children.85 Opposition also came from
groups involved in the Northern Ireland peace process: the Social Democratic and
Labour Party (SDLP), a Northern Irish nationalist party whose leader, John Hume,
won the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in both the 1960s Catholic civil rights
movement and in ending the Troubles, loudly opposed the referendum as a threat to
the Good Friday Agreement 86, as did Bruce Morrison, a former U.S. Congressman
who not only worked on the peace process, but who helped move immigration
legislation through the Congress in order to make more visas available for Irish
workers.
85 Immigrant Council of Ireland. 2004. "There are so many reasons to Vote NO."
electioneering pamphlet. Available online at:
http://irishelectionliterature.wordpress.com/2013/04/01/citizenship-referendum-there-are-
so-many-reasons-to-vote-no-whats-yours-irish-council-for-civil- liberties/
86 William Graham, "Nationalists concerned over referendum," Irish News June 9 2004.
156
The National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism
(NCCRI), the government-sponsored migration-monitoring agency, also issued a
statement on the proposed change. 87 Although as a non-partisan organization it did
not take a yes or no position, it noted that the increase in non-nationals at Irish
maternity hospitals "Coincided with increased migration to Ireland, mainly as a
consequence of people working, including those working in our health services"
(NCCRI 2004, 10). It also voiced concerns about the rising practice of calling non-
national maternity hospital visits 'citizenship tourism' or 'benefits tourism', calling
these terms 'derogatory' and tracing their origins to a "xenophobic and unfounded
scare campaign by British tabloids in the run up to the enlargement of the EU on 1
May 2004" (pg. 10). Finally, echoing some of the complaints in the Dail, they noted
that there the referendum was "not being held in the optimum circumstances"
because it was concurrent with the local and European elections, thus leading to a
great deal of public confusion.
Despite these objections, the citizenship referendum had broad public support
and passed: 79.17% voted "Yes" to changing the constitution. However, the
government came under fire afterwards from the Referendum Commission, the non-
partisan agency tasked with handling the public information campaign for any
constitutional referendum. 88 The Commission's complaints echoed those of the
87 The NCCRI will be discussed in detail below.
88 The Referendum Commission has "the statutory role of explaining the subject matter of
the referendum to the electorate. In addition [in 2001] it was granted a new role of
promoting public awareness of the referendum and encouraging the electorate to vote at the
poll" (Referendum Commission 2004, 2). It issued direct mail booklets explaining the
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opposition in the Diil: the government, in its rush to link the referendum to the
local and EU elections, did not allow sufficient time for public debate and
understanding of what voters were being asked to decide on:
It is with a certain sense of frustration that the Commission must once again record
the fact that on this occasion it was not permitted ample time to run a fully
comprehensive information campaign....
The Commission is of the view that democracy is not well served by allowing a
minimal amount of time for the electorate to consider proposals to amend the
Constitution. 89
The passage of the referendum led to the Diil enacting legislation that laid
out the terms for naturalization. The Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2004
decreed that:
A person born in the island of Ireland shall not be entitled to be an Irish citizen
unless a parent of that person has, during the period of 4 years immediately
preceding the person's birth, been resident in the island of Ireland for a period of not
less than 3 years or periods the aggregate of which is not less than 3 years"
(4.6A(1)).
Under this legislation, time spent in Ireland as a student or as an asylum-
seeker did not count towards residency.
Although the citizenship referendum was seen as a disaster by immigrant
communities and their supporters, there was a second result from the local elections
that was also of great interest: Portlaoise, a small community located about an hour
outside of Dublin, elected Rotimi Adebari, an immigrant from Nigeria, to the town
council. Adebari's election attracted global attention, but in Ireland it had the effect
referendum, ran ads on both radio and television, and set up a website, which both made
the booklet available and provided detailed information on the proposals.
89 Referendum Commission, Report of the Referendum Commission on the Referendum of the
Twenty-Seventh Amendment of the Constitution Bill (Irish Citizenship), Dublin (2004).
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of redirecting attention away from the citizenship issue towards another key
concern of political incorporation: electoral politics.
Electoral Incorporation
Incorporative activity in the area of electoral politics in Ireland has been a
mixed bag. The fact that all non-citizen adults are allowed to vote in local elections
might lead one to expect that, at a minimum, parties that are seeking to gain power
would try to register new immigrant voters, for as a relatively unorganized
constituency, they could provide a boost in support to parties or even individuals
looking to make an impact on city or county government (Dahl [1974] 2005). Yet
despite this potential, migrants in the 2004 local election cycle were targeted for
exclusion, not inclusion: the vote for the citizenship initiative was timed to take
place during the local and European elections. Not surprisingly, studies of party
behavior in the 2004 elections found that none of the parties had migration or
migrant-related issues as part of their platforms or party literature (Fanning et al
2004). Together, the 2004 election cycle sent a clear message to immigrant
communities and their allies: political incorporation was not a priority for Irish
political parties, despite supportive rhetoric about inclusion from some quarters.
With that, both changing circumstances and a determined group of local officials
and community organizations set out to insure that the 2009 cycle would be
different.
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Voters, Candidates, and the 2009 Local Elections
Mindful of both the attention and interest that Adebari drew and the rapid
influx of Eastern Europeans, the 2009 election cycle saw a significant increase in
incorporative activity on the part of parties. In the run-up to the elections, the Irish
Times and other newspapers ran a series of articles with breathless titles such as
"Immigrants Join in the Political Jousting" that featured migrant candidates.
Indeed, party recruitment of migrant candidates in 2009 was considerably higher
than in 2004, when only six immigrant candidates stood overall. In 2009, out of
thirty-eight immigrant candidates, ten stood for Fianna Fiil and eight for Fine
Gael.90 Interestingly, the Green Party (which although it was in government with
Fianna Faiil at the time was a minority party overall), also had eight immigrant
candidates, thereby punching well above its weight in terms of migrant candidate
recruitment relative to size. Labour, as the third-largest party in the state, had far
fewer migrant candidates at four, and Sinn F6in, despite its advocacy on behalf of
immigrant citizenship rights, had none. Notably, there were a significant number
of candidates who ran as independents: twenty-one percent of immigrant candidates
ran without any party affiliation at all. Of these, seven out of eight were African
immigrants [Table 4.1]
Yet despite the party interest in migrant candidates, they did receive some
criticism for their approach to electioneering. First, some migrant candidates
90 The Irish Times reported that over forty immigrant candidates ran, but Metro Eireann, a
weekly newspaper targeting the immigrant community, put together a migrant voting
guide with thirty-eight candidates. Given Metro Eireann's role in the immigrant
community, and the lack of official figures, I chose to use their numbers instead of the data
from the Irish Times.
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complained that they received limited support from the parties. Second, despite all
of the interest in migrant candidates, there was relatively limited activity around
the recruitment of migrant voters. Instead, the strategy on the part of parties
seemed to be akin to "If we build it, they will come", namely, the presence of
migrant candidates would entice migrant voters to the ballot box - and parties
would ultimately benefit. One Irish candidate, running as an independent, told Le
Monde that immigrant candidates were simply being used as "as 'sweepers',
intended to bring out an immigrant vote that will transfer to the party's lead
candidates, while the candidates themselves are being unfairly 'led on' by the
parties to believe that they have a realistic chance".9 1
The parties did make some efforts to reach out not just to migrant candidates
but potential migrant voters: between the 2007 general elections and 2009 local
elections, both Fine Gael and Fianna Faiil hired immigrant outreach coordinators.
However, this was not a mass voter outreach effort; rather, they played a
coordination role in making contacts with different migrant organization, and
overseeing the preparation and distribution of party literature and information to
migrant communities. The party reps did take part in some migrant voter
mobilization events organized by immigrant community groups, but not in a
partisan fashion. Where the civil war parties did try to directly boost migrant voter
registration and participation, their efforts seemed to be limited to Eastern
Europeans, specifically Poles - despite the fact that Africans as a group showed the
91 Colin Murphy, "New faces of Irish politics," Le Monde diplomatique, June 10, 2009,
htt)://mondediolo.com/2009/06/10ireland.
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most interest in and enthusiasm for local politics in Ireland and their votes seemed
up for grabs as they were not, as a community, tied to any given political party.
Ultimately, incorporative activity by parties for the local elections was a
mixed bag. On the one hand, most parties did make an effort to run immigrant
candidates, and there was a notable improvement in migrant community outreach
as compared to the 2004 election cycle. On the other hand, the parties still seemed
to be marginally engaged in migrant voter registration and mobilization efforts.
This was particularly surprising in Ireland, where party 'ground game', namely
efforts to be sure eligible voters were both registered and could make it to the polls,
is well developed, especially within Fianna Fiil, Fine Gael and Sinn F6in. Taken
together, however, it seems that the observer who noted that migrant candidates
were being used as "sweepers" may have been correct. Despite the pejorative
overtone, this approach seems rational for two reasons. First, it is relatively low-
risk: immigrants could potentially draw in new voters themselves and benefit other
party candidates on the ballot. But in addition, as one party official noted, for
smaller parties that do not have the manpower or resources of the larger parties,
candidates have to rely heavily on personal networks, and particularly friends and
family, in order to canvass and get voters to the polls on election day. Because
Ireland is a new destination, immigrants are at a distinct disadvantage: they may
not have been living in Ireland long enough to be able to leverage their social
networks into a seat in government.
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Ironically incorporation through immigrant candidate selection was the most
limited for the two parties that were the most vocal in support of migrant
citizenship rights, Sinn F6in and Labour. This is in part due to both where the
support for these parties lies, and the internal culture of the parties. First, both
Labour and Sinn Fein draw heavy support from voters in Dublin, and the city is a
hotbed of grassroots organizing for both parties. However, Dublin also has a
disproportionately high immigrant population. Because parties will generally not
run more than three candidates for a given district, priority for candidate selection
goes to those who have a solid, proven track record of both community and party
activism. Therefore, in the case of the Labour party, immigrants interested in
running for Labour in Dublin were going to be disadvantaged by the fact that the
pool of potential candidates is already relatively deep, and because immigration is
so new, migrants are less likely to have developed the kind of organizing record that
many natives have. Ironically, this means that the areas where new immigrant
candidates have a better chance of getting on the ballot are the areas where Labour
has a smaller base, and are therefore less likely to get elected anyway. Sinn F6in
puts an even higher premium on grassroots community activism than Labour.
Therefore, it remains to be seen whether or not immigrants will be able to work
themselves up the internal structures and hierarchies of these parties in time for
the next round of local elections in 2014.
Bureaucrats, Voters, and the 2009 Local Elections
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However, in 2009 there was another set of native actors that became involved
in migrant voter registration: local government. In the wake of the 2004 and 2007
elections where immigrants received scant attention from parties, some local
government officials decided that they should step in to fill the gap. Specifically,
local bureaucrats in the Dublin City Council (DCC) were concerned because in their
view, they were at the 'coal face' of the incorporation process (Bureaucrat #2,
personal interview, Dublin, April 2010). First, as noted, migration in Ireland is a
disproportionately urban phenomenon. In addition, DCC bureaucrats were
painfully aware that native-immigrant conflicts were behind a series of urban race
riots in England in the 1980s (a period when Irish emigration levels to the UK were
quite high). More recently, the 2005 Parisian riots were in the back of their minds,
and they did not want to see similar social unrest in Dublin. In the view of DCC
officials, migrant voter mobilization would be an important step towards
incorporating new immigrants into civic life.
Just as DCC officials were becoming interested in taking up the task of
incorporation, migrant-led civil society groups were proliferating. Among the non-
European groups that migrated to Ireland before 2004, (most notably Nigerians),
many were heavily involved in migrant community organizing. Some of this
heightened activity was a reaction to the 2004 citizenship referendum: for Africans
in particular, getting involved in politics was a way to gain a more visible place in a
society that seemed increasingly determined to exclude them. However, the
elevation of Rotimi Adebari to the position of Lord Mayor of Portlaoise heightened
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African immigrant community interest in electoral politics: Adebari was the first
black mayor in Irish history. The "Irish Obama" made political inclusion seem like
a real possibility - a welcome message after the harshness of the citizenship
referendum debate. With the opening of Ireland's labor market to the new Eastern
European EU member states in 2004, the number of migrant organizations surged
again as these new immigrants not only formed their own organizations, but
became deeply involved with the Catholic Church, the first port of call for many
Polish workers bewildered by Irish society.
The DCC's involvement in political incorporation was also facilitated by a
completely unrelated political event: the Polish national elections. The political
organization of the Polish community in Ireland, the largest single immigrant group
after British citizens, was hastened by events at home: for the 2007 Polish national
elections, the conservative and increasingly nationalist Law and Justice Party, led
by Jaroslaw Kaczynski, faced a stiff challenge from the pro-European Civic
Platform party led by Donald Tusk. Tusk and several of his party ministers traveled
to Dublin to address the overwhelmingly young Polish migrant population, and
emergent Polish migrant leadership on the ground contributed to the mobilization
efforts targeting the over 24,000 eligible Polish voters in Ireland. 92 Some of the
local Polish activists involved in bringing Tusk to Dublin became increasingly
interested in turning the attention of their community to political life in their newly
adopted country. Therefore, between the disgruntled leadership in the African
92 "Turnout high in Polish elections," RTE, October 21, 2007. According to media reports
after the elections, 70% of Polish voters in Ireland supported Civic Platform; the party
received 42% of the vote overall (Metro Eireann 2007).
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community and the energized young organizers in the Polish community, migrant
leaders, particularly in and around Dublin, were primed to make the leap into
electoral politics - and they wanted to bring their communities with them.
Starting in the summer of 2008, Cormac O'Donnell, an official in the Dublin
City Council Office of Integration, began to assemble a steering committee that
would be tasked with launching and managing a migrant voter registration drive.
O'Donnell used both his personal and organizational networks to build the
committee: for the last several years he had taken an interest in migrant
integration at the local level, and had even been involved in European and North
American exchanges on incorporation best practices. Through these different
exchanges he had become friendly with many migrant community organization
leaders, and used these networks to build a steering committee on migrant voter
registration. Eventually the committee had sixteen member organizations whose
representatives were either personal contacts of O'Donnell's or were recommended
by his contacts. While O'Donnell was careful to assemble a diverse group of
organizations, not everyone was happy with the personalized nature of how
participants on the committee were selected; one migrant activist voiced concerns
that while the city was lucky to have people in the DCC who "are really
committed...for them it's not just a paycheck" there was a problem in that too much
in Irish political life was driven by "characters and not the ethos" and this
"character driven" approach made it difficult to institutionalize programs and
policies (NGO13, personal interview, Dublin, July 2009).
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In 2008, the Lord Mayor of Dublin, on behalf of the City Council, announced
the official launch of a migrant voter registration drive. The city's objectives were
clear: a press release noted, "Facilitating participation in the political life of the city
is a key element in promoting and supporting the integration of ethnic minorities in
the life of the city".93 The main objectives of the steering committee were to develop
a public multi-lingual voter registration campaign that would be followed by a
"train the trainer" program targeting immigrant community activists who would
then turn around and register people in their communities to vote.
Yet despite the pomp and circumstances of the announcement, and the stated
objectives of the DCC, the migrant voter initiative had a relatively limited budget of
C45,000 - by comparison, the referendum commission had a budget of C4 million.94
The committee had to rely on the (not insignificant) knowledge and networks of the
participants. The committee was able to, among its own members, translate voter
registration education materials into over twenty languages, and multi-lingual
flyers and posters were distributed across both city offices and among migrant-
serving organizations in Dublin and beyond - indeed, migrant community
association networks were so extensive that the materials produced by the DCC
Committee soon began to make their way across the country digitally via blogs,
" "Migrant Voters Campaign: press release," Office of the Lord Mayor press release (2008).
94 To put these figures into perspective, Ireland's population at the time was just over four
million people. However, the population of the Greater Dublin area was over 1.8 million.
Therefore, compared to the efforts to inform voters about the citizenship referendum, efforts
to inform immigrants about voting rights seems woefully under-funded, even when you
account for immigrants as a percentage of the Greater Dublin population (18%).
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email, and community websites.95 In addition, the city was able to work out a deal
with Dublin Bus to put posters in bus shelters along key lines that ran through
immigrant communities. However, an attempt to hold a migrant "town hall"
meeting where a panel of party representatives would address and respond to an
audience of new immigrants fell though, despite support from the national
broadcaster RTE, who offered to host the event. In addition, some steering
committee members complained about a lack of cooperation with the Department of
the Environment and Local Government, the national bureaucracy in charge of
managing local elections.
Despite the inability of the committee to act as a bridge between migrant
communities and political parties, the voter registration effort promoted two
different kinds of bridge building. First, and perhaps most surprisingly, the DCC
program strengthened the relationship between migrant organizations and An
Garda Siochina, the Irish police force (heretofore referred to as the Garda). Under
Irish law, voters who register for a local election less than six months before election
day have to do so at a police station; subsequently several of the groups that
participated on the steering committee organized community events where Garda
representatives came to them in order to register people to vote. This was a far less
intimidating situation than going to a police station, especially for immigrants from
countries where state security forces are generally feared, not seen as allies; as one
African community organizer noted, "Even if you have done nothing wrong, it is a
9 See Appendix for examples of posters and materials created and distributed by the
Steering Committee.
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very scary thing to go to a police station! (NGO13,personal interview, Dublin, July
2009). Several steering committee members noted that the Garda were very good
about coming to community events in order to promote familiarity; one participant
who had a good relationship with the local Gardai laughed that in his district "they
[the Garda] always come to every dinner; they are getting quite fat!" (NG011,
personal interview, Dublin, July 2009). The close engagement with the Garda is
also significant because they are responsible for both border control and visa
issuance. Taken together, for migrant communities, the Garda are significant
gatekeepers: they both guard access to the country itself at the border, and to its
polity through the voter rolls. The fact that the DCC initiative helped to somewhat
improve migrant-Garda relations is therefore in an of itself a small but important
step towards meeting the stated goal of 'supporting the integration of ethnic
minorities in the life of the city'; as Bloemraad (2006) notes, interaction with
representatives of the state can affect "understandings of citizenship, especially of
immigrants' legitimate political standing" (pg. 4). This is not to say that these
relationships are perfect - at some police stations migrants were erroneously told
that they could not register - but the sense was that these issues were one-off,
rather than systemic problems.
The other key benefit of the DCC voter registration drive was that it
facilitated network-building among a wide and varied set of migrant community
actors. The steering committee included businessmen, trade union activists,
religious representatives, and community workers from over a dozen different
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countries. Some already had close ties to political parties - at least one participant
was asked to run for office - while others were disconnected from the parties and
were, frankly, quite suspicious of them. Regardless of the background of the
participants, however, many spoke of how beneficial it had been to make
connections across different immigrant communities, which in Ireland vary
significantly in size, socioeconomic status, and political status. Therefore, although
the DCC effort did not do much in terms of building a bridge between migrant
communities and political parties, it did serve as a bridge-building exercise within
the diverse immigrant community leadership cohort.
The one outcome from the DCC effort that remains uncertain was its actual
effect on voter registration rates. A report from the Africa Centre and New
Communities Partnership claims that the campaign contributed to an additional
15,000 voters added to the register. 96 While for the purposes of this project, the
outcome of interest is incorporative activity not incorporative outcomes, the actual
number of migrant voters motivated by the DCC campaign is almost impossible to
ascertain: there is no way to discern what effect the campaign had on voter
registration rates, especially given that the pool of potential voters grew
exponentially between the 2004 and 2009 election cycles.
So just what happened to the political parties when it came to migrant voter
registration and mobilization efforts? Different groups had different opinions.
96 "Our Vote Can Make a Difference: Voter Registration and Education Campaign," report
issued by the New Communities Partnership and the Africa Centre, June 2010, available
online at:
http://www.newcommunities.ie/download/pdf/ncp ac vep report full colour final version.
pdf.
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While one participant noted that in their community "there was no involvement
with the parties - no communication, no contact, nothing" (NGO 12, personal
interview, Dublin, June 2009), other members of the committee speculated that
parties did engage in outreach to migrant communities, but this was primarily
limited to Eastern Europeans, most notably Poles (the largest immigrant group in
2009, after the British). As noted, several of the steering committee members had
ties to parties, but this was at a personal, rather than community, or group-based
level. One committee member resented some of the back-channel maneuvering of
parties for they saw it as lazy; as she put it: "[We were not going to be] handing the
people to political parties... they would have to sweat to get to the people. We
weren't here to work for their election campaigns" (NGO9, personal interview,
Dublin, July 2009). This was not an ungrounded sentiment: in Irish local political
culture, there is an expectation that candidates will come and personally ask people
for their votes. This norm of campaigning is so strong that the Irish political
scientists Liam Weeks and Aodh Quinlivian found that in the 2004 local election
cycle only four candidates did not directly canvass for votes, and of these only one
actually won a seat (2009). Therefore, the reluctance of the parties to participate in
direct outreach programs to migrant communities through the planned DCC/RTf
forum could be interpreted as an insulting breach of a well-understood norm of Irish
political life.
Some party activists and officials had a different take on the issue, however.
In their view, the main problem with doing mass voter outreach to immigrants is
171
that nobody actually knew how they would vote. Ironically, officials from the more
left-wing parties on the Irish political spectrum were the most concerned about this:
despite their general support for migrant political and legal rights (including
birthright citizenship), they were concerned about the potential social conservatism
of migrant voters, Poles in particular. Poles, like the Irish, are overwhelmingly
Catholic, and many on the political left in Ireland had engaged in trench warfare
with the Catholic Church over social policy for decades, most notably around the
issues of divorce, homosexuality, and abortion.97 Subsequently, the idea of
potentially bringing hundreds of new socially conservative voters into the political
system was anathema to them.
To some extent, this assessment of Polish political behavior is
understandable: Donald Tusk's Civic Platform, the party that won 70% of the Polish
vote in Ireland, would be considered economically liberal but socially conservative
by European standards. However, this does not explain why the more socially
conservative parties seemed unwilling to participate in the DCC programs; Civic
Platform looks a lot like the pro-business Fine Gael politically - both parties even
caucus with the same party in the European Parliament (the European's People's
Party). That said, it is also unclear the extent to which young Polish electoral
support for Tusk was an endorsement of his party, or a rejection of the social
97 Divorce was not legal in Ireland until 1996, and even today it takes five years for a
divorce to be finalized. Laws criminalizing homosexual activity were on the books until
1993. Abortion was effectively illegal in Ireland, until 2013, a position that was further
entrenched by a 1983 referendum that added a clause to the Irish constitution protecting
the rights of the unborn. As of yet, it is still unclear what the implications of the 2013 law
will be for access to abortion in the Republic.
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policies, rising nationalism and euro-skepticism of the Kaczynski brothers, who at
the time dominated Polish politics. 98 It does seem likely that general uncertainty
about immigrant voters has contributed to disinterest on the part of Irish political
parties in direct mobilization efforts for local elections: in the best of circumstances,
this is a time-consuming, expensive task, so if there are uncertainties involved, it
may just be best to let sleeping dogs lie - at least until those dogs prove that they
can bite. The relatively low migrant voter registration rates, however, mean that,
for now anyway, the immigrant community is not seen as either interested enough
in politics to spend time trying to woo people to vote, nor organized enough to
punish parties that ignore them, or pass anti-immigrant legislation. Therefore,
immigrants as 'new minorities' may have to demand attention from parties in order
to get a say in decision-making processes rather than waiting for parties to extend
an invitation to take a seat at the table of power - and the best way to demand that
attention is to prove that they can make or break candidates at the ballot box.
Finally, despite the best efforts of local bureaucrats to overcome the
disinterest of political parties, at the end of the day, their efforts were curtailed by
party behavior in another arena outside of electoral politics: budgeting. In 2010,
the DCC Office of Integration was cut in half, largely due to budgetary reasons. In
light of the feeble funding allocated to the DCC effort, and the funding cuts to the
DCC migrant outreach staff, the Irish experience with 'bureaucratic incorporation'
suggests that it is nearly impossible to sidestep the role of parties in this process.
98 At the time, Lech Kaczynski was the President and his twin brother Jaroslaw was
running for re-election as Prime Minister.
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This is a key point, because there is a broader debate today within the study of
immigrant political incorporation over the role that public bureaucracies could - or
should - play in incorporation (Bloemraad 2005, 2006; Marrow 2010).
The DCC experience suggests that bureaucratic incorporation through local
government may be, at best, a limited option. This is in part due to the
competencies of local versus national government: local government may fret about
maintaining social cohesion and order, but for immigrants, national government is
where the real political action is at, since it is national legislators who make
citizenship and immigration policy. In addition, local government agencies are in
an even worse position than local party officials: they do not even have the benefit of
partisanship - a major motivator for political engagement. One head of a migrant
organization operating in Dublin put it bluntly: "Local government isn't political,
but wants political participation...this is a little bit stupid I think" (NGO4, personal
interview, Dublin, 23 June). It is also due to the fact that budget allocations for
bureaucracies are in the hand of elected officials, and when the party balance of
power in government changes and/or economic conditions change, bureaucracies
may find that old axiom to be true: the best-laid plans of mice and men often go
awry. While the efforts of the DCC were certainly a clear example of incorporative
activity on the part of native actors - and an effort duly noted among migrant
community leaders - given its vulnerability to the political process, public
bureaucracies that are in the end accountable to the whims of politicians may not be
the most stable source of incorporative activity in the long run.
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Capacity-Building
The final area of incorporative activity under investigation is capacity
building. I define this as strategic or financial partnerships with migrant
community organizations in order to enhance the capacity of these groups to make
their own demands on the state. Conceived as such, capacity-building can
encompass activities both on the parts of explicitly political organizations such as
parties, or more non-partisan organizations such as community groups and public
agencies. For example, the DCC migrant voter campaign was a clear example of
attempts to engage in capacity-building; indeed, through its fostering of new
networks and working relationships between the state and immigrant organizations
and between immigrant organizations, the campaign was an almost prototypical
example of capacity-building incorporative activity. Here, I focus on the actions of
two key groups: state agencies and worker organizations.
State Agencies and Capacity-Building
In 1998, the Irish government created the National Consultative Committee
on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI). The mission of the organization was to
act as a bridge between the government and NGOs in order to:
- Develop an inclusive and strategic approach to combat racism by focusing on its
prevention and promoting an intercultural society
- Contribute to policy and legislative developments and seek to encourage dialogue
and progress in all areas relating to racism and interculturalism
- Encourage integrated actions towards acknowledging, celebrating and
accommodating cultural diversity
- Establish and maintain links with organisations or individuals involved in
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addressing racism and promoting interculturalism at national, European and
international level
Provide a national framework for responding to and consulting with key
European and international bodies on issues related to racism and
interculturalism.
As with social partnership, a key issue here was consultation: the NCCRI
was meant to allow for some degree of input from the migrant community into
government incorporation policies; the government, meanwhile, would support
programs to help migrants adjust to life in Ireland. Also, as a neutral third party,
in theory the NCCRI was meant to both 1) monitor social relations and incidents of
racism and 2) offer reports and analyses addressing these dynamics. In practice,
the NCCRI developed into a key ally of the immigrant community: its reports on
racism and the problems of incorporation, and the subsequent media attention they
attracted, allowed migrant groups felt as it they had some outside confirmation of
their experiences with racism and inter-group conflict in Ireland and a key ally in
the public sphere to highlight these issues.
Despite the work of the NCCRI, there was still a sense that Ireland not only
lacked a cohesive migration policy, but that these issues were not particularly
important to the government. To that end, migrant groups and allies demanded
both an integration plan for the national government and some kind of immigration
ministry that could play a more direct role in linking migrant communities to the
government. In 2007, they got their wish - kind of. The government created a new
position, the Minister for Integration, and a new government office, the Office of the
Minister for Integration (OMI). As with the social partnership agreement, the OMI
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was intended to be both consultative and deliberative: the new Minister of State for
Integration, Conor Lenihan, laid out the mission of the OMI in one of his first
speeches as minister:
We are committed to social cohesion and this has been given a new political focus
through my appointment as Minister of State with responsibility for integration. My
office has been given a cross-departmental mandate to develop, drive and co-
ordinate integration policy across other Departments, agencies and services. It will
be involved in the development of a long-term national policy on integration
informed by widespread consultation at a national level.
Stakeholder consultation is critical to successful integration. The process of
consultation with NGOs and key stakeholders has already begun...
... I have plans to establish a range of other consultative structures. As I already
announced, I intend to establish a task force on integration in 2008 to identify key
issues affecting immigrant communities. This will consult widely with the
immigrant and indigenous populations, visit communities, examine previous
research and report back with specific practical and implementable
recommendations for the medium to long-term development of policy which must be
introduced now rather than later. 99
While the principles of consultation laid out in the Minister's statement were
a positive step for migrant communities, what people were not so sure about was
the government's choice for the Ministerial position. Conor Lenihan had an
impeccable political pedigree: he father, grandfather, and aunt all served as TDs
(parliamentarians) for Fianna Fiil. However, in 2005, during a debate in the Daiil,
when Socialist TD Joe Higgins began attacking the government's position on airline
privatization, Lenihan, then Minister of State at the Department of Foreign Affairs,
was caught on camera telling Higgins he should "Stick with the kebabs", referring
* Seanad (Ireland), Integration Policy: Statements, vol. 188, No. 3, 13 December 2007 (209-
211)
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to a labor dispute involving Turkish workers that Higgins was involved in.100 Given
that these comments were seen as xenophobic and offensive, some questioned
whether or not Lenihan was well-suited to be tasked with managing the
government's relations with a rapidly diversifying immigrant community. At any
rate, those concerned about Lenihan's suitability for the job had little to worry
about, for he did not last long: the OMI went through three ministers in four years
(2007-2011) until under the new Fine Gael government it was disbanded as a
ministry and re-opened as the "Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration"
within the Department of Justice and Equality.
The OMI was not the only government-subsidized organization to feel the
winds of change: the NCCRI closed at the end of 2008 due to budget cuts.
Combined with the cuts to the DCC Office of Integration, by 2011, nearly the entire
bureaucratic infrastructure that Irish politicians put in place in order to facilitate
migrant political and social integration no longer existed, or at best, were small
offices rolled into larger bureaucracies. While Ireland was at the time experiencing
a painful recession, and cuts to public agencies and services were largely expected,
the rapid dismantling of the institutional infrastructure developed to address new
immigration sent a strong signal to both native and immigrant communities: these
programs are not politically important. Unfortunately for local officials and migrant
community organizations, migration was not an issue that could be ignored, as hard
times meant that conflict over access to public housing and other cash-strapped
public services intensified. As one migrant community organizer lamented, "At the
100 Most kebab stands in Dublin are Turkish.
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very time we need these organizations the most, the government is taking them
away" (NGO15, personal interview, Dublin, May 2010).
Worker Organizations and Capacity-Building
The other opportunity for capacity-building incorporative activity was
through migrant community partnerships with trade unions and other worker
organizations. At the point when migration began picking up in Ireland, unions
were in a rather unique position: social partnership meant that, unlike their British
and American counterparts, they had some say over both industrial and social
policy. They also had a tighter grip on their membership: in 2005, 35% of Irish
workers were unionized versus 28.8% of British workers (CSO 2010a; Department
for Business Innovation and Skills 2010). However, social partnership was a huge
boon to public more than private-sector workers: while 56.5% of UK public sector
workers were unionized in 2005, close to 75% of Irish public sector workers were,
and over time, this imbalance started to become problematic. First, by basically
ignoring the private sector, unions were left flatfooted with the private sector-led
labor market expansion of the Celtic Tiger. Second, for years, organized labor in
Ireland could be categorized as 'business unionism' rather than 'social movement
unionism': unions were more concerned with servicing existing members than
recruiting new members. While this is a problem that most unions in post-
industrial countries are grappling with, in Ireland this dynamic was exacerbated by
social partnership, as there was growing concern that because pay raises were
negotiated with the government rather than directly between union officials and
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employers, workers were losing sense of what, if any, value the union added to their
lives. Finally, and most distressing, it was not clear that social partnership was
working for low-wage workers: for the 2006 bargaining cycle, Mandate, a union that
represents retail and other low-wage private-sector service workers, sat out of wage
negotiations and instead took employers on directly via industrial action. By going
outside of the social partnership process, Mandate was able to negotiate a better
wage and benefits packet for grocery retail workers than they would have
otherwise, and this sent a strong signal to both organizers and low-wage workers
that perhaps social partnership wasn't all it was cracked up to be. 101
It is within this context of weak private sector representation that Eastern
European workers flooded the hotel and restaurant and construction industries in
the mid-2000s. Faced with unprecedented migration and the expansion of sectors of
the labor market where union presence was relatively low, Irish trade unions
sought out a number of partnerships with other organizations in order to better
gain access to migrant workers. The largest trade union, SIPTU, hired several
Eastern European organizers who were plucked from migrant-led organizations. On
the non-organizing side, SIPTU teamed up with one of the biggest organizing
unions in the United States, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) in
order to expand both their strategic research and organizing capacity: SEIU is
known in the U.S. for its "Justice for Janitors" campaigns targeting immigrant
workers. Mandate also linked up with American organizing unions and established
101 Brian Sheehan. 2007. "Union secures above-norm pay deal at Tesco," European
Industrial Relations Observatory.
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organizing teams. And at the federation level, ICTU (the equivalent of the AFL-
CIO in the United States) hired a migrant outreach coordinator.
However, the more radical, direct representation of migrant worker issues
happened not through the trade unions, but through worker centers, most notably
the Migrant Rights Center of Ireland (MRCI). The MRCI describes it mission and
approach as such:
MRCI works from a particular understanding and analysis of the challenges facing
migrants and the solutions required to best effect social change so that they can live
as equal members of Irish society. This analysis is guided by an equality and social
justice framework that situates community work as the foundation to its approach to
social change.
A community work approach involves creating the conditions for the participation
and empowerment of communities/groups affected by inequality to take collective
action for social change. It involves promotion and support of migrant worker
participation in policy and decision-making arenas, including advocacy and
campaign efforts. In addition, it seeks to support collectivisation (e.g. Action Groups
such as Domestic Workers) and the development of migrant leaders.10 2
A key difference between union organizing and the MRCI approach was that
the MRCI focused much more heavily on migrant capacity-building, particularly
among female migrant workers, in order to help them articulate their issues and
make their demands directly on the state. However, the MRCI also tends to
concern itself more with broader policy issues of concern to migrant communities:
racism, social exclusion, and exploitation feature heavily, and many of its
organizing campaigns are not contract-oriented in the sense of union organizing
campaigns, but rather issue-oriented.
102 The MRCI mission statement is available on their website at:
http://www.mrci.ie/background/ [accessed September 8, 2013].
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The MRCI has occasionally worked with SIPTU on specific campaigns.
However, in conversations with migrant worker organizers both inside and outside
of the labor movement, this could at times be a tense relationship. Similar to the
problems faced by SEIU and other organizing unions in the United States, Irish
union partnerships with migrant organizations can seem one-sided and
instrumental: migrant worker organizations may have access to workers, but
unions have access to money and power, and this can lead to tension over the
nature of partnerships and tactics.
Taken together, on paper Irish unions seem to be doing many of the right
things when it comes to migrant workers: they have tried to reach out to new
immigrant communities via both their own staffing policies and partnerships, they
have tried to re-orient themselves towards taking a more proactive approach to
internal organizing, and for the 2005-2006 round of social partnership negotiations,
they even called for immigrant-friendly changes to the visa system.10 3 In practice,
however, there are a number of problems. First, in the view of some migrant
organizers and community leaders, union activity and migrant community
partnerships have been less about building the capacity of migrant communities to
be active participants in Irish political life, and more about co-optation.
Subsequently, some migrant leaders interested in labor market-related issues feel
sidelined in the debates about their own future; one Dublin-based migrant
community organization official emphasized this point, insisting, "We have our own
voices. We can represent ourselves!" (NGO5, personal interview, Dublin, April
103 Ed Carty, "Unions warn on migrant policy," Irish News, October 19, 2005.
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2010). In addition, it is also unclear how deep ICTU's commitment to migrant
worker issues is: their migrant outreach coordinator is actually based in Belfast
because the funding for these outreach efforts is not coming through the union, but
rather through money available to groups in Northern Ireland specifically to work
on post-conflict 'good relations' issues.
The bigger problem though is the fact that, despite these recent internal
changes, the structure of the social partnership agreements means that the power
of Irish trade unions lies not in their relationship with their members, but in their
relationship with the government. Social partnership was established in order to
prevent industrial action, insure wage restraint in order to make Ireland more
attractive to foreign investors (particularly from the U.S.), and create a deliberative
body to set social and economic policy. The American model for organizing migrant
workers, however, particularly in the low-wage service sector, relies on direct
confrontation - exactly what social partnership was meant to prevent. The
American model is also is reliant on a staff that treats worker organizing and
representation as a vocation, not as a 9-to-5 job. An additional problem for Irish
labor unions then is the fact that their internal culture at the time when migration
picked up was contrary to the American organizing ethos, but the state of the
economy and the political changes in the Ddil are increasingly contrary to social
partnership. It remains to be seen if unions can truly engage in capacity-building
with immigrant workers because at this point, their more pressing issue may be
simply building their internal capacity to survive life after social partnership, which
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seems unlikely to survive the recession and Fianna Fiil's departure from
government. The future seems grim: as one unhappy organizer speculated, "At the
rate they are going, these unions won't be around in ten years" (Union3, personal
interview, Dublin, July 2009).
IV. Discussion and Conclusion
The basic question that this thesis grapples with is, what explains
incorporative activity (or lack thereof) on the part of parties, and to a lesser extent
unions and NGOs, in new destinations? Ireland stands out as one European new
destination where the path to incorporative activity seemed relatively clear when
immigration first began gaining momentum in the 1990s: a well-educated migrant
population, migrant access to citizenship, non-citizen voting rights for local
elections, and state-supported bureaucracies that served as a bridge between native
actors and migrant communities meant that for native political actors there were
few institutional impediments to migrant outreach. Yet despite these advantages,
incorporative activity was sporadic, and at times, native actors - namely, parties -
moved to actually close off access to the polity. Why?
A return to the review of the literature offered in Chapter Two may help us to
tease out some possible explanations. The first set of arguments to explain political
behavior looks to power dynamics. Groups that are seeking to gain power -
whether through membership drives or vote share - are the ones most likely to
organize new groups into politics, for bringing new constituents into the game
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allows them to shift the balance of power within the system. To some extent, we see
this dynamic happening with party politics: the Greens, as one of the smallest
parties in Ireland, had a relatively large pool of migrant candidates, and this may
have helped them to attract the attention of migrant voters. Conversely, we would
also expect that those political organizations that are hegemonic - i.e. they
completely dominate a given political system - to be disinterested in incorporative
activity, as they don't need new voters or members in order to hang onto power.
This may explain why the trade union approach to immigrant workers has been
underwhelming: under social partnership, unions don't have to mobilize workers in
order to get a contract or concessions - instead, they pick up the phone and
negotiate with the social partners. This is in notable contrast to their British
counterparts, who, having been cast in the political wilderness by the Thatcher
administration, had to actively seek out and mobilize new membership - and this
includes migrant workers.
Can this hegemonic theory of local power dynamics explain the behavior of
Fianna Fiil? It is certainly true that Fianna F iil has dominated Irish politics like
no other party: it has been in government over 70% of the time since independence,
and Eamon De Valera was able to use that dominance in the early 1930s in order to
completely redefine both the nation's institutions and narrative of self-
understanding. However, Fianna FAil's ability to dominate Irish politics has waned
over the last three decades: before the 1980s, they refused to go into government
with other parties, yet since then, they have had to rely on coalitions with small
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parties, and it was widely known going into the 2009 local elections that, given the
state of the economy, they were facing a bloodbath at the polls. Given their
weakening position vis-a-vis the other parties, and the influx of new potential voters
who were neither bound by civil war politics nor livid at the government, it was
surprising that Fianna Fiil was so disengaged from migrant voter mobilization.104
The second set of explanations draws on theories of identity to explain
differences in political behavior: we should be able to predict, based on the
ideological bent or political identity of a political actor how they will respond or
behave when confronted with key political issues. As with power theories of
political behavior, identity-based theories seem to explain some but not all of the
incorporative activity we saw in Ireland. What we saw with the Green Party,
Labour, and other left-wing parties, was largely what we would expect: left-wing
parties are generally supportive of migrant citizenship rights and liberal migration
regimes. However, identity-based arguments run into two fundamental problems in
Ireland. The first is Ireland's lack of a traditional left-right political spectrum.
While Fine Gael is perhaps most accurately described as a Christian Democratic
party in the Continental European mold (and caucuses as such in the European
Parliament), Fianna Fiil is more accurately described as populist, rather than
belonging on any standard political spectrum. The Republican Party's rather
uneven approach to economic and social policy was most on display in the 1990s and
2000s: when representing the Fianna Fiil government in her 2000 speech to the
14 In addition, the party's insistence on holding the 2004 citizenship referendum at the same
time as the local elections suggests that the party was, at lest in part, seeking to improve
vote share - exactly the kind of activity that a hegemonic party does not need to engage in.
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American Bar Association, Mary Harney tried to distance herself from collectivist
Europe ('Berlin') in an attempt to align the government's policies with the more
individualist, market-oriented ('Boston') approach to political economy. But just
four years later, Bertie Ahern told an interviewer that he was 'one of the last
socialists left'. 105 The Irish media had a field day as did the opposition: the leader of
the Labour Party even went so far as to address him as "Comrade Taoiseach"
during Questions time in the Diil. But Ahern's 'red' turn on economic policy was
better considered as part and parcel of Fianna Fail's long-term political strategy to
stay in power rather than some great ideological conversion: his embrace of
socialism came in the midst of a contentious battle over the public ownership of Aer
Lingus, the national airline. The Irish Times political columnist Stephen Collins
took note:
All in all, then, Ahern got a good return on his little burst of enthusiasm for
socialism. He helped redefine Fianna Fail's image, caused trouble for the Labour
leadership and put it up to Labour's Dublin backbenchers. If the episode helps to
drive a wedge between Labour and Fine Gael, then the Taoiseach will really get full
value for his socialist solo run.106
Ahern's approach seems to echo De Valera's comments during his first
speech to the newly formed Fianna Fail party in the 1920s when he put to the
audience: "If you want to know what the direction of that line of advance at the
moment is, ask yourselves what line a young man would be likely to take". If
nothing else, Fianna Fail has always know where its base stood and which way the
105 "Ahern 'a genuine socialist' says McCreevy," breakingnews.ie, November 6 2005,
available online at: http://www.breakingnews.ie/ireland/ahern-a-genuine-socialist-says-
mccreevy-228947.html.
106 Stephen Collins, "Politics," Irish Times, November 21, 2004.
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wind was blowing, and while this approach may have contributed to its electoral
success over the years, it can also lead to extraordinarily cynical political behavior,
a situation that did not pass unremarked upon by Pat Rabbitte of the Labour Party
during the 'Comrade Taoiseach' debate in the Dail:
I want to ask comrade Taoiseach now that he has come out as a socialist how this
will affect the ordinary lives of our citizens? Nothing has stretched credulity so
much since the press conferences in Baghdad of "comical Ali". Will the Taoiseach
say what this will mean in practice for ordinary people? How will it change the lives
of ordinary people now that a true socialist leads the government... People will want
to know if his calculated, cynical announcement at the weekend will mean a change
of direction in the Government policies he has pursued for seven and a half
years... 107
What made this situation even more bizarre, yet even more emblematic of
Fianna Fiil's populist approach, was at the same time as Ahern was declaring his
affinity for socialism in Dublin, his party was caucusing with the nationalist right
in the European Parliament: Fianna Faiil, as a member of the now-defunct Union
for Europe of the Nations (UEN), sat with the Danish People's Party and the
Northern League of Italy, among others. Therefore, according to traditional
economic and/or social metrics, it is nearly impossible to classify Fianna Fail as
anything other than savvy populists - which explains why and how the 'socialist'
Ahern could stand behind the citizenship referendum even as every other left-wing
party in the DAil vigorously opposed it.
The second problem is the question of republicanism. Since the 1700s,
republicans have repeatedly risen up against the British state in order to establish
an independent Irish republic, and a willingness to use violence to meet that
107 DAil Eireann, Leader's Questions, vol. 592, No. 3, 16 November 2004 (65).
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political end has, to some extent inextricably linked republican identity to physical
force. This linkage is particularly strong within the republican movement itself:
Anthony McIntyre, a former IRA Volunteer during the Troubles who has since
become an academic, notes that among militant republicans in Northern Ireland,
those who chose the ballot box over bombs were "for years viewed... as wasters -
[Sinn Fein was seen as] a hiding place for those who wanted to be republicans
without the baggage of suffering that went with being members of the IRA"
(2003,184). Among the most militant, many of the most revered leaders of this
movement were those who called for not just a republic, but a democratic,
egalitarian, and socialist republic: Tone, Pearse and James Connolly, the dedicated
socialist and co-founder of the Labour Party. Yet many of those who supported the
aims of the republican movement, and who self-identified as republicans, were not
driven solely - or even at all - by ideas about a more egalitarian society, but rather
fought in the name of an idealized 'imagined community' of the Irish nation that
was Catholic, Gaelic, and rural. The triumph of this 'pastoral' vision of the republic
as articulated by De Valera was captured in the 1937 Constitution, and for much of
Ireland's modern political history, Fianna Fail, the self-titled Republican Party, has
been the guardian of that vision. But starting in the 1980s when Sinn F6in, revived
by and under the control of Northern republicans, came south and began to gain
ground in the Republic, the differences in these visions of republicanism were
thrown into sharper relief: both parties commemorate the men of 1916, and both
have historic ties to the IRA, but in its current iteration, Sinn F6in and Fianna Fiil
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have strongly disagreed on a number of policy issues, most notably on the question
of citizenship - a fundamental issue for any republican.
The final issue is institutional: is there something about Ireland's electoral
rules or political procedures that inhibit incorporative activity? The answer may lie
not with the fact that these institutions exist, but rather, they may have something
to do with how they came into being in the first place. The common thread running
through the development of Ireland's civic institutions for the last century was the
need to define the political and legal relationship between Ireland and Great
Britain, not Ireland and "foreigners": despite the GAA restrictions against "foreign
games", the reality of the situation is that there are foreigners and there are British
people - neither of these two groups are Irish, but nor do they have equal standing
in Irish society. While from a distance, Ireland's civic institutions may have seemed
open to foreigners, in reality, they were open to British citizens.
So what are the key lessons from the Irish case? We generally believe that
native political actors in new destination societies are ill-equipped to take on the
task of political incorporation due to a lack of migrant-serving institutions and
organizations, and a lack of historical narratives around immigration to legitimize
the inclusion of new immigrants in civic life. Yet, even before migration became a
phenomenon in Ireland, the country had - quite unintentionally - developed a series
of institutions, most notably citizenship and electoral institutions, that were
extraordinarily friendly to immigrants. With new immigration, however, those
institutions were vulnerable to retrenchment, and the well-meaning allies that
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emerged were often swamped by party politics. Most strikingly, Ireland's lack of a
coherent historical narrative around migration and its relation to citizenship meant
that, in contrast to countries like the United States where these narratives are well-
developed, Irish political elites by and large did not have a framework for
understanding, interpreting, and acting upon this new social phenomenon. Given
that the largest party in the state was already prone to populism and policy u-turns,
it is not surprising that incorporative activity was uneven. What is surprising,
however, is how much events in the Republic seem to differ from concurrent events
on the other side of the border in Northern Ireland, and those differences are the
subject of the next chapter.
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Table 4.1: Immigrant Candidates by Party and Region of Origin, 2009
Region of Origin
Central
and
Eastern Western
Party Africa Europe Europe Americas Asia/Pacific TOTAL
Fianna Fail 2 7 0 0 1 10
Fine Gael 4 4 0 0 0 8
Labour 0 2 1 1 0 4
Green Party 5 2 0 1 0 8
Sinn F6in 0 0 0 0 0 0
Independents 7 0 0 0 1 8
TOTAL 18 15 1 2 2 38
192
Figure 4.1:
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Chapter 5 - Old Grievances, New Institutions: Incorporative
Activity in Northern Ireland
The whole map of Europe has been changed. The position of countries has been violently altered. The
modes of thought of men, the whole outlook on affairs, the grouping of parties, all have encountered
violent and tremendous changes in the deluge of the world. But as the deluge subsides and the waters
fall short we see the dreary steeples of Fermanagh and Tyrone emerging once again. The integrity of
their quarrel is one of the few institutions that has been unaltered in the cataclysm which has swept
the world.
- Winston Churchill, address to Parliament, Westminster, 1920
How do you integrate into a disintegrated society?
- Community worker, Personal interview, Belfast, September 2011
Upon first glance, Northern Ireland is a place that seems irretrievably
broken. Levels of self-segregation in housing and schools are extraordinarily high.
Walls and fences separating Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods, commonly
known as 'peace lines', have proliferated across the region; there are more today
than there were in 1998, when the thirty-year conflict known as 'the Troubles'
formally came to an end. Barbed wire, paramilitary graffiti, and security cameras
are a constant reminder of the region's legacy of conflict, and sectarian tensions still
spill over into violence with alarming regularity.
Despite these depressing reminders of the region's violent history, there is a
different side to the North, one that may surprise outsiders and residents alike.
Northern Ireland has some of the highest levels of voluntary activity in the UK. Its
laws protecting the rights of women, gays, and ethnic minorities were some of the
strongest in Europe at the time of their creation (Equality Challenge Unit 2010).
And despite a deeply entrenched sectarian political system where family name,
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neighborhood of birth, and religious affiliation serve as key social and political
markers, in 2007, Northern Ireland's voters became the first in Europe to elect a
Chinese-born candidate to serve in a parliamentary body.108
Indeed, perhaps the biggest surprise about Northern Ireland these days - to
both outside observers, and certainly to residents - is that it has become a magnet
for immigration. Prior to the 1990s, Northern Ireland would have been a place
where emigration was more the norm. However, with peace in 1998, and the
opening of the UK and Irish labor market to new Eastern European EU accession
states in 2004, the region experienced an unprecedented influx of foreign workers,
and the foreign-born population increased four-fold from 1997 to 2010.
While the rate of immigrants as a percentage of the population is still
relatively low at 4.5%, the sudden influx of foreigners raised many of the usual
concerns about political incorporation, the process by which migrants become a part
of "mainstream political debates, practices, and decision making" (Bloemraad
2006:6-7). However, given Northern Ireland's political history, these questions were
- and continue to be - particularly fraught: what does political incorporation mean
in a place where party affiliation is generally sectarian? What does taking up the
'task' of incorporation mean in a society where almost all political activity centers
on the deeply divisive 'national question', namely Northern Ireland's status as part
of the United Kingdom? To paraphrase one community worker, how are
immigrants supposed to integrate into a disintegrated society?
108 Anna Lo, of the Alliance Party.
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Despite no historical legacy of immigration to guide community groups, state
bureaucracies, parties, and other political organizations, and their own internal
legacy of distrust and violence, political actors in Northern Ireland have taken up
the task of incorporation surprisingly well.109 Parties have made tentative steps
towards including new immigrants in electoral politics: several migrant candidates
were nominated in the last election cycle, and migrants are playing an increasingly
visible role within the parties themselves. Labor organizations, neighborhood
associations, and a variety of non-profit groups are working directly with migrant
communities to educate workers about their rights. In addition, community groups
have engaged in capacity building by establishing strategic partnerships with
migrant organizations, and helping these groups gain access to public funding for
community projects. The willingness of local political actors to engage in
'incorporative activities' with new immigrants is clear. What is less clear is why
they choose to do so.
In this chapter, I argue that there are two key factors driving incorporative
activity in Northern Ireland today. The first involves the province's post-conflict
political institutions. The social unrest that grew in the 1960s was fuelled by a
sense in Catholic communities that the province's political institutions, most
notably its voting eligibility rules, were exclusionary. Inspired by the black civil
109 Here I refer to the working definition of incorporative activity established in Chapter 2:
the actions that political organizations take in order to facilitate migrant membership in
the polity. Using Andersen's (2010) framework for measuring incorporative activity -
creating a pathway to citizenship, facilitating electoral participation, educating migrants
about opportunities for participation, and providing resources to help them do so - I focus
on two key areas: 1) facilitating electoral participation, and 2) what I call'capacity
building', namely a combination of migrant education and resource provision.
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rights movement in the United States, Catholic community organizers put forth an
alternative narrative of inclusion and equality that challenged the very foundations
of the sectarian state. When anger over ongoing political marginalization spilled
over into paramilitary violence leading to the thirty-year conflict known as 'the
Troubles', the unsustainability of the status quo became abundantly clear to the
state as well. Subsequently, during peace negotiations in the 1990s, one of the
central issues for parties and community organizations alike was the need to re-
build political institutions in a way that included all members of society, whether
Protestant or Catholic, nationalist or unionist. The 1998 Good Friday Agreement
(GFA) and the Northern Ireland Act reflect the triumph of this new, alternative
social narrative, and today consent and consultation are key components of
Northern Ireland's new political institutions. To reference Churchill's comments
from above, while the 'quarrel' over the political status of Northern Ireland remains
deeply entrenched, the institutions of the province have been profoundly altered.
The second key factor is the effect that the conflict had on the behavior of
political actors, at both the individual and organizational level. At an individual
level, the leadership cohort from the Catholic civil rights movement in the 1960s
was clearly engaged in 'high-risk activity', and consistent with findings on civil
rights activists in the United States, that generation of leadership stayed active in
progressive politics and community organizing decades later. 110 Today, many of the
most vocal proponents for migrant's rights have roots in the Catholic civil rights
movement of the 1960s. At the organizational level, one of the most enduring
110 See McAdam 1990.
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legacies of the Troubles is the complete restructuring of civil society, particularly
the relationship between voluntary organizations and the state. Under the old
'Stormont' system that existed prior to the Troubles, Catholics came to view the
distribution of public goods as overtly sectarian, and the unequal allocation of public
housing was a particular area of contention due to overcrowding in Catholic
neighborhoods. During the conflict, these areas became no-go zones for the state,
particularly in the poor and working-class neighborhoods of Belfast and Derry. To
fill this vacuum, community organizations, often with support from the British
government, took over many of the functions that were traditionally the province of
the state. Subsequently, with the retreat of the state, and the expansion of the
voluntary sector, not only did the distribution of public goods and services became
mission-driven rather than explicitly sectarian, but community organizations
became active players in the region's volatile politics. Therefore, by the time that
immigrants began streaming into Northern Ireland in the late 90s and early 00s,
there was both a neighborhood-based service infrastructure in place that was
established to insure that native marginalized communities had access to both
public services and public officials, and a cadre of community leaders ready, willing,
and very able to not only engage with new immigrants directly, but to challenge the
state on their behalf.
Taken together, the North's new post-conflict political institutions and the
structure and political orientation of civil society inadvertently create the ideal
conditions for incorporative activity targeting migrants. The province's new
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political institutions put a statutory duty on the regional government to both
monitor and address issues of social and political exclusion for all minority groups,
not just the 'traditional' minority group in Northern Irish society, Catholics. In
addition, migrants have native political allies in a community sector that is
reflexively willing to speak up on behalf of politically, economically, and socially
marginalized communities. And many local political actors, particularly in Catholic
communities, are able to use the historical narrative they developed to articulate
their own concerns about political marginalization and exclusion in the past, to
justify pushing for the political and social inclusion of immigrants in the present.
Therefore, despite the fact that Northern Ireland is a 'new destination' for migrants,
it has some of the key characteristics that facilitate incorporative activity in 'old
destinations': established institutions to foster the political and social inclusion of
linguistically and culturally distinct minority groups, politically embedded
community organizations that see migrants as a valued constituency, and a
historical narrative that helps natives articulate and justify why newcomers should
be included in civic life.
This is not to say that things are all rainbows and roses for immigrants living
in Northern Ireland. In some areas, sectarianism has morphed into racism with
distressing ease. Immigrants have been subjected to harassment on the streets,
and in the worst cases, have been intimidated out of their homes - a sad echo of the
darkest days of sectarian strife in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 2000s, Belfast was
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increasingly mentioned as 'the race hate capital of Europe'"1 , and a well-publicized
2009 attack on Roma immigrants living in South Belfast did little to enhance the
city's reputation. But in Northern Ireland, community groups keep a close watch
for potential flare-ups, community pressure and statutory obligations force
politicians and local officials to address these concerns, and there are an array of
legal options that both native and migrant-led organizations can utilize in order to
ensure that immigrants have both the opportunity to be a part of civic live and to
have their needs taken into account in the policy-making process.
The chapter proceeds in five sections. Section one describes the exclusionary
nature of the political institutions established at the time of Northern Ireland's
creation, the local political actors that supported and opposed these institutions,
and how this situation became untenable by the 1960s. Section two explains how
the new post-conflict political institutions of the province were developed, and their
effect on political participation and representation. Section three traces the rise of
immigration in the wake of the peace process, explores the extent of incorporative
activity in reaction to new migration, and shows how the legacy of the conflict has
shaped this activity. Section four briefly considers the unique role of Irish
nationalists in the process of incorporation. Section V offers a brief discussion of the
Northern Ireland case's implications.
111 "Race hate on rise in NI", BBC News Online, January 13, 2004, available online at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/northernireland/3390249.stm.
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I. Conflict and Chaos: The Rise and Fall of the Stormont Regime
Northern Ireland was conceived out of sectarian concerns, born out of
sectarian mobilization, and run on strictly sectarian lines. From its borders to its
electoral institutions, the province was designed to protect Protestant social,
economic, and political privilege. Over time, this situation became increasingly
untenable, as the post-war expansion of the welfare state spawned two key groups:
a new generation of civic-minded middle-class Catholics who got their economic and
political footing in the newly expanded civil service, and grassroots neighborhood
organizations determined to get their share of newly available public resources. By
the 1960s, a Catholic civil rights movement emerged that threatened to upset the
balance of power in the province. Tensions escalated through the decade, but an
inability to generate reform within Northern Ireland, or impose it from London, led
to chaos and the eventual collapse of the province's political institutions. It also
profoundly shaped the political identity of a generation of activists, agitators, and
combatants. Taken together, the rise and fall of the province's political
institutions, and the baptism by fire of its emergent political leadership would, after
years of bloodshed, set the stage for a 'new' Northern Ireland.
Building Stormont
As detailed in the previous chapter, the driving issue in Irish politics since
the 18th century has been the 'national question', namely the nature of Ireland's
political status vis-a-vis the United Kingdom. The fight over the 'national question'
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came to a head in 1920 with the push to create a corner of the island that would
remain part of the United Kingdom, regardless of what happened in the rest of
Ireland. This entity, which came to be known as Northern Ireland, consisted of six
out of the nine counties in Ulster. The decision to designate Northern Ireland as a
six-county province, rather than using the traditional nine-county Ulster border
was a direct result of the need on the part of Protestants - who were
overwhelmingly, but not exclusively unionist - to maintain a numerical majority
that would have been lost if the traditional boundaries of Ulster were maintained.
This gerrymandering did not go unnoticed by nationalists, who voiced their
opposition to partition in Parliament:
We are told that there is a homogeneous Ulster. So the homogeneous six counties are to
be created a separate State and cut off from the rest of Ireland! What are the facts about
three of these Ulster counties, the three that lie together, and are coterminous with
what is called Southern Ireland? There is the county of Tyrone, which has a Nationalist
majority of 15,365. There is county Fermanagh, which has a Nationalist-or call it
Catholic, if you like-majority of 7,644. It is proposed that these two counties are to
have a kind of self-determination, that the minority in these two counties are to rule the
majority, and that the majority in these two counties is to be placed in the position of a
permanent minority in a Parliament where they get practically no representation.
I put it to Englishmen, who have a reputation for being sportsmen, and men who like to
see fair play; is it fair on any constitutional ground that two counties, having an
absolute majority of the population, ought to be put into an assembly where they never
by any chance can have their rights asserted, and where they will be subject to the
bitterest and most bigoted government that could ever be set up-of men who have
stated in this House during this Debate that never would they coalesce with their
brother Irishmen? 1 2
Despite this opposition, Northern Ireland came into existence in 1922, when the six
counties voted to 'opt out' of the newly created Irish Free State (later the Republic of
Ireland) and remain part of the United Kingdom.
112 127 H.C. Deb. 31 March 1920 col. 1309
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Once the union with Britain was firmly established, and a great degree of
political autonomy granted by London, the worst fears of nationalists were realized.
First, the districting and electoral institutions of the new province were re-designed
to maintain a unionist majority. Prior to partition, the British government had
implemented a system of proportional representation, which meant that even
minority parties would gain a presence in the legislature.1 13 Much of the impetus
for these electoral reforms stemmed from the fact that, outside of Ulster, unionists
were under-represented in both local and national politics. With proportional
representation, they could not only gain seats in areas like Dublin and Cork where
there were still clusters of unionist supporters, but the political support for Sinn
F6in could be diluted. However, proportional representation also meant that
nationalists, as the largest minority group in Ulster, would also achieve greater
representation; subsequently Ulster unionists in Parliament were bitterly opposed
to the implementation of proportional representation on an all-Ireland basis. Their
opposition did not go unremarked upon by John Redmond, one of the leaders of the
Home Rule movement and the head of the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) who
noted that:
The minority [unionists] in the rest of Ireland demand and ought to get fair
representation. Once, however, the minority of Ulster is thought about, once it is
suggested that the minority of Ulster [nationalists], which is a larger minority than
113 In proportional representation (PR) systems, seats in a legislature are allocated based on
the preferences of voters. For example, if in a voting district, 35% of voters support the
Green Party, the Greens would win roughly 1/3 of the seats. However, if seats are allocated
based on winning a simple majority (i.e. 50% +1), the Greens would never get into
government, because they would never cross the 50% threshold. See Lijphart 1994 and
Cohen 1997 for an in-depth analysis of how voting systems affect the representation of
minority interests.
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that of the Unionists in the South and West of Ireland, should have as equal and fair
representation as the minority in the South, then the cry is heard, "Hands off
Ulster!"... That is the very kernel of the opposition to this Bill by Members from the
North of Ireland. Let the minority in the South of Ireland, because they belong to
one political persuasion, have fair representation! But the minority in the North of
Ireland, in Belfast, Derry, and Tyrone, must ever and always be ground down by the
Ulster ascendancy, and we, they say, shall never allow them to have their proper
and fair representation! We who come from Ireland know only too well the real
opposition to this Bill. It is this: Hon. Members opposite know that under
proportional representation in is quite possible, nay, probable, that the majority of
the people in Derry City, who are Nationalists, will for the first time come into their
proper representation. They also know that the people in the county of Tyrone - a
division of which I had the honour to represent for several years in this House - will
also come into their own. They do not care two straws whether the Unionists of
Dublin - or Waterford, for that matter - get representation so long as the
Nationalists of Belfast, Derry, and Tyrone do not get their fair share. That is the
kernel and the essence of the Ulster opposition." 4
However, the new post-partition government implemented a 'first past the
post' electoral system, meaning that representatives only needed a simple majority
of votes to win office. In addition, voting rights were limited to those that owned
property or were heads of households, rather than by individual adult.1 1 5 This put
Catholics at a disadvantage, as they were more likely to live in overcrowded, multi-
generational households and less likely to own businesses and property than their
Protestant counterparts. These electoral restrictions, combined with pro-unionist
gerrymandering, insured that unionist politicians were over-represented in both
local government and the new regional legislature that came to be known as
Stormont. The effect of this institutional change was most visible in predominately
nationalist areas such as Derry; by 1967, although unionists only won 32.1% of the
votes in local elections, they gained 60% of the seats (0 Dochartaigh 2005).
114 HC Deb. 1919, vol. 114 cc99-183.
115 'One man, one vote' was a key slogan of civil rights campaigners.
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This discrepancy did not escape the attention of the British government. The
1969 'Cameron Report', commissioned by the government to detail the rising social
unrest in Northern Ireland, noted:
... it must be kept in view that since the setting up of the Government of Northern
Ireland under the Government of Ireland Act 1920 one political party has been
continuously in power [the Ulster Unionist Party]. Not only so, but there has not so
far been developed any united parliamentary opposition, dedicated basically to
support the existing constitution, which upon any view has been at any time in a
position to present itself as a possible alternative government. We are not concerned,
and could not properly be concerned, with the reasons for this situation, but we
record the fact, because it is impossible to appreciate the immediate as well as the
underlying causes of the outbreaks which we have to consider without having regard
to the fact that in Northern Ireland the possibility of any organised Opposition
becoming the alternative Government has not so far been one which was in any
sense a reality. An Opposition which can never become a Government tends to lose a
sense of responsibility and a party in power which can never (in foreseeable
circumstances) be turned out tends to be complacent and insensitive to criticism or
acceptance of any need for change or reform (Chapter 1, section 7).116
It should also be noted that the unionist dominance of regional politics was
aided by Catholic apathy and the deliberate decision of many nationalists to abstain
from Northern Irish politics altogether. Consistent with the abstentionist policies of
early twentieth century republicans, hardline republican families with historical
ties to the Irish Republican Army (IRA), were particularly opposed to legitimizing
British political institutions through their presence in what they saw as illegitimate
legislative bodies.117
116 1969. "Disturbances in Northern Ireland: Report of the Commission appointed by the
Governor of Northern Ireland". The findings of the report are consistent with the literature
on contentious politics: if people feel that their grievances cannot or will not be address via
electoral or legislative politics, they may take to the streets instead; see Piven and Cloward
1977; Tarrow 1998.
"7 Hardline republicans even today deny the legitimacy of both the governments in
Stormont and the Dail. Instead, they see their demands for a unified Irish republic in the
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The systematic exclusion of Catholics from the region's politics, and the
abstentionist policies of hardline republicans left the Catholic community without
effective political representation for decades. Northern Ireland was essentially a
one-party unionist state. As one observer noted, "At Stormont nationalism had
found itself excluded from power, office and influence like some orphan child gazing
into a brightly lit and furnished shop window" (Bloomfield 2007). This situation
was exacerbated by the fact that there were few alternative political organizations
beyond parties that were open to Catholics. One example is trade unions:
traditionally, the unionized industrial jobs in the shipyards and heavy
manufacturing industries that buoyed the regional economy were the almost
exclusive province of Protestants, as Catholics had been ejected from the Belfast
shipyards amidst an increase in sectarian violence in the 1920s. 118 In addition, due
to the sectarian nature of the region's politics, religious community organizing as a
means of affecting policy was also not an option; attempts at ecumenical cross-
community reform in the early 1960s petered out, largely due to fears from unionist
organizations, most notably the Protestant fraternal organization the Loyal Orange
Institution, commonly known as the Orange Order:
And just as the proponents of ecumenism saw a connection between increased
religious tolerance and a breakdown of political barriers, many Protestants feared
that what was on the agenda was what they interpreted as 'surrender'. Such fears
were expressed by the Grand Master of the Independent Orange Order, W. J.
McClure, quoted in the Irish Weekly, the Irish News's weekend publication, of 21
July 1962: 'Rome is therefore unchanged and carries in her the same spirit of evil as
model of the First Dil Eireann as declared by Patrick Pearse in the 1916 proclamation as
the only legitimate form of government in Ireland.
118 See Munck 1985 and 0 Murchdi 2005 for an analysis of ethnic politics and organized
labor in Belfast.
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in the days of her greater power to torment the saints. Others may compromise, and
shake hands with this hellish institution, but we of the Independent Orange Order
will never bow the knee" (Purdie 1990, 20-2 1).
Therefore, by mid-century, Catholics found themselves largely locked out of
meaningful participation in the public life of Northern Ireland.
Interestingly, it may have been the expansion of the post-war welfare state
that in turn sparked Catholic mobilization. 0 Dochartaigh notes that the growth of
the welfare state in the post-war era had two key effects on state-society relations.
First, the British government's decision to delegate the distribution of public goods
to a sectarian local government further deepened Catholic grievances, as the
distribution of public housing, in particular, was seen as biased towards
Protestants. Subsequently, tenants organizations began appearing in the 1950s
and 60s as a means of both securing housing and ensuring that it was properly
maintained. Secondly, the overall expansion of the state created a need for a larger
civil service; these jobs provided a springboard for many upwardly mobile Catholics
into the middle class. This new pool of young professionals would become deeply
involved in the emergent Catholic civil rights movement (0 Dochartaigh 2005).
Stormont and its Discontents
By the 1960s, the situation in Northern Ireland seemed increasingly
untenable. Due to rising political confidence and a growing level of grievance,
Catholics began organizing in order to demand social, political and economic rights.
This challenge to the established order, along with the attempted reforms of the
O'Neill administration (1963-1969) provoked alarm amongst Protestants, many of
207
who saw any gains in the Catholic community as a potential threat to the
traditionally dominant political and socioeconomic position of their community. 119
Tensions finally boiled over in 1968, a 'hot' year across much of Western Europe,
and by 1969, the region had collapsed into bloody warfare.
Up until the 1960s, as noted, Catholics lacked effective political
representation, for both institutional and internal reasons. However, the black civil
rights movement in the United States gave the emergent Catholic leadership,
particularly in and around Derry, a framework for which to make claims on the
state. In the United States, groups like the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference (SCLC) and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)
made basic but powerful claims to equal citizenship rights under U.S. law.
Although claims to full citizenship resonated for many Catholics in Northern
Ireland, this was a risky strategy due to the republican policy of abstention: to make
claims for citizenship-based rights was to essentially acknowledge one's status as a
British citizen. For many Catholics who identified strongly with the republican
tradition, this was a step too far.
Despite this ambivalence, the situation in the North, and particularly in
Derry and Belfast, had reached a breaking point and activists were ready for
change. The situation in Derry was a particular sore point, for unlike Belfast, it
was a majority-nationalist city - yet nationalists were largely excluded from civic
119 In addition to pushing for economic reforms, Captain O'Neill (who was also the head of
the Ulster Unionist Party) visited Catholic sites, and met with the Taoiseach (prime
minister) of the Republic, Sean Lemass. This public fraternization with Catholics was
unprecedented, and became increasingly controversial, particularly among members of the
Orange Order.
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life. A 1965 report from the Campaign for Social Justice highlighted the main
concerns of the nationalist community in and around Derry: 1) political
gerrymandering that left nationalists grossly under-represented, 2) discrimination
in housing development and allocation, 3) discrimination in local government hiring
and compensation practices, and 4) discrimination in the allocation of public
resources for economic development projects. The report cited several key figures to
bolster their claims: although Catholics outnumbered Protestants in Londonderry
by a 2:1 ratio, 1) only 32 out of 177 employees of the Derry County government were
Catholics, and 2) only eight out of twenty councilors were nationalist. In addition,
while there was no wait for public housing in the Protestant community, over 2,000
Catholics were on a waiting list (Campaign for Social Justice 1965).
It is within this context that groups such as the Northern Ireland Civil
Rights Association (NICRA) and the Derry Citizen's Action Committee (DCAC)
emerged to demand equal housing rights and a greater say in civic affairs. Notables
from this era include John Hume of the DCAC, and later a co-founder of the
nationalist Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP), Eamonn McCann, a NICRA
co-founder and prominent socialist activist, and Bernadette Devlin who burst onto
the scene from the emergent student's rights movement out of Queen's University
Belfast. This generation of leadership represented the new face of Catholic political
leadership around the 'national question', one that looked to constitutional means
rather than political violence. Hume would go on to lead the SDLP through
numerous elections and later the peace process, and Devlin would go on to win (and,
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contrary to traditional republican practice, take) a seat in Westminster, becoming
the youngest female MP in British history.
This new leadership cadre engaged in direct confrontation with the Stormont
regime, primarily through clashes with the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and
the auxiliary security forces, known as the B-Specials. The RUC, which already had
a terrible reputation among Catholics as a biased police force, confirmed the
community's worst fears when they allowed civil rights marchers to be attacked by
Protestant mobs, or worse yet, set upon protesters themselves. Perhaps the most
notorious incident of RUC violence against civil rights protestors took place in
Derry in October 1968, when officers clubbed peaceful protestors - including two
Westminster MPs. 120
Under normal circumstances, in non-violent protest movements, street
actions are designed to draw a disproportionate response from the state, thus
leading to more public support for the cause. This was an extremely successful
tactic in the U.S.: the images of police in Birmingham and Selma attacking peaceful
protesters sparked a wave of national and international sympathy for the demands
of the movement. Initially, the Catholic civil rights movement had a similar effect:
the video of RUC officers beating peaceful protesters in Derry made international
headlines and galvanized the nationalist community at home and the large Irish
diaspora abroad. However, the problem for civil rights activists in Northern Ireland
was that they had to contend with the ongoing internal tension between those
committed to constitutional means versus Ireland's long history of physical force
120 These incidents were also detailed in the Cameron report.
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republicanism. As state-sanctioned violence on the part of the RUC and Loyalist
neighborhood 'defense associations' grew, the ability of the Catholic civil rights
leadership to maintain a non-retaliatory, non-violent approach declined, and force
increasingly seemed like the only viable response. Matters were not helped by
intransigence among some hardline unionist leaders, who within the context of the
"zero-sum" mindset of the region's politics, saw any concession to Catholics as the
first step on a slippery slope towards Dublin (and Papal) rule.
The breaking point for the Catholic community came in the summer of 1969,
which saw intense sectarian rioting across the province. The 'Battle of the Bogside'
in Derry, a sustained confrontation between the RUC and Catholic residents, and
the Bombay Street riots in Belfast, which saw the RUC stand by while Protestant
mobs burned hundreds of Catholic families out of their homes, were enough to
convince many Catholics, and in particular republicans, that constitutional means
were not enough: Catholics would never be secure in a British-controlled Ireland.
Thus, the 'Provisional' movement was born: young Catholics took up arms against
the RUC (and later the British army) and formed what would come to be known as
the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). The 'Troubles' had officially begun.
The Informal Civil Service: The Rise of the Community Sector
The conflict known as 'the Troubles' lasted for three decades and cost over
3,500 lives, but the deadliest years were from 1971-1976.121 As a result of the chaos,
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121 Sutton Index of Deaths
London disbanded Stormont and implemented direct rule in 1972, eventually
stripping the local government of administrative and political responsibilities and
putting the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) in charge of major policy and
administrative initiatives of the province. During this time, the British government
and the NIO attempted to introduce a series of reforms, known as 'the Sunningdale
Agreement', that were meant to address issues of political power-sharing and
consultation. However, the proposals were met with disdain from republicans and
stiff resistance from the unionist community, and were summarily dropped.
Subsequently, the burden of governing in Northern Ireland shifted away from
elected officials to the civil service, and policies were developed and administered
from the NIO. However, the elimination of the Stormont regime failed to eliminate
suspicion of the British government, particularly in republican strongholds.
Administrators were at a loss: on the one hand, Catholic communities were
historically under-served by local government, and this had fuelled much of the
conflict. On the other hand, these now paramilitary-controlled republican
heartlands were no-go zones for British government officials. How could the state
make inroads into these communities, provide services, and perhaps in the process
engage in a 'hearts and minds' campaign that could possibly soften community
sentiment?
Starting in the late 1960s, the British government enacted a series of what
came to be known as 'community relations' schemes as a means of managing
conflict, particularly in deeply sectarian areas. In an interesting parallel to
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immigration matters, these efforts were seen as an incorporation mechanism: "This
meant for the first time in its history the Northern Ireland statelet would attempt
to incorporate the Republican/Nationalist/Catholic community" (McVeigh 2002).
Through the UK government, funding was made available for community-based
groups to engage in social service provision, women's groups, social clubs, and youth
activities.
Critics note that the funding system, like everything else in Northern
Ireland, was heavily politicized: only 'acceptable' groups (i.e. moderate nationalists
or groups with no links to paramilitary organizations) would be eligible for support.
More specifically, the community relations agenda promoted and supported project
that had a cross-community focus, rather than an internal (i.e. single community)
community-building focus. However, it is the internal processes that, some have
argued, 'opened up' insular inner-city working class communities to wider political
participation: " the activities of the capillaries of civil society in the working class
communities of Northern Ireland have helped to improve the morale and increase
the confidence of these communities" (Lister 1998). Single-community work in
other areas (with women and the queer community being two key groups) also had
a key confidence-building function; women's groups in particular would come to play
a small but significant role in the 1990s peace process. Confidence is a key
component of community relations, particularly in Northern Ireland, and as we
shall see, community confidence would play a significant role in shaping how local
actors responded to new immigration.
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Ironically, it was in the most deprived communities that were shut out of
government assistance where the most radical community work took place. Most
notable was West Belfast, where self-help groups proliferated in the republican
Falls Road area in the absence of the state. These were groups created by Irish
republicans for Irish republicans, but they were not insular; the republican
movement's ties to other nationalist movements (such as the Basques of Northern
Spain), anti-apartheid groups, and civil rights organizations have given Belfast's
republican activist community, in particular, an international, universalist outlook
on political, civil, and human rights.122 As it did for Sinn F6in in the early twentieth
century, and for the Catholic Civil Rights movement in the 1960s, looking abroad to
understand the struggles of other marginalized people helped republicans to better
understand and frame their own situation at home.
In contrast, due to both differences in state-society relations and internal
differences between the two communities, community organizing has been less
robust in loyalist heartlands. This is in part because loyalists traditionally saw the
state as a legitimate force in society, and felt no need to set up parallel institutions.
In addition, as previously noted, loyalist communities benefited politically and
materially from the old Stormont regime. Third, the Protestant community is not
122 Today, this international agenda immediately greets any newcomer to the Falls Road, as
a block long wall of murals declare the community's solidarity with Basques, Catalans,
political prisoners, Cubans, and other marginalized groups. Murals play a particularly
important symbolic role in Northern Ireland. Traditionally, they have been used to 'take
the temperature' of a given community, or to signal its political discontent. Murals, graffiti,
curb-painting, and flags are also used to mark the territory of hardline republican or
loyalist housing estates, and during the Troubles were used to signal what paramilitary
organization controlled a particular area. See Appendix D at the end of this chapter for
examples.
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homogeneous; there have long been divisions between Anglicans and Presbyterians
and between the inner-city working class and the upper classes who lived in the
leafy suburbs overlooking Belfast. Even the paramilitary movement was fractured;
internecine feuds between loyalists both during and after the Troubles were
particularly deadly, and loyalist communities lack the history of shared grievance
that fosters community cohesion in Catholic communities. Subsequently, as the
region's institutions opened up, and Catholics took on a greater role in the public
life of the province, many Protestant communities suffered a crisis of confidence.
Later, as we will see, this lack of confidence would come to the fore when inner-city
Protestant communities were faced with the challenge of new immigration.
Conclusion
The rise and fall of the Stormont regime had a profound effect on the politics
of Northern Ireland, both on its institutions and its key actors. The dire political
and social position of Catholics in the run-up to the Troubles highlighted the
multiple failures of the era's political institutions. The articulation of that social
position in the face of extreme political and legal hostility forged the views of a
generation of Catholic activists. And the collapse of local government and the
subsequent expansion of the role of the voluntary sector gave NGOs a privileged
place within local politics.
However, the collapse of Stormont left a huge hole in the politics of the
region. Given the problems of the past, clearly more inclusive institutions were in
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order. But what should they look like? And who should have a say in the 'new'
Northern Ireland? We now turn to the next section, which explores how key
stakeholders, many of whom were sworn enemies, came together to rebuild
Northern Ireland's political institutions from the ground up, and in the process,
created some of the most progressive minority rights laws in the world.
II. Old Battles, New Institutions: Peace and the New Northern Ireland
As the stark violence of the 1970s subsided into the protracted, low-level
phase of the Troubles known as the 'Long War', elected officials, bureaucrats, and
community organizations set about on the long process of rebuilding the region's
political institutions so as to not only bring about an end to violence, but to insure
that such a conflict would be less likely to erupt in the future. While the main
preoccupations of the peace negotiators were bringing an end to paramilitary
activity and finding a way for both sides to 'agree to disagree' on the national
question, the community sector focused on coming to an agreement that would
ensure a broadly inclusive future for everyone, not just those who identified as
being republicans or loyalists. The inclusion of small parties such as the Northern
Ireland Women's Coalition, and the input from the vibrant community sector served
to open the language of the agreement beyond the 'two communities' basis to
instead focus on universal human rights and special consideration for minority
groups, whether Catholic, gays, or racial minorities. This led to the development of
Section 75 within the 1998 Northern Ireland Act, which explicitly mandates that
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every public body in the province develop an equality plan that lays out how it will
address the needs of diverse groups within Northern Irish society. While the
'equality agenda' is extremely contentious, the loud and open debates about it and
the state's role in furthering (or inhibiting) it have created an opening for minority
groups to air their grievances and demand that both the civil service and elected
officials pay attention to their specific needs.
Therefore, by the 1990s, a completely new institutional environment had
been created in Northern Ireland, one that was meant to insure broader community
representation and consent than the old Stormont regime. While the nature of
these new institutions is still contested today, they provide the key operating
guidelines for political parties, voluntary associations, and the civil service. Over
time, they would come to provide key guidelines for how to respond to new
immigrants as well.
New Electoral Institutions
By the late 1980s, it was obvious to all parties that a clear military victory
was impossible, and it was time to negotiate. While constitutional means to settle
the 'national question' were central to peace negotiations, both the British
government and the community sector were well aware that the new institutions
governing both electoral politics and civil society had to be designed in a way to both
allow for inclusion of multiple groups and traditions, but that also recognized
differences.
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The new electoral institutions permanently did away with majoritarian 'first
past the post' voting for local elections and instead reverted to the proportional
representation-single transferable vote (PR-STV) system, thus creating room not
only for small parties and independent candidates to enter the system, but also
guaranteeing some degree of minority interest representation. 123 During the
intermittent local elections during direct rule, and in post-1996 elections, the STV
system created space for alternative parties, such as Alliance, a non-sectarian party
dedicated to cross-community mobilization and economically liberal policy, and the
Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), a small unionist party made up of working-class
loyalists with ties to the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), a paramilitary organization.
The Northern Ireland Women's Coalition (NIWC), although short-lived, was
another 'alternative' cross-community party, dedicated to breaking the 'two-
communities' paradigm of the peace talks. Therefore, although the central axis for
political relations still turned on the nationalist-unionist divide, the new electoral
institutions that evolved out of the peace process created some space for 'third-way'
parties to have a say in the region's politics.
Institutionalizing Equality - State-society relations under the GFA
Beyond electoral institutions, there was still another question: inequality. It
should be noted that, prior to the mid-1990s, there were no laws in Northern
Ireland governing minority rights. Despite watershed legislation enacted in the UK
123 Consistent with the rest of the UK, elections to Westminster still use the single-member
district first-past-the-post system.
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during the 1960s, at the behest of a unionist political leadership fearful of Catholic
claims, Northern Ireland was left exempt from fair employment and race relations
legislation (Geoghegan 2010). According to Geoghegan, this was the modus
operandi of the NIO for much of the 1970s and 80s: "The notion that Northern
Ireland had neither minorities nor the need for any form of race-based anti-
discrimination legislation remained the dominant position within the corridors of
the Northern Ireland Office" (41).
Unhappy with the myopic focus on religious-based discrimination only, and
mindful of developments on the other side of the Irish Sea, a variety of community
organizations began to mobilize around the idea of a more expansive anti-
discrimination regime. At a minimum, groups sought the same legal protections
that were available in other parts of the UK, although by the 1990s, a nascent race-
based movement led by the Northern Ireland Council for Ethnic Minorities
(NICEM) explicitly demanded legislation that dealt with race, not just sectarianism.
The growing demands from the region's small but growing minority population
coincided with a series of demands for inclusion from a number of other social
groups who fell outside of the 'two communities' sectarian model: women's
organizations, gay activists, and disability rights groups all pushed for a more
universal language of human rights to be included in the new institutions of the
province.
After years of negotiations, and some last-minute maneuvering, on April 10,
1998, representatives from the British and Irish governments, and Northern Irish
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political parties announced the peace accord that came to be know as the Good
Friday Agreement (alternately the 'Belfast Agreement', heretofore referred to as
'the Agreement' or the 'GFA'). Although it was clearly designed to address how the
two communities could come to a constitutional agreement on the 'national
question', it notably put equality at the center of the governing principles of the new
Northern Ireland:
We are committed to partnership, equality and mutual respect as the basis of
relationships within Northern Ireland, between North and South, and between these
islands. [Article I, Section 3].
...affirm that whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of
Northern Ireland, the power of the sovereign government with jurisdiction there
shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the
diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be founded on the principles of
full respect for and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of freedom
from discrimination for all citizens, and of parity of esteem and of just and equal
treatment for the identity, ethos and aspirations of both communities [Article 2,
Section 1(v)].1 24
The language of the GFA is notable because it reflects both the alternative
social narrative put forth by the Catholic civil rights movement some thirty-plus
years before, and the social ideals espoused in the 1916 Proclamation. However, it
was also controversial, particularly among hardline republicans, because it
essentially "copper-fastened" Northern Ireland to the United Kingdom: by letting
the people of Northern Ireland have final say over the status question by a majority
vote, just as it did in 1920, the British and Irish governments effectively closed off
the pathway to reunification for at least another generation.
124 The GFA is available online at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/agreement.pdf.
CAIN, the host, is a major database of conflict-related documents and memorabilia from
Northern Ireland.
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Citizens of both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland voted to
approve the GFA in 1998, which was essentially an accord meant to mark an end to
the conflict and lay out the key principles upon which a new institutional order
could be founded. However, the main legislation that set out not only the principles
but the statutory requirements for the new Northern Ireland was the Northern
Ireland Act of 1998 (heretofore referred to as 'the Act'). As with any such
legislation, the devil lies in the details. But the details of the Act are where things
get interesting.
The Northern Ireland Act of 1998 was designed to provide structure to the
ideals set out in the GFA. Much of the Act is dedicated to the structure of the
province's political institutions, which include provisions for cross-community
consent, oversight, and occasional veto-power. However, perhaps the most far-
reaching and revolutionary part of the Act is Section 75, which puts a statutory
duty on public authorities to:
... in carrying out its functions relating to Northern Ireland have due regard to the
need to promote equality of opportunity between persons of different religious belief,
political opinion, racial group, age, marital status or sexual orientation; between
men and women generally; between persons with a disability and persons without;
and between persons with dependents and persons without. (a-d).
According to the Equality Commission of Northern Ireland, the original intent
behind Section 75 was to "radically overhaul the process of policy-making and to
create profound change in the administration of government and public authorities.
It was meant to make a difference to public life and to the lives of people" (2007, 4).
Given the sweeping language of the statute, some community activists noted their
surprise that there was not more resistance to its inclusion. However, ambiguity
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can be a boon to interested political actors: "institutional rules are subject to
varying interpretations and levels of enforcement and therefore exhibit ambiguities
that provide space for interested agents to exploit in their effort to alter them"
(Mahoney and Thelen 2010). Given the proliferation of parties, community
organizations, and new bureaucracies in the run-up to the peace agreement, there
was no shortage of 'interested agents', and the unintended consequences of Section
75 would profoundly affect how the community sector and the bureaucracy would
respond to new immigration.
Conclusion
By the end of the 1990s, Northern Ireland was a completely different place
that it had been seventy - or even thirty - years earlier, both in terms of its political
institutions and its main political actors.
The most obvious changes involved the province's formal political
institutions. Electoral rules could no longer be used to exclude, and the post-GFA
institutions were designed to encourage a competitive, multi-party democracy.
Citizens were granted oversight and input into the operation of key government
agencies, including the police.125 And the new post-conflict laws made it a statutory
duty for government agencies to take necessary steps to accommodate the needs of
minority groups. Embedded in these new institutions were the predominant social
125 Because of clashes between the RUC and the nationalist community prior to and during
the Troubles, and the targeting of RUC officers by the IRA during the Troubles, policing
has historically been one of the most contentious issues in Northern Ireland.
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narratives of both the Catholic civil rights movement and of unionists fearful of
becoming a political and religious minority.
However, the political institutions of Northern Ireland would not have
changed so significantly without changes among its key political actors. The
Catholic community is now mobilized and active in politics, through both the
community sector and political parties. Even republicans, for the first time, are
deeply engaged in Northern Ireland's legislative politics. The regional bureaucracy
has shifted from one that served the needs of the sectarian state, to one that serves
the needs of the population, and is required by law to accommodate difference.
Finally, today's Northern Ireland has a robust associational life, particularly in
inner-city working class areas that were traditionally economically and socially
deprived.
This is not to say that things in the North are perfect. Community workers
and small parties have complained of a 'sectarian carve-up', with Sinn Fein and the
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) negotiating power between them with little time
for anyone else. Ironically, these were the two parties that were tied to the most
militant wings of the nationalist and unionist movements; the DUP, under the
leadership of the Reverend Ian Paisley, actively campaigned against the GFA.
Educational and residential segregation is rife, and the province has the highest
levels of welfare dependency and lowest rates of workforce participation in the UK
(CENI 2003). Sectarian violence still rears its ugly head, especially during the
contentious summer 'marching season' when Protestant fraternal lodges celebrate
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past military victories over Catholics. But the province has changed enormously: in
the 1990s, nobody would have believed that Martin McGuinness, an ex-IRA
commander, and Ian Paisley, a firebrand unionist rabble-rouser, would not only
serve as the duly elected co-leaders of the regional government, but that they would
get along famously, earning the media nickname 'The Chuckle Brothers".
Increasingly, the outside world has taken notice of the internal changes in
Northern Ireland. Investors are pouring in; there are shiny new buildings along the
Belfast skyline. Tourism is on the rise, and the province is becoming a favorite
weekend holiday destination within the UK and Ireland. But perhaps the most
visible reminder that the world's view of Northern Ireland has changed is the fact
that, for the first time in its modern history, people from around the world are
actually choosing to live, work, and settle there. We now turn to their story.
III: Re-Imagining Communities: Migrant Political Incorporation, Nordy-
Style
As the Troubles wound down, the region became increasingly attractive to
investors. It also became attractive to immigrants. From 1997 to 2010, the migrant
population increased fourfold. This influx of new residents raised concerns about
political incorporation: in a place that was still trying to figure out what state-
society relations should look like among natives, what would incorporation of
outsiders actually look like? Is incorporative activity even possible in a society as
divided as Northern Ireland's?
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The short answer is, yes, but not uniformly. Using Andersen's key metrics of
the 'tasks' of immigrant political incorporation as a guideline, I examine
incorporative activity in two key areas: encouraging inclusion in electoral politics,
and education and resource development (what I will call 'capacity-building').126 My
analysis of incorporative activity around electoral politics focuses on two key areas:
1) migrant voter registration campaigns, and 2) recruitment of migrant candidates.
For capacity building, I examine three key streams of incorporative activities: 1)
educational outreach to teach new arrivals about formal and informal civic
institutions, 2) migrant organizational capacity building via strategic partnerships
and/or financial support, and 3) assumption of an intermediary role between new
arrivals and the state and new arrivals and local residents.127
My findings indicate that there is much more incorporative activity around
migrant capacity building than through electoral mobilization. Given the nature of
party politics in Northern Ireland, this is not particularly surprising: the Northern
Ireland Assembly was not fully reinstated until 2007, and parties are still making
the adjustment from dealing primarily with political violence to having to manage
and create policies that address more mundane political issues such as budgeting
126 Andersen describes the tasks of incorporation as "encouraging and facilitating
naturalization, promoting voter registration, educating people about issues and
participatory channels, and providing them with the resources and motivations to
participate" (2010, 71). I do not include citizenship in this chapter, as this is not an area
over which key political actors have any real control over in Northern Ireland. However, I
cover the debate over citizenship in the Republic - a fight that included political actors from
the North - in Chapter Five. I also consolidate education and resources under the heading
of capacity building as both financial support and technical know-how can help propel new
immigrant communities into public life; see Bloemraad 2005.
127 This chapter does not address incorporative activity around citizenship, as this issue is
discussed in-depth in Chapter Four.
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and snow removal. However, given the levels of social mistrust and isolation in the
North, and Northern Ireland's lack of history dealing with migrant populations, the
level of engagement is still surprising.
New Institutions, New Immigrants
Not surprisingly, net migration in Northern Ireland was resolutely negative
from the early 1970s on through much of the 1990s [see Appendix C]. In 1997, the
year before the Good Friday Agreement came into effect, the foreign-born
population of the province was approximately 19,000, which was just over 1% of the
overall population (NISRA 2010).128 This population primarily consisted of small
pockets of East and South Asians: Hong Kong Chinese and Indians were small
business owners (primarily in the restaurant trade), while Filipinos and South
Asians were drawn to the region - particularly around Belfast - to work for the
National Health Service (NHS).
As the political situation settled, and the economy improved, migration began
to pick up during the 1990s. The biggest change came in 2004, when the UK and
Ireland granted the new Central and Eastern European accession states of the
European Union - known as the 'A8' - access to their labor market; by 2010, the
foreign-born were 4.5% of the general population. 129 Poles made up almost half of
this group (see Tables 1 & 2).
128 Foreign-born statistics do not include those born in the UK 'mainland' or the Republic of
Ireland.
129 The A8 countries include the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania,
Latvia, Estonia, and Slovenia. These countries initially faced labor market restrictions in
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However, the distribution of new immigrants has not been even, both within
the UK in general, and Northern Ireland as a region. Within the UK, Northern
Ireland has seen one-third more registered A8 workers on a per capita basis than
any other region. Within the province, migrants have been disproportionately
drawn to two key regions: southwestern agricultural areas where food processing is
a booming industry and greater Belfast, where jobs with the NHS and restaurant
and tourism industries are a major draw.
Even in the best of cases, immigration presents challenges for the receiving
society, and Northern Ireland was no exception. In rural areas, the sudden arrival
of work crews numbering in the hundreds could rapidly transform the
demographics of a small town; in Dungannon, a town of less than 12,000, the arrival
of approximately 400 Portuguese workers over the course of one weekend
dramatically changed the local demographics, literally overnight. In Belfast,
migrants settled in Protestant areas due to the relative availability of housing; this
sparked no small consternation not only because outsiders were moving into local
estates, but many of these outsiders were Catholics. 130 Across the region, elected
officials, local bureaucracies and community organizations were confronted with the
question: who were these people, and what role, if any, would they play in political
life?
other EU countries with the exception of Sweden, the UK, and Ireland. Malta and Cyprus
also joined the EU at this time, but their citizens did not face work restrictions.
130 Poles and Lithuanians, the main representatives of the A8 countries in the North, are
overwhelmingly Catholic.
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Electoral Incorporative Activity
Incorporative activity around electoral politics can happen in two key areas:
migrant voter registration drives and running migrant candidates in local elections.
While electoral incorporative activity has been relatively limited overall, migrants
are becoming more visible in party politics - sometimes in troubling ways.
Migrant voter registration
A key aspect of incorporative activity is migrant voter registration. In
Northern Ireland, any citizen of the UK, Ireland, a Commonwealth country or the
European Union who is at least seventeen years old and has lived in Northern
Ireland for at least three months is eligible to be on the electoral register.131 Once
registered, citizens of Ireland, Malta, Cyprus, and the Commonwealth can vote in
any UK election, while EU citizen participation is limited to local and EU elections.
In recognition of the region's diverse population, in addition to English, Irish, and
Ulster Scots, voter registration forms are available in Lithuanian, Polish,
Portuguese, Romanian, and Slovak.
Given the geographic origins of migrants living in Northern Ireland, over
two-thirds are eligible to vote in local and regional elections. However, migrant
voter registration activity was relatively limited for the 2011 local elections. This is
consistent with much of the literature on political mobilization: in a world of limited
resources, parties have an incentive to focus their turnout efforts on voters who they
131 Voter registration information is available through the Electoral Office for Northern
Ireland: http://www.eoni.org.uk/index/registration.htm. While residents can register at age
17, they must be 18 by Election Day in order to vote.
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already know are supporters (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). However, immigrants
are generally an unknown political commodity; no immigrant group is associated
with a specific party.
Notably, getting parties deeply involved in voter registration drives on both
sides of the Irish border has been difficult: because the PR-STV system allows
voters to support multiple candidates from different parties, the parties are wary of
mobilizing a new, unknown population, as resources spent to get people to register
and vote for your party could lead to votes for someone else.132 Interestingly, this
cross-border problem has prompted a cross-border response: inspired by the Dublin
City Council migrant voter registration drive in 2009, some migrant community
organization leaders in Belfast wanted to set up a similar partnership with the
Belfast City Council for the 2011 local elections. However, it remains to be seen
whether or not parties will get involved in mass migrant voter mobilization given
both immigrants' relatively new entry to the political scene and the institutional
constraints on maximizing vote return for efforts expended.
Migrant Candidates
Of the five major parties to contest the 2011 Assembly elections, only two, the
SDLP and the Alliance party, had immigrant candidates on the ballot. This was not
the first time that the Alliance Party had an immigrant candidate; in 2007, Anna
Lo, a Hong Kong native, won an Assembly seat in South Belfast. Lo was previously
132 As detailed in Chapter Five, this was an explicit concern of parties that were not in
government at the time: they did not want to spend limited resources on voters who could
possibly give transfer votes to what they saw as the opposition.
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the chair of the Chinese Welfare Association, a migrant self-help group based in the
area that is also at the edge of a major interface zone.133 Interestingly, despite the
concentration of Chinese immigrants in the area, she credits her win to non-ethnic
cross-community support; the Chinese at the time were not particularly active
voters. However, her win has had an inspirational effect on new immigrants;
several migrant-led organizations pointed to Lo as an example of what was possible
in Northern Ireland.
Alliance is also unique in that it is the only major party in Stormont to have
no official designation as a unionist or nationalist party. In recent years, the party
has made a conscious effort to position itself as a third-way alternative to sectarian
politics. At times, this has been cause for derision, particularly from some
republican activists who characterize the Alliance Party and its supporters as smug,
but between the success of Anna Lo and its outspokenness on migrant-related
issues, Alliance does present itself as a credible electoral option for new immigrants
wary of being aligned with an explicitly sectarian party. By its very presence in the
Northern Irish political landscape, Alliance creates space for migrant political
participation in a way that no other party in the province does.
The other party with migrant candidates, the SDLP, is an explicitly
nationalist party, and is designated as such in Stormont. The SDLP sees itself as a
party that could have wider appeal beyond its traditional Catholic base, due to its
social democratic policy orientation. In addition, in contrast to Sinn F6in and some
133 Interface zones are areas where a majority nationalist area abuts a majority unionist
area. These zones have often been flashpoints for conflict and violence.
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unionist parties, it is not tainted by affiliation with paramilitary organizations.
However, it has steadily lost vote share to Sinn Fein over the last several years, and
is now the smaller of the two main nationalist parties in government.
The SDLP selected three migrant candidates. Two Polish candidates ran for
seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly (Stormont): Magdalena Wolska in East
Belfast, and Anna Ochal-Molenda in Craigavon Central. Daniel Gouveia, a native
of Portugal, stood in the Portadown local council elections. None of the candidates
did particularly well - all finished last or close to last in their districts - but Wolska
ran in a unionist 'heartland', and the other two ran in districts where the SDLP did
poorly overall.
Why did the SDLP decide to run migrant candidates in the last election
cycle? There are some unconfirmed reports that the SDLP put migrants on the
ballot in an attempt to increase turnout - i.e. a sort of migrant voter registration
drive by proxy - but there is not evidence that this works in Northern Ireland: Anna
Lo's presence on the ballot has had little effect on minority ethnic voting patterns,
despite the fact that South Belfast is one of the more diverse areas of the country.
It is notable that the candidates running outside of Belfast were in areas where the
SDLP has lost vote share to Sinn F6in over the years; perhaps the recruitment of
migrant candidates was an attempt to reclaim lost ground via new migrant voters.
But given the voting patterns of these districts (East Belfast, for example, elected
three DUP MLAs, and is the power base of Northern Ireland's First Minister and
DUP president, Peter Robinson), it is hard to see these migrant candidacies as
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anything more than symbolic. That said, in a place where political symbolism is
still quite powerful, symbolic actions meant to send a signal about the role of
migrants in Northern Irish politics may have some value in and of itself. Symbolic
actions are particularly important within the context of societies with a legacy of
ethnic violence, for as Kaufman notes, "Effective conflict resolution...requires
addressing the emotional and symbolic processes that influence how tangible issues
are perceived and how they play out politically" (2006: 202).
When migrants have become prominently featured in party politics, however,
it has at times been controversial. In 2008, headlines were made across both
Ireland and the UK when Daniel Konieczny, a Polish community worker, was
invited by his local MLA, Jeffrey Donaldson of the DUP, to address the party's
annual conference. Although it was a surprise that a party with a history of anti-
Catholic leadership would ask a Catholic to address its main body, 134 it was truly
shocking when, at the conclusion of his statements, Mr. Konieczny shouted "No
Surrender!" - or, more accurately, "Nie Poddamy Sie!" - long the catchphrase of
unionist hard-liners. The headline in the next day's Irish Times largely summed up
the glum opinion of many observers: "Language may be new but the message is
depressingly familiar".135 While Mr. Konieczny's inclusion in DUP politics may be
incorporative activity, it is not necessarily the kind of incorporative activity that
many in Ireland - North or South - would like to see.
134 The former head of the DUP, Ian Paisley, has repeatedly referred to the Pope as 'the
anti-Christ', and during the years of the Troubles developed a reputation as an anti-
Catholic bigot.
135 Gerry Moriarty, "Language may be new but the message is depressingly familiar, Irish
Times 3 November 2008.
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One interesting aspect of the 'No Surrender' incident is the difference in how
it was viewed by migrant community activists versus native community activists.
The first time I heard the story in an interview, it was recounted by a Eastern
European who was clearly dying of shame as she told it; she could not believe that
her community was being publicly tied to the policies of the DUP. However, the
second time I heard the story it was from an Irishman who could barely tell it for
laughing so hard. While the 'No Surrender' incident certainly provided fodder for
the province's infamous black humor, it also points to an important fact: aware of
the depths of the conflict, many migrant community leaders are quite wary about
being lumped as a group into one 'side' or the other. This, however, may be an
impossible task; as another migrant community worker noted: "Here, you have to
choose. You have to choose sides if you want someone to represent you" (NGO15,
personal interview, Belfast, September 2011).
To the DUP's credit, under its current leadership the party has struck a more
conciliatory tone towards Catholics in particular, and minority groups in general.
In the same article that reported on the 'No Surrender' affair, the current party
leader, Peter Robinson, stated, "I want to see a unionist community that is
confident and generous and one that reaches out to those from all parts of the
community and indeed to those who come to Northern Ireland from abroad."136
Confidence is a major issue for loyalist communities, still reeling from a
combination of de-industrialization and what many see as a sort of status reversal;
unsurprisingly, confidence in post-conflict governance, political leadership, and
136 Moriarty 2008.
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institutions has waned significantly (McKay 2005). And the movement beyond the
hardline position can be seen in the party's recent choices for open seats; in the
recent local elections, the party ran Sammy Douglas, a community worker with
close personal ties to republican activists, for office in East Belfast - and he won.
But there are still elements of unionism that see any efforts to reach out to
communities beyond their own as something tantamount to treason; in response to
the Sammy Douglas nomination, Harry Toan, a candidate for the Traditional
Unionist Voice (TUV) party in East Belfast released a statement on his website
noting,
The adulation of Mr Douglas from Martin O'Muilleoir [a Sinn F6in affiliate] is no
recommendation. Nor is being a 'very close personal friend' of a prominent Shinner a
boast of which to be proud. Mr. Douglas may, to the great satisfaction of his close
personal friend, O'Muilleoir, speak the tongue of the Gael, but I'd far rather speak
the tongue of the ordinary folk of East Belfast in opposing the laentable [sic] failure
of the DUP/Sinn Fein coalition at Stormont.137
Douglas' subsequent election victory may have been an important repudiation of the
old politics of division, and his longstanding engagement in community activism
represents a new direction for the DUP, but clearly there is more work that needs to
be done within the rank-and-file of political parties in order to root out sectarianism
for good.
Overall, it is still early days yet for immigrant mobilization into electoral
politics. However, it is still early days for electoral politics in Northern Ireland in
general. Under direct rule, local politicians had no real responsibility for managing
137 The press release is available on the TUV website at: http://www.tuv.org.uk/press-
releases/view/ 10 19/tuv-comments-on-irish-speaking-dup-candidate-who-is-'close-personal-
friend'-of-top-shinner [Accessed October 2011].
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the day-to-day affairs or setting policy for the province, and this role was handed
over to the civil service and the community sector. Now that elected officials are
technically running the show, they at times have found it difficult to make the shift
from talking about political violence to dealing with mundane bread and butter
political issues. As one republican activist noted during an interview on a snowy
afternoon in Belfast:
Look, now people are worried about the snow, and clearing the paths... but you don't
worry about the snow on the pavements if a 1,000 pound bomb went off in the city
center yesterday, or if three people were shot the night before...today we are not so
transfixed by the politics of the last atrocity (NGO3, personal interview, Belfast,
December 9, 2010).
There have also been turf battles between elected officials and the community
sector. One local bureaucrat noted that politicians were "driven demented" by the
community sector, and added that elected officials constantly complained about
community groups:
... because they imagined that once they [the politicians] got their shit together, the
community sector would just fall away... So for them, it's like 'feck off and stop
telling us what to do'... They are very cross" (BUR2, personal interview, Belfast,
December 16, 2010).
Clearly, post-conflict participation in electoral politics has been a learning process
for everyone.
Incorporative Activities - Capacity Building
The second component of incorporative activity under analysis is capacity
building, which includes "educating people about issues and participatory channels,
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and providing them with the resources and motivations to participate" (Andersen
2010, 71). Key elements include 1) education about formal and informal political
institutions - i.e. the written and unwritten rules of the game, 2) strategic
partnerships or financial support, and 3) taking on an intermediary role.
Migrant capacity building is an area where there is the most visible, vigorous
incorporative activity in Northern Ireland. The extensive presence of community-
based organizations, the significant funding streams dedicated to good relations,
and the statutory requirements of the political institutions - most notably via
Section 75 - means that there are a plethora of groups positioned to help
immigrants get their foot in the door of Northern Irish politics, and a civil service
and political class who are required by law to take their needs and concerns
seriously. This is not to say that all is perfect, however: at times, the still-unsettled
nature of community relations in the North spills over into incorporative activity,
sometimes with dark undertones. I explore capacity building across two key types
of non-governmental organizations: worker organizations and community
associations.
Worker organizations and capacity building
The vast majority of immigrants in Northern Ireland are labor migrants;
hence groups such as trade unions or migrant worker organizations can play an
important role in capacity building. These groups have not only been able to
educate migrant workers about their rights and how to make demands on the state,
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but have established partnerships with migrant organizations. In addition, they
have been able to use Northern Ireland's post-conflict institutions to provide both
strategic and financial support to migrant communities. However, due to the
sectarian nature of party politics, worker organizations have been less successful as
political intermediaries.
Trade unions have been able to provide both strategic and financial support
to migrant communities. The Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), a cross-
border labor federation, was able to set up a migrant outreach program under the
umbrella of Peace III funding. Peace III funds were established by the European
Union in the wake of the conflict in order "to reinforce progress towards a peaceful
and stable society and to promote reconciliation by assisting operations and projects
which help to reconcile communities and contribute towards a shared society for
everyone" (Special EU Programmes Body 2007). Over 330 million euros were
allocated for Peace III programs between 2007-2013. While this is a large sum of
money, the application and reporting requirements are onerous: in general, only
large, well-staffed organizations have the internal capacity to tap into this funding
stream. Because of its extensive administrative infrastructure, ICTU was able to
obtain funds, but access to this kind of money is not an option for smaller, less
established organizations.
In addition to financial resources, unions have engaged in strategic
partnerships with migrant and minority ethnic groups to provide services to
migrants. In 2010, the Belfast Migrant Centre, a joint venture between ICTU,
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Unison (a UK-based trade union), the Polish Association of Northern Ireland, and
the Northern Ireland Council for Ethnic Minorities (NICEM), opened in
Shaftesbury Square. The Centre offers immigration and legal advice, translation
services, and assistance to those facing discrimination or racism.
Non-union worker organizations have also been able to take advantage of
Northern Ireland's unique post-conflict institutions. In many countries with
immigration, especially new destinations, access to translators is a major issue for
immigrants seeking public services or government recourse. Mindful of this
problem, one migrant's rights association printed a number of pocket-sized cards
that cited Section 75 and requested appropriate linguistic assistance: the cards were
printed on English in one side, and in the relevant foreign language for the
particular petitioner on the other. Any new immigrant who needed state services
was sent to the appropriate government office with this card, and the office had a
statutory duty to offer 'equal' - i.e. linguistically appropriate - services.
Despite these activities, worker organizations in Northern Ireland are in an
odd position politically: unlike the Labour Party in the 'mainland' UK, or the
Democrats in the United States, labor interests in Northern Ireland have no go-to
partners in government, as most parties until recently were sectarian, rather than
policy-oriented (and the one party with no sectarian designation, Alliance, is
economically liberal and not considered particularly labor-friendly). This weakens
the ability of unions to build reliable political partnerships and act as an
intermediary between migrant workers and parties: trade unions, fearful of
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splitting their membership, are loath to hitch their wagon to a specific party.
Subsequently, both unions and worker organizations have had to work with
individual politicians who are perceived as 'good' on labor or immigration issues on
an ad-hoc basis.
Community Associations
Northern Ireland's community associations are unique in that they, rather
than local governments, are often the direct providers of social services. This is
largely due to the North's legacy of social conflict and the political vacuum created
when Stormont was shut down in the 1970s. Community associations, which
include resident's associations, community development groups, and other localized
interest organizations, take on two keys roles: 1) they act as an intermediary
between neighborhood residents and various arms of the state, including legislators,
bureaucracies, and the police, and 2) they educate residents about both the formal
institutions of the state (how to get public benefits, for example), and the informal
institutions, or unwritten norms, of the community. These groups are deeply
embedded in the province's civic landscape: over six hundred community
associations are recognized by the Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE), and
the Housing Executive actively encourages residents to form their own
organizations in order to address community concerns.138
138 A step-by-step guide to setting up a community association is available from the Housing
Executive website at:
http://www.nihe.gov.uk/index/community/get-involved/community groups/forminga group
.htm.
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Given their long-standing role as intermediaries between people living in a
specific geographic area and the state, many community associations have found it
quite easy to take on new immigrants as 'constituents': access to recreational space,
information-sharing about municipal services, and assistance with government
paperwork are issues that matter for all residents, and adding immigrants to the
mix has not been a huge stretch (although language issues can sometimes be a
problem). However, community associations play a dual intermediary role: they not
only negotiate between residents and the state, but between different communities
on the ground; Shirlow and Murtagh characterize the role of the community sector
as a "circuit breaker of communal angst"(2006, 51). For example, while residents
and neighborhood associations try to stamp out sectarian tensions and are often
responsible for monitoring the gates dotting 'peace lines', the walls and fences
separating Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods, they also try to mediate more
mundane disputes between neighbors such as loitering or littering.139
When it comes to immigration, however, this secondary role may actually be
the most important as misunderstandings can escalate quickly, especially given the
volatile nature of Northern Irish politics. Many of the tensions around immigration
at the neighborhood level stem from the fact that locals feel new arrivals are not
139 There can be a darker side to resident's associations as well, which are often staffed by
ex-paramilitaries: intimidation, banishment, beatings, and 'kneecapping', the practice of
shooting 'problematic' individuals through the knees to send a message to them and the
community at large, have all been used to impose social order on close-knit communities
that are often suspicious of the police and outside interference. While these tactics are
often used to address problems of 'anti-social behavior', in particular joyriding and petty
drug dealing, at times these practices have been used to protect drug dealers and
racketeering rings.
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being 'neighborly' - an unwritten social norm - so local groups try to organize
community activities such as dinners and sporting events. However, they also get
involved in informal street-level regulation around issues like people not emptying
their trash bins properly or loitering. For example, one community worker
recounted that in his area, there had been issues with Roma immigrants who
collected scrap metal: while they would search through garbage and recycling bins,
they would not put trash that spilled out back in the bins and the homeowner would
end up getting fined for not maintaining their bins properly (NGO9, personal
interview, Belfast, July 2010). Since this area has high unemployment and many
people survive on government benefits, this put a significant financial burden on
local families. These kinds of issues are usually resolved by someone from the
native organization approaching a 'community leader' from a given immigrant
group. However, this approach can be problematic if an immigrant group doesn't
have a point of contact - or if local people don't trust immigrant community liaisons.
The latter came up as being an issue with the Roma community in South Belfast:
multiple community groups have tried to work with the Roma to help them to better
understand community norms and avoid conflict, but none of the local people that I
spoke with felt that they had a good working relationship with the Roma, despite
their best efforts.
Beyond the minutiae of city life, community workers have also been deeply
involved in managing anti-immigrant prejudice. At times, these complaints can
seem ridiculous. One interviewee noted that he had received numerous resident
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complaints about immigrants just being visible around the neighborhood, which
was interpreted as "just strutting about as if they owned the place"; exasperated, he
added "if you get angry about the way somebody walks, there's something wrong
with you!" (NGO6, personal interview, Belfast, December 2010). However, he went
on to note that there is a growing perception, particularly in loyalist housing
estates, that it is government policy to displace people out of estates near 'ethnic
frontiers', namely communities where the demographics are changing or
gentrification is in motion (or both). This speaks, again, to the aforementioned
confidence issues in the unionist community: as many middle-class Protestants
have moved to the suburbs, and immigrants and students have moved into or near
their emptying neighborhoods, working-class Protestants, particularly in inner-city
Belfast, feel increasingly besieged.14 0 These tensions boiled over in 2009, when over
a dozen Roma families were intimidated out of their homes in a loyalist area, an
incident that was a dark reminder of the 'bad old days' that many in Northern
Ireland would like to put behind them. While mediation has helped to mitigate
social conflict in new areas of Roma settlement, unfortunately the use of
extrajudicial means towards community ends has not completely disappeared in the
North.
Less successful than mediation has been attempts to promote cultural
exchange and learning through cross-community events such as pot-lucks and
culture nights. While several community leaders saw 'breaking bread'-type events
140 The hollowing-out of neighborhoods is less of an issue in Catholic areas, which have
historically been overcrowded due to limited housing options and large families.
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as ineffectual but harmless, one interviewee - a Northern Ireland native - felt that
these kind of events were "tokenistic and racist", and most organizers were not
cognizant of the symbolism of mostly non-white immigrants serving food to white
natives, a situation he characterized as a "saris and samosas kind of welcome... not
quite as bad as 'dance, monkey boy!", but not positive either (NGO17, personal
interview, Belfast, 13 December 2010). However, the lack of opportunity for casual
socialization in Northern Ireland is problematic; one community worker noted that
one of the key lessons learned from immigration in England is that many
immigrants, particularly those from outside of the European Union, are not going to
socialize in pubs, and Ireland and the UK do not have much of a 'caf6 culture'
(NGO4, personal interview, Belfast, December 7, 2010).141 The situation is
complicated by the fact that even leisure activities in Northern Ireland are seen
through sectarian lenses: sports like hurling and Gaelic football are seen as
'Catholic', while soccer, rugby, and hockey are 'Protestant'. This is one area that
community organizations have not quite figured out how to navigate.
The differences in patterns of casual socializing, combined with high levels of
residential segregation raise another key issue for community associations: given
the divided nature of Northern Irish society, whose version of civil society are
resident's associations meant to teach new immigrants about? Republicanism?
141 I heard similar complaints from non-EU origin migrant community leaders in Dublin:
the fact that so much of Irish social life revolves around a raucous drinking culture means
that many new arrivals and their children face unintentional social inclusion.
Interestingly, this is one area where locals and new immigrants have similar complaints;
many Irish people would like to see more caf6-style options for family gatherings or casual
socialization outside of pubs. However, a recent bill to introduce caf6 licensing was killed;
the powerful publican lobby had a strong hand in its defeat.
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Unionism? 'Britishness'? The question of'whose civic-ness?' came into the spotlight
when, in 2005, it became public that an anti-racism organization in West Belfast
had created a "Welcome Packet" for migrant families that counseled new arrivals
against calling the police. Specifically, it stated:
The police force in the north of Ireland (the PSNI) is seen by most people here as an
extension of the British state and has no support. You should avoid calling them into
the area, unless it is a necessity, eg, for insurance purposes. If the PSNI ask
questions about your neighbours you should not answer them and you should inform
your local community centre or councillor at once. It is advisable not to go to a PSNI
station alone (WARN 2005, as cited in Geoghegan 2010).
Although the pamphlet caused a general uproar at Stormont, Unionists were
particularly outraged that public funds had underwritten the production of the
pamphlets. However, a columnist in the nationalist newspaper, the Irish News,
argued:
The vast majority of people in West Belfast are Sinn F6in voters. Sinn F6in does not
support the PSNI. They state this regularly. Life is difficult for people from an
ethnic background finding their place in northern society. Indeed last week the
PSNI issued figures showing a steady increase in racially motivated attacks across
the north. It would have been highly irresponsible of Warn had they not explained
to members of the ethnic community the attitude of the people in west Belfast to the
PSNI... The advice in the booklet does not compromise those it is aimed at. It is not
trying to co-opt them into a republican position. It is not saying to them don't
support the police. It is factual advice. It is dealing with reality on the ground, in
the streets of west Belfast where some members of the ethnic community have
chosen to live and work.142
Therefore, from a certain republican perspective, the welcome packet made perfect
sense, and its distribution was a clear form of incorporative activity - in this case,
education about the neighborhood's informal institutions - that was consistent with
republican political and social values. Here, however, the emphasis is on a certain
" Jim Gibney, "Seems political vetting is still alive and well," Irish News, June 2, 2005.
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republican perspective: Geoghegan (2010) found that the WARN packet did not go
over well with other community groups in republican West Belfast either, with one
local community leader calling it a "nightmare" (pg. 135).
The disagreement over the welcome packet makes clear that there are
multiple models of citizenship and multiple polities in Northern Ireland. However,
the recognition of different citizenship traditions is part and parcel of the GFA.
Article 1 states:
The two Governments recognize the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland
to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so
choose, and accordingly confirm that their right to hold both British and Irish
citizenship is accepted by both Governments and would not be affected by any future
change in the status of Northern Ireland.
While this clause was clearly meant to assuage Protestant concerns about their
legal relationship with the UK should Northern Ireland someday vote to become
part of the Republic, it indirectly highlights that there are two competing traditions
of citizenship in the region. And while the GFA is primarily concerned with the
legal status of citizenship, the bigger issue for social cohesion in the North is that
the practice of citizenship has been quite different between the two communities,
and this divide goes far deeper than what country's name is stamped on the face of
one's passport. Given that there is no clear consensus on what citizenship means to
the residents of Northern Ireland, one must wonder what exactly the expectations
should be for new migrants in the province.
Conclusion
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Incorporative activity in Northern Ireland is uneven, but it is certainly
underway. At this stage, political parties have played a relatively limited role in
the process, which is not surprising, since until recently they have played a
relatively limited role in governance. However, the community sector has been
engaged in incorporative activity, whether through partnering with migrant
organizations, educating new populations about their rights (and obligations) as
residents of Northern Ireland, or providing direct funding to groups that work on
migration-related issues. In the short-term, however, one has to wonder how
sustainable the heavy public subsidization of the voluntary sector is: this cycle of
Peace funding through the EU will end in 2013, and London has imposed austerity
measures across the UK. That said, the stakes are much higher in Northern
Ireland than in other parts of the UK: as one community activist who struggled to
get funding for her organization noted, "here, the government [through
underwriting the community sector] has bought the peace" (field notes, Belfast, 30
July 2009). As long as the community sector is seen as playing a critical role in
maintaining the peace, it is hard to imagine public financial support for or local
interest in voluntary activity will dry up completely.
IV. Migrants and Nationalists
It is worth taking a moment to consider the relationship between new
immigrants and Irish nationalists. Nationalism, by its very nature is exclusionary,
yet CNR (Catholic/Nationalist/Republican) political parties and community
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organizations have taken on the task of incorporation across several key
dimensions: electoral politics (albeit limited), substantive representation on key
migration-related issues, and migrant community outreach and capacity building.
An analysis of party behavior and interviews with political leaders and activists
across the political spectrum also suggests that, in general, CNR organizations have
been more engaged in incorporative activity than their Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist
(PUL) counterparts. Why are CNR groups so willing to take on the task of
incorporation?
First, perhaps the most basic argument is that substantive representation
and new immigrant outreach may be driven solely by demographics. One might
assume that CNR groups are more likely to take on the task of incorporating new
immigrants because new immigrants have settled in predominately Catholic
neighborhoods. But this is not the case; due to a legacy of housing shortages in
Catholic neighborhoods, and the suburbanization of much of the Protestant
population (particularly in Belfast), new immigrants are actually more likely to
settle in Protestant areas than Catholic neighborhoods.143 Another demographic
argument may be that CNR groups are simply looking out for the interests of their
co-ethnics; for example, the two SDLP migrant candidates were also Catholic. While
there may be some sense of religious solidarity, this is not anything that is talked
about explicitly which, given the tribal nature of the region's politics, is unusual.
143 In Belfast, this movement has been dubbed the 'donut effect': middle class Protestants
have moved out of core urban areas into first-ring suburbs surrounding the city.
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Instead, the language of rights is consistently universal, and rooted in the very
specific Northern Irish 'good relations' vernacular.
Second, it may be the case that the political actors who engage in the task of
incorporation are doing so for purely rational reasons: they are looking to build their
support base (Dahl [1974] 2005) or to open up a closed political process in order to
further their own agenda (Schattschneider 1960). Therefore, we might expect those
groups who are political outsiders or relatively weak to turn to immigrants as a
possible means of shoring up their base. To a certain extent, this may be true. As a
numerical minority, CNR organizations may feel the need to shore up their base
more than their PUL counterparts. And this dynamic can be seen even within the
CNR community; it is notable that the SDLP, which has lost significant vote share
to Sinn F6in since the 1990s, was the nationalist party that ran three immigrant
candidates for office. However, given the structure of the Agreement institutions
when it comes to the 'national question', it would seem that both communities have
an incentive to educate and incorporate migrants, as under the terms of the peace
process, the vote to remain part of the UK or re-unite with Ireland will be made by
a simple majority vote. In a close referendum, migrants could tip the balance either
way.
One criticism that is frequently leveled at republicans is that they may
support minority rights, but that their support is mainly symbolic or 'cheap'. From
a unionist perspective, it is easy for republicans to be pro-immigration, because
there are relatively few immigrants living in their neighborhoods. This view of
248
republicanism is consistent with the oft-heard unionist complaint that republicans
are good at public relations, even if things are all flash and no substance (POL4,
personal interview, Belfast, 7 September 2011). However, some republican activists
have voiced similar concerns; one interviewee noted that it was easy for republicans
to be 'smug' because they did not have to deal with the day-to-day realities of rapid
immigration in the same way that unionist communities have (POL2, personal
interview, Belfast, December 11, 2010).
The problem with this perspective is that it is not entirely clear how 'cheap'
support for migrant political incorporation actually is. More than the SDLP or the
Alliance party, Sinn F6in and republican organizations rely on working class
communities for their political support, and these are areas where migrants are
often perceived as being in direct competition with native workers.144 In other parts
of the UK, communities with similar demographics provide the base of support for
the extreme-right British National Party. Yet Sinn F6in and other republican
groups not only publicly support migrants' rights, they work quite carefully to
manage internal community relations when migrant-native conflicts arise, and take
their 'circuit breaker' role seriously.145 These local conflicts have increased in recent
years as, in the wake of a series of spectacular attacks on immigrant homes in and
144 Or perhaps not: one Eastern European community organizer drily noted that migrants
were accused of "stealing people's jobs" but "my neighbors haven't worked a day in their
lives" (field notes, Belfast, July 30, 2009). Among the native-born population, Northern
Ireland has the lowest workforce participation rate in the UK.
145 This is not to say that these activities don't go on in other areas - residents associations
in "mixed" areas that abut both traditionally Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods have
worked particularly hard to promote and maintain good community relations.
249
around Belfast, republican areas are increasingly seen as safer than loyalist
neighborhoods.
Finally, the cheap/symbolic politics critique seems particularly odd within the
context of Northern Ireland's politics, because symbolic politics is a key component
of both local political spats and broader claims about nationhood. In Northern
Ireland, symbols are so central to the debate around the national question, and so
contentious, that there is an entire section of the 1998 Act dedicated to the
regulation of 'Flags and Symbols' in the workplace and public areas. In a place
where gable walls in paramilitary-controlled housing estates regularly telegraph
community sentiment via use of historically contentious symbols such as the Red
Hand of Ulster, the Union Flag, or the Armalite rifle, symbolism matters far more
than critics give it credit for.146
Given the history of the nationalist community in Northern Ireland, and
particularly in the republican heartlands of Derry and Belfast, the most plausible
explanation may be that the republican experience of being a disenfranchised
minority group has affected its response to new immigration. Some community
activists with roots in the Catholic civil rights movement have made this connection
explicitly; when asked by The Independent about her current political activism
around migrants rights through a rural development association, Bernadette
Devlin, the student civil rights leader and former MP, noted "People have said, 'You
146 Symbolism is so central to Northern Irish politics that groups often adopt symbols that
are in direct opposition to what another group adopts. For example, pro-Palestinian murals
and symbols (flags, keffiyehs) are common in republican areas. Subsequently, Israeli flags
have appeared in some hardline loyalist areas.
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were with us; now you're with the foreigners.' I say, 'No. I am doing the same thing
I have always done. It's still about people having a right to fulfill their potential and
not be excluded from that because of other people's prejudice."147 And in West
Belfast, the International Wall, a series of murals along the Falls Road, explicitly
links the past experience of anti-Irish discrimination to the situation of immigrants
and ethnic minorities today [see Appendix D]. Solidarity has been a consistent
theme in republicanism, and there is a growing body of research that suggests that
previously marginalized groups have more empathy for and solidarity with other
'out' groups (Fetzer 2000; Hayes and Dowds 2006).
This is not to suggest that the process of incorporation is in any way easy for
republicans. In areas where migration patterns have shifted quite dramatically,
some are clearly struggling to rectify their ideological beliefs with their day-to-day
concerns about maintaining community cohesion and culture. During an
impromptu chat with one republican activist, he wistfully noted that his community
had worked extremely hard to rebuild Gaelic culture and maintain social order in
their community, and it was difficult to see that some newcomers did not respect
that.148 But this same man proudly recounted how he had been able to help new
immigrants not only find housing, but get permission to remain in the UK. One
suspects that there are many republican activists and community workers who
share this man's dedication to the task of incorporation, but harbor similar concerns
about how migration may affect the long-term political project of a united Ireland.
147 Cole Moreton, "Bernadette McAliskey: Return of the Roaring Girl", Independent
[Ireland], October 8, 2008.
148 Field notes, Belfast, August 2010.
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V. Conclusion
At first glance, Northern Ireland would seem to be an unlikely case for
incorporative activity. Yet parties, community groups, and unions are clearly
moving in that direction. What are some of the implications of this case, especially
when we take the experience of the Republic of Ireland into account?
First, the experience of Northern Ireland shows that incorporative activity is
possible in new destinations, even under difficult circumstances. This finding is
significant, for there are growing concerns that today's new destinations will
struggle with incorporation, as they do not have the institutions, political actors, or
historical narratives that foster incorporative activity in 'old' destinations. 149 Put
slightly differently, incorporative activities in new destinations are expected to be
limited because native actors lack the kind of political 'toolkit' that old destinations
have developed in order to manage new immigration: the "repertoire... of habits,
skills, and styles from which people construct 'strategies of action' (Swidler 1986:
273). But the experience of Northern Ireland suggests that these fears may be
misplaced: societies can draw on existing institutions that are a legacy of prior
social conflict, immigrants may find that they have local political allies, and both
political actors and average citizens may be able to use existing historical
narratives in order to help them make sense of new immigration. In effect, new
destination societies may have developed their own 'toolkits' during past historical
149 See Waters and Jimenez 2005; Griffith 2008; Andersen 2010; Marrow 2011.
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battles over identity and inclusion that, in turn, equip them to deal with
unanticipated future conflicts around similar issues affecting new immigrants.
Second, the nature of Northern Ireland's politics raises an interesting
question about political incorporation. If the point of incorporative activity is to
help new immigrants to become members of the polity, in a contested society where
there are still disagreements over identity, citizenship, and national belonging, one
has to ask: what polity might that be? The "No surrender" affair involving the
Polish worker at the DUP conference and the anti-PSNI flyers in West Belfast are
clear examples of incorporative activity - the former incident was the result of
political outreach, and the latter an attempt at migrant civic education - but they
were also attempts at incorporating migrants into two very different civic traditions
that are still at odds with each other. While loyalist DUP members or West Belfast
republicans may have supported these actions within their own communities, the
reaction to these events outside of those communities suggests that incorporative
activity by groups at the far ends of the political spectrum can inflame, rather than
ease tensions in contested societies.
One long-term question that remains for migrant political incorporation in
Northern Ireland is whether migrants may present an opportunity to increase the
size of the non-sectarian 'third-way' groups in the North, or they will be absorbed
into the two-camp nationalist-or-unionist system. Thus far, the picture is unclear:
although the non-aligned Alliance party has become inextricably linked to migrant-
related issues, arguably (nationalist) Sinn Fein and the (unionist) DUP have
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broader political support and are much more influential in terms of policy - hence
the previously comment from the migrant rights activist who noted that immigrants
needed to choose a side if they wanted to be represented. However, there are signs
that migrants may be uniquely positioned to help re-focus the region's attention on
normal politics; the Hong Kong-born Alliance MLA Anna Lo has stated repeatedly
that part of her appeal to voters is that they know she is not thinking about how
policies would benefit 'her' community at the expense of the other. Some trade
unionists have also speculated about the potential role for immigrants in re-
orienting the region's politics, with the thinking being that a non-aligned social-
democratic party that can unite working-class voters would also have political
'space' for immigrants. That said, this is not a universally held sentiment: when I
asked a different union representative if she thought this could become a reality in
the future, she smiles wanly and replied, "If you are a very optimistic person, yes"
(Union4, personal interview, Belfast, July 2010).
Northern Ireland is a strange, but fascinating case, and it is full of
contradictions. But when one compares it to the North to the Republic, one can
begin to understand how the differences in political development over the course of
the twentieth century shaped the present-day responses to migration in ways that
we would not expect. Unlike the quangos and institutions set up in the Republic, it
is difficult, if not impossible to completely roll back the quangos and institutions in
the North that deal with questions of equality, racism, and social integration: in the
North, these institutions are backed by powerful constituencies and by legal statute.
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In addition, in Northern Ireland, the legacy of both the Catholic civil rights
movement and the peace process gives today's community activists a powerful
historical narrative with which to justify the civic inclusion of - and to combat acts
of overt racism and discrimination against - new immigrant communities. Finally,
immigrant communities have seen the emergence of native political allies among
those groups who are looking to expand their political influence outside of the two
communities (i.e. nationalist-unionist) paradigm. It is unclear how influential or
sustainable these groups will be over time, but they have created some political
space for immigrants in Northern Ireland, and as the case of Anna Lo shows, not
being a member of a 'tribe' may have its privileges after all.
Stepping back, however, it must be asked: what can we really learn from
Northern Ireland's tribal politics? More broadly, can we really be confident that the
lessons learned from comparing Ireland and Northern Ireland would be useful
anywhere else in the world? In other words, how can we be sure that these cases
are externally valid? Here I introduce a third case into the analysis: Spain. Spain,
like Ireland is a new destination country in Europe, having spent much of the
twentieth century bogged down in civil war, separatist violence, and economic
stagnation. Like the Irish Republic, it experienced a massive housing bubble in the
2000s (that burst in spectacular fashion towards the end of the decade), and that
bubble was a key point of attraction for migrant workers who poured, en masse, into
the construction industry. And, like Ireland north and south, native political actors
struggled with the issue of political incorporation. Unlike Ireland, however, a
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significant percentage of Spain's immigrants were Muslim, undocumented, or both:
all factors that normally contribute to anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe. Spain
has also had a consistently high unemployment rate, even during its boom years.
Given these key factors, we might expect to see less incorporative activity in Spain
than in Ireland or Northern Ireland.
Yet, this is not the case. Spanish parties have extended amnesties (thereby
granting residency and a pathway to citizenship) and enhanced voting rights to new
immigrants. Spanish unions reached out to migrant workers as early as the 1990s.
And the Spanish government supported a number of organizations and institutions
geared towards both building migrant capacity to participate in civic life and build
bridges between migrant communities and native political actors. Why do we see
such different reactions to immigrants among native actors when we compare Spain
and Ireland - what explains this variation? That is the focus of the next chapter.
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Table 5.1: Foreign-born population of Northern Ireland, 1997 - 2010
Non-Irish Foreign-Born
Year as a % of the totalpopulation in Northern
Ireland
1997 1%
2003 2%
2010 4.5%
Source: NISRA
Table 5.2: Country of origin as a percentage of the foreign-born population
in Northern Ireland (2007)
Country or Region of Northern Ireland
Birth 2007
Ireland 36.2%
Other Europe 30.9%
Eastern European
Accession States (% of
total migrant population) 24.5%
Rest of the World 33%
TOTAL 100.0%
Source: NISRA
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Figure 5.1:
Distribution of Protestant-Catholic Population in Belfast 1 50
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Figure 5.2: Net migration in Northern Ireland (NISRA 2010)
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Figure 5.3 - West Belfast International Wall
The following photos are examples of republican murals that emphasize solidarity
with other marginalized groups. All photos were taken by the author.
Photo 1: Falls Road, West Belfast, September 2011
This photo was taken at the beginning of the "International Wall" at the lower end
of the Falls Road. Interestingly, it highlights the discrimination that Irish workers
faced in London in the 1960s, and compared it to the idealized welcome ('Fiilte') of
new migrant workers in Belfast. The West Against Racism Network (WARN) was
the same organization that distributed the controversial welcome packets asking
new residents not to bring the police into the area.
Ironically, just behind the welcome mural is a 'peace line', a three-story high fence
separating the majority nationalist population along the Falls Road from the
neighboring Shankill Road area, which is majority unionist.
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Photo #2, Falls Road, West Belfast, July 2009
This photo, also from the International Wall, illustrates solidarity with other
regional nationalists, in this case the Basques. The mural also highlights Catalan
and Galician homelands.
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Photo #3, Falls Road, West Belfast, July 2009
Another example of historical parallels: Fredrick Douglass. Northern Catholics
have a history of linking their struggles to those of African-Americans: the black
civil rights movement in the United States provided both inspiration and a template
for the Catholic civil rights movement in Northern Ireland.
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Chapter Six - "Spain is Different": Unraveling the mysteries of
the Spanish approach to immigrant political incorporation
In Spain, the dead are more alive than in any other country in the world.
- Federico Garcia Lorca
In the early 1960s, the Spanish government, having decided that tourism
could be a viable pathway to economic growth, launched a publicity campaign with
the tagline "Spain is Different". While this new slogan was meant to evoke an
image of "exotic" Spanish culture for Northern Europeans, one could not deny that
in many ways, Spain was different: two decades after the end of World War II,
Spaniards, unlike their former Italian and German allies, still lived under an fascist
regime.
Now, over forty years later, Spain is held up as a model of democratization.
Its transition to pluralistic politics was relatively peaceful and stable - the
government has changed hands four times since the 1978 constitution was
implemented - and Spain has caught up with the social policies of other European
countries: divorce, effectively prohibited under Franco, is now legal, and more
recently Spain was the third country in Europe to legalize gay marriage.
Unfortunately, it also faces many of the same economic challenges as its
Mediterranean neighbors: a seemingly intractable double-digit unemployment rate,
wobbly banks, and government austerity. In many ways both economic and social,
Spain's rapid convergence with the rest of Western Europe is complete.
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However, when it comes to immigration, Spain is still different. Despite
consistently high levels of unemployment over the last two decades, Spanish unions
have been vocal supporters of migrant social and political rights, and have even
gone so far as to establish migrant worker outreach centers.151 Despite data from
the European Social Survey (2006) showing that close to half of Spaniards feel that
too many immigrants are being allowed into the country - and a solid 15% of the
adult population thinks that there should be no non-European immigration at all -
Spanish parties have enacted multiple amnesties for undocumented migrant
workers, thus granting a potential pathway to residency, and over time, citizenship.
And in contrast to many European parties that have sought to limit immigrant
access to citizenship and electoral politics, Spanish political parties have extended
local voting rights to new immigrant populations.
Why is Spain 'different'? Why have native Spanish political actors -
including, quite notably, regional nationalists - engaged in incorporative activity at
a level that goes not only beyond Ireland, its main 'new destination' counterpart,
but even many 'old destination' countries? In this chapter, I argue that the answer
to this question lies in how Spain has addressed past internal conflicts that turned
on the issues of minority interest representation, political identity, and the
boundaries of the Spanish nation versus the state. How these conflicts were
contested and resolved held long-term, unintended consequences for the structure of
the country's political institutions and the interests of key native political actors,
151 According to OECD data, from 1989 - 2009, Spain only enjoyed three years where its
unemployment rate was not in the double-digits: 2005 (9.2%), 2006 (8.6%) and 2007 (8.3%).
264
and these institutions and interests interacted to shape their behavior when
confronted with new immigration.
In the 1930s, the internal pressures of economic modernization, rising
Basque and Catalan nationalism, church-state relations, and the struggle between
monarchists and republicans boiled over and resulted in a disastrous civil war. A
Fascist victory led to four decades of dictatorship and the implementation of legal,
social and political institutions that were a direct reaction to the wild pluralism that
characterized the early 1930s: regional autonomy was curtailed and the state
centralized, political parties and trade unions were banned, the Basque and
Catalan nationalist movements were crushed, and conservative Catholicism guided
social policy. When social and economic pressure on the Franco regime grew in the
1970s, the system boiled over yet again, but this time, Spain's transition was to a
democracy rather than dictatorship. As in the 1940s, the institutions of the new
regime were a direct reaction to the policies of the preceding era: through the
Spanish Constitution of 1978, the country's culturally and linguistically distinct
'historic communities' were recognized and granted autonomy, parties - including
nationalist parties - and unions were legalized, and social policy liberalized.
However, the historical memory of the hatred and violence of the civil war and its
aftermath not only shaped the formal, but the informal institutions of Spanish
political life. Mindful of the extremism of the 1930s, the norms of policymaking and
political debate in the newly democratic Spain emphasized consultation,
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compromise and inclusion in decision-making processes on matters of broad
economic, social and political importance, and moderation in public statements.
Therefore, when immigration began to gain steam in the 1990s, Spain had
three important contextual attributes that developed completely independently of
the migration process: 1) broadly written formal political institutions derived from
the 1978 Constitution that both promoted pluralism and political inclusion, and
protected the rights of minorities, 2) broadly understood informal institutions born
out of the historical memory of civil war that prioritized pluralism, consultation,
and moderation in political demands, and 3) native political actors who were
committed to maintaining these institutions.15 2 With the arrival of new
immigrants, the civic institutions originally designed to protect the right to political
participation for previously marginalized communities at home and abroad were
repurposed to allow for greater political inclusion of 'new minorities', namely
immigrants. And the informal institutions that demanded both consultation and
restraint, while fraying, have acted as a firewall against the kinds of anti-
immigrant political extremism that have become commonplace in many European
countries - this despite Spain's double-digit unemployment rate, one of the highest
in the industrialized world.
152 Here, I use Helmke and Levitsky's 2004 definition of formal and informal institutions:
"We define informal institutions as socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are
created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels. By contrast,
formal institutions are rules and procedures that are created, communicated and enforced
through channels widely accepted as official. This includes state institutions (courts,
legislatures, bureaucracies) and state-enforced rules (constitutions, laws, regulations), but
also what Robert C. Ellickson calls 'organization rules,' or the official rules that govern
organizations such as corporations, political parties, and interest groups".
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However, mindful of the havoc that disgruntled minority groups were capable
of in the past, Spain's political elites have at times been motivated by fear as well:
fear of the potential for extremist politics, and fear of what it would mean to have a
large number of marginalized people that could cause the kind of chaos seen in
Paris in 2005 - or in Barcelona and Andalusia in the 1930s. And while more
nakedly political motivations are at times clearly in play, the steady movement
towards increasing civic space to allow for the inclusion of immigrants has forced
the hand of parties that are indifferent towards, or at times hostile to immigrant
civic participation: once the door to immigrant political participation has been
opened, they too rush to organize migrant voters as potential constituents, as they
do not want to lose out on a potential new voter pool that has yet to commit to a
given party.
In this sense, the historical memory of the chaos and violence of Spain's past
plays a similar role in shaping the incorporative activities of native political actors
that the historical narratives of equality and recognition that emerged from the
Troubles have played in in shaping the incorporative activities of native political
actors in Northern Ireland: the battles of the past - namely the articulation of
demands and the means and terms of resolution - provide a political and social road
map to address new issues of inclusion and representation in the present. And, as
in Northern Ireland, those who made the strongest demands for political recognition
in the past have been some of the most active proponents of immigrant political
incorporation in the present, often drawing on the laws and institutions designed to
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address their past exclusion and repurposing them to extend to new immigrants.
Therefore, with their inclusive institutions, interested political actors and use of
historical narratives and experiences to frame the contemporary issue of migration
and inclusion, Spain, like Northern Ireland, has - quite by accident - come to
develop the very attributes that facilitate incorporative activity in old destinations,
despite the fact that it had no experience with being a country of immigration until
very recently.
Given the parallels to Northern Ireland, and its particular role both in
Spain's economic modernization and the democratization process, this chapter pays
special attention to the position of the Basques, and their responses to migration.
In the late 19th and early 20th century the Basque Country, like Ireland, was a
particularly restive region within a much larger country: ethnic nationalist
movements, industrial unrest, and rising demands for separation from the 'mother
country' shaped both the internal politics of the region and the region's relationship
with the metropole. In the late 1960s, tensions over this relationship spilled over
into violence, and Basque nationalist terror on the part of ETA, like its
contemporary the Provisional IRA, provoked a state crackdown that only furthered
discontent and swelled the ranks of their supporters. The izquierda abertzale
(nationalist left, heretofore referred to as the abertzales), like Irish republicans,
were actively engaged in the anti-Franco movement, and today - like their
Northern Irish counterparts - they are vocal supporters of immigrant political
incorporation. Although the Basque Country has not received migrant inflows at
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the levels of Madrid or Catalonia, given the strong ethnocentrism of early Basque
nationalism and the political salience of the 'national question' namely the
relationship between the Basque people and the national government, the support
for migrant political inclusion and engagement in incorporative activity on the part
of Basque parties and NGOs is still surprising.
However, the Basques differ from the Irish in two key ways. First, the
conservative parties of nationalism, Fianna Fail in Ireland and the Partido
Nacionalista Vasco (the Basque Nationalist Party or PNV) have taken very
different approaches to incorporative activity: while the PNV has generally moved
in the Congreso (the lower house of the Spanish national legislature, the Cortes) to
support inclusive policies - most notably, the extension of migrant voting rights and
the shortening of the residency period to qualify for citizenship - Fianna Fail led the
charge to restrict migrant access to citizenship. Secondly, unlike Sinn F6in and the
republican movement, the abertzales and affiliated political parties are not as fully
embedded in electoral politics at the regional and national levels: abertzale parties
have frequently been banned from contesting elections due to alleged ties to ETA
and other anti-system groups. Therefore, until very recently, the abertzales were
less well-positioned to influence local policymaking and to engage in incorporative
activities than their republican counterparts.
This is not to say that the overall reception for immigrants in Spain has been
uniformly welcoming. Many immigrants have reported incidents of street-level
racism - particularly against sub-Saharan Africans - and complaints of police
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harassment are common in urban areas. Some immigrants from Latin America
resent the colonialist overtones of Spanish migration and citizenship policies, and
there have also been complaints about labor market discrimination and sporadic
episodes of anti-immigrant violence. 5 3 However, despite anti-immigrant sentiment
at the individual level, and the occasional migrant-bashing proclamations from
individual politicians, these attitudes have not been institutionalized: unlike
Ireland, the constitution has not been changed to restrict access to the polity, and
unlike other European countries, far-right xenophobic parties are not in
government - or in any policy-making role at all.154 While this may be cold comfort
to immigrants that have faced racial abuse or discrimination on an individual level,
Spain's formal and informal institutions along with a large number of native actors
interested in preserving minority rights and access to civic participation mean that
at least Spain's immigrants have some hope for maintaining access to political life -
and using that access in order to enhance their economic, social and political
position in the future.
Section one of this chapter describes how the competing political
organizations that emerged in late 19th and early 20th century Spain and their
competing visions of what the modern Spanish nation-state should look like became
irreconcilable by the 1930s, leading to civil war. The victorious Nationalist forces,
153 Perhaps the most famous incident of anti-immigrant violence in Spain took place in El
Ejido, in Andalusia. After a Spaniard was killed by a Moroccan immigrant suspected of
having psychiatric problems, natives went on a rampage, attacking migrant-owned
businesses and immigrants themselves; over fifty were injured.
154 Plataforma per Catalunya (PxC), a far-right nationalist party out of Catalonia, only
received 1.65% of votes cast in the 2012 Catalan elections, which was insufficient to gain a
seat in the Generalitat, the regional parliament.
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an amalgamation of right-wing groups, swept away Spain's nascent republican
institutions, and instead centralized the country under a strict Castilian, Catholic,
monarchic regime. Section two explores the process of democratization, and in
particular the development of the 1978 Constitution, which laid out new principles
of state-society relations that emphasized political pluralism and inclusion. Section
three introduces the economic and social changes of the post-Franco period that led
to Spain's unprecedented influx of new immigrants, and traces incorporative
activity in the areas of citizenship, electoral politics, and capacity-building. Section
four considers existing explanations for incorporative activity, draws direct
comparisons between Spain and Ireland, and offers alternative arguments.
I. Development and Dictatorship
The early twentieth century was a turbulent time across much of Europe, and
while Spain was no exception, the level of political chaos was exceptional, even for
the era:
... in little more than a century, Spain had six constitutions and underwent seven
pronunciamientos (in 1820, 1843, 1854, 1868, 1874, 1923, and 1936), four
monarchial abdications, two changes of monarchial dynasty, two dictatorships (one
lasting nearly four decades), two republics, and four civil wars (1833-40, 1846-48,
1872-75, and 1936-39) (Gunther et al 2004, 2).155
The fundamental problem was that an emerging set of new political actors,
the result of both economic modernization and rising nationalist sentiment across
the Continent, had a fundamentally different view of the nature of state-society
155 A pronunciamiento ('pronouncement') is a pronouncement by the military that they no
longer support the current regime. This may or may not trigger regime collapse.
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relations than the more traditional political groups that had long dominated
Spanish politics and society. These clashes, over Spain's identity and structure as a
nation-state, the representation of different groups in society, and the role of the
new urban working class in national politics came to a head in the 1930s with the
establishment of the short-lived Second Republic and Spain's subsequent collapse
into civil war and dictatorship.
Competing Factions in early 20th century Spain
The process of political and economic modernization in late 19th and early
20th century Spain saw the emergence of new social groups and the political
organizations to represent them. Most notably, new parties, unions, and other
worker organizations emerged to represent the growing number of urban industrial
workers in the north and northeast, and the increasingly restive landless peasants
('journaleros) in the south. In addition, rising economic fortunes, cultural
renaissance movements and disagreement over center-periphery relations fueled
the emergence and popularity of regional nationalist parties in the Basque Country
and Catalonia. Finally, poverty and chaos at home and the collapse of the Empire
abroad, led to calls for an overhaul of Spanish political institutions, particularly the
structure of the monarchy. Collectively, the conflict between these emerging groups
and traditional powers, their multiple, cross-cutting cleavages, and escalating
extremism on both ends of the political spectrum in the 1930s would lead to political
and social chaos, and eventually, system collapse.
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The politics of the twentieth century were in part shaped by the last, great
political clash of the nineteenth century: in 1898, Spain lost the final remnants of
her empire in the Spanish-American war. 156 Known as el desastre, ('the Disaster'),
the loss of empire shattered Spanish confidence in their political institutions,
raising tensions between those who wanted to see a Liberal monarchy, others who
wanted to see a monarchy strongly backed by the military in order to maintain
social order at all costs, and a rising number of Spaniards who wanted to do away
with the monarchy altogether in order to establish a republic.
Despite its moribund political institutions, Spain was undergoing rapid
economic change: its (relatively late) industrial revolution generated hard currency
through exports and thousands of new jobs at home. The fact that these jobs were
in cities, however, represented a major shift for a country where even as late as
1900 over half of the population still lived in the countryside. As in other European
countries, urban workers were ripe for political organizing: the Union General de
Trabajadores (Workers General Union, or UGT), the Partido Socialista Obrera
Espaioles (Spanish Socialist Workers Party, heretofore referred to as the Socialists
or the PSOE), the Partido Comunista de Espaia (the Spanish Communist Party, or
PCE), and the anarchist Confederacidn Nacional de Trabajo (National
Confederation of Labor, or CNT) all emerged between 1879 and 1920.157 Urban
working class mobilization was particularly fervent in Catalonia, home to much of
Spain's textile production, and the Basque Country, where iron ore mining and
156 Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam were ceded to U.S. control.
157 The PSOE was founded in 1879. The UGT was founded in 1888. The CNT was founded
in Barcelona in 1910. The PCE was founded in 1920.
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metallurgy formed the backbone of heavy industry. The rise of syndicalism even
reached beyond the industrialized areas of the north: Andalusia, long Spain's
largest, poorest, and most populous region, became the site of significant
mobilization efforts among landless farmworkers - a group that one observer called
"the most starved and downtrodden race of agricultural labourers in Europe"
(Brenan 1943, 78). This deprivation also fueled radicalism and anti-clericalism,
which ran rampant in Andalusia and Catalonia. The Catholic Church in Spain was
not just a religious but a political institution, and by casting its lot with the
powerful, it earned the enmity of the increasingly radical working and laboring
class. 158 In a dark foreshadowing of the cataclysm to come, anti-draft riots in
Barcelona in 1909 led to not only street battles between police and protestors, but
the burning of several convents.
However, the process of industrialization and urbanization did not just fuel
the rise of worker organizations, it also fueled the rise of regional nationalism. The
Basque Country and Catalonia had long been two of Spain's regions where a
significant level of autonomy from Madrid was both desired and expected. In
Catalonia, the interests of cultural and business elites converged, and Catalan
nationalism became a process of trying to establish, similar to Home Rule in
Ireland, an autonomous region within the broader Spanish state. The Lliga
Regionalista (Regionalist League) was born, in part to further these claims, in 1901.
Presaging center-periphery politics in Spain for years to come, the industrialists
158 One Spanish politician noted in 1900 that "Catholicism is a religion, and clericalism is a
political party" (Ullman 1983).
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behind the party cast their lot with anyone in Madrid who could guarantee some
degree of autonomy and economically favorable institutions (Enrlich 1998). In the
case of the socially and economically conservative Lliga, it also favored those who
would tame the radicalism of the workers. Six years prior, the Euzko Alderdi
Jeltzalea-Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party, heretofore referred
to as the PNV) was born in Bilbao, in part as a reaction to the changes wrought not
only by industrialization but by the attempts to liberalize Spain's political
institutions, and the party's co-founder, Sabino Arana, sought to preserve not just
the old laws but what he saw as the old ways of the Basque people: rural life, the
Basque language, monarchism, and a deeply devout, conservative Catholicism.
Therefore, although both the Catalans and the Basques sought to maintain some
degree of autonomy from Madrid, the root of the Catalan nationalist disagreement
with the state was that the state was seen as a hindrance to much-desired political
and economic modernization, while for nationalists in the Basque country, the state
was seen as aiding and abetting (unwanted) political and economic
modernization.159
Therefore, by the early twentieth century, there were four clear cleavages in
Spanish society: 1) institutional, 2) class-based, 3) religious, and 4) center-
periphery. However, many of these cleavages were cross-cutting: for example,
economic elites in Catalonia and the Basque Country feared and loathed the
radicalism of the working class, but while the nationalist movement that emerged
in Catalonia linked Catalan industrial and political elites to the left-wing
159 See Shafir 1995 for a detailed comparison of Catalan and Basque nationalism.
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intelligentsia that served as the vanguard of Catalan language and culture, early
twentieth-century Basque nationalism was conservative, reactionary and anti-
capitalist. The inability of Spain's decaying political institutions to channel and
contain these rising groups and their disparate demands would present Spanish
political elites with their greatest challenge of the early twentieth century.
Modernization and the Basques
At the same time as the government in Madrid was trying to figure out how
to manage its relations with its restive historical communities on its periphery,
namely the Basques and Catalans, the people of the Basque Country, and in
particular the provinces of Biscay and Gipuzkoa, were trying to figure out how to
balance their own internal interests. As in the rest of Spain, this process in the
Basque Country was triggered by political and industrial modernization, and it
generated multiple disagreements over institutional arrangements, class relations,
and rising ethno-nationalism.
The seeds of disagreement
In the Basque Country (also known as Euskadi), the center-periphery
relationship was traditionally governed by the fueros ('old laws'), legal institutions
that gave the Basque provinces varying degrees of autonomy from the central
Spanish government, including the ability to set tax and tariff policy.160 However,
160 A note on terminology: the autonomous community of the Basque Country as it is known
today consists of three provinces: Biscay, Gipuzcoa, and Alava. However, the term 'the
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this system was ended in 1876 after the Third Carlist War and replaced with a
system of tariff and tax protection run from Madrid that came to be known as the
Concierto Economico, a change that favored the emergent industrialists but
horrified traditionalists. Therefore, the old Carlists, rural conservative Catholics
who supported both the monarchy and the fueros, stood in opposition to the new
urban industrial class who favored closer ties to Madrid.
The industrial revolution may have come late to Spain, but it hit the Basque
Country with a vengeance. Ground zero for industrialization was the province of
Biscay, whose capital city, Bilbao, emerged as the region's center of industry,
banking, and commerce: between 1876 and 1900, over 94 million tons of iron were
mined from the province of Biscay alone, and 90% of this was set for export (de la
Granja et. al. 2011). However, the emergent mines, foundries and mills needed
workers, and laborers streamed in from the Basque hinterlands and beyond: by
1900, the migrant influx was such that almost half of the male population of Bilbao
was born outside of the region (de la Granja et. al. 2001).
These economic changes presented a dual threat to traditional life in the
Basque Country. First, the expansion of heavy industry, and the development of a
regional banking center to finance it, led to the emergence of a growing industrialist
class in Bilbao with close ties to the Spanish state, who they increasingly depended
on to negotiate favorable trade agreements for their export goods. This represented
Basque Country' can also referred to the 'imagined community' of the Basque people which
stretched across seven provinces: four in Spain and three in France. References to the
Basque Country in this chapter are specific to the three provinces of today's autonomous
community, and I occasionally use the term 'Euskadi' to avoid repetition.
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a permanent threat to Basque autonomy, which was historically tied to their ability
to manage their own financial affairs. Second, the insatiable need for labor in
rapidly expanding Bilbao triggered inward migration, and the mines and mills of
Biscay not only drew the local population away from the fishing villages and
countryside of the Basque hinterlands, but from other parts of Spain as well. Not
only were these outside workers, the majority of whom hailed from Castile, less
religious and more anti-clerical than their local counterparts, but, radicalized by
poverty and terrible working conditions, the new urban workforce flocked to the
newly formed PSOE and UGT. 161
Rising discomfort with the twin effects of industrialization - namely the
emergence of both an urban working class and a bourgeoisie - fueled the rise of a
third key constituency in the Basque country: nationalists. Basque nationalism was
in many ways similar to its counterparts of the time, including Irish nationalism.
Like Eamon De Valera and his fellow-travelers in Ireland, Basque nationalists
clung to a romanticized vision of rural life that revolved around tending to
smallholdings, Catholicism, national games, and the use of the native language; the
emergence of heavy industry, large-scale enterprise, and a growing urban workforce
therefore presented an existential threat to this traditionalist view of society.
At the forefront of this movement against the forces of industrialization was
Sabino Arana, the founding father of modern Basque nationalism who not only
helped to establish the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party or
161 At this time, members of the UGT were required to also be members of the PSOE. See
Astudillo Ruiz 2004 for an overview of how this relationship has evolved over the years.
278
PNV, but established some of the key symbols of the Basque nation: the flag
(ikurriha) and the anthem. Most importantly, he laid out the intellectual and
political framework for modern Basque nationalism: similar to Sinn F6in founder
Arthur Griffith's view on what ailed the Irish, Arana saw Basque engagement with
the political and economic matters of Greater Spain as the root of many of the
Basque Country's problems. In a speech that came to be known as the Discurso de
Larrazabal - one that had startling parallels to Griffith's work The Resurrection of
Hungary - he stated:
... sons of Biscay, you could see it already in the eighteenth century, intoxicated by
the Spanish virus, anemic and without the strength to oppose those against the old
laws (fueros), and finally in our century shattered by foreign forces, and expiring -
not dead, which would be preferable - but humiliated, trampled and mocked by
Spain, by that miserable nation... 162
However, Arana went much further than his Irish counterparts in drawing
'bright' boundaries between the Basques and everyone else.163 Labor migrants were
the target of much of Arana's ire: labeling them maketos, a slur that signified
someone who was not from the Basque Country, he famously claimed that if
162 Sabino Arana, "Discurso de Larrazabal," Begoia, Viscaya, (June 3, 1893) Available from
the Basque Studies Society (Eusko Ikaskuntza):
http://www.euskomedia.org/aunamendi/46801. Griffith felt that one of the major problems
plaguing the Irish was tendency to try and resolve their issues through the British
Parliament. In his 1918 revised preface to The Resurrection of Hungary, he wrote: "These
are the evil fruits of Parliamentarianism masking as Constitutionalism - physical and
economic decay, moral debasement, and national denial... Ireland was sick - mind-drugged
by Parliamentarianism - but Ireland is convalescing. The memory of what she was and the
realization of what she is are restoring her to national health" (xi-xii).
163 Alba (2005) draws distinctions between different kinds of social boundary-setting: "Some
boundaries are 'bright' - the distinction involved is unambiguous, so that individuals know
at all times which side of the boundary they are on. Others are 'blurry', involving zones of
self-presentation and social representation that allow for ambiguous locations with respect
to the boundary" (pg. 21-22).
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Spaniards were to learn the Basque language, Euskera, then the Basques would
have to abandon it in order to preserve their cultural distance from Spain (Conversi
1990). Unfortunately, unlike the Catalans, the Basques were not able to use their
language as the glue that stitched the nation together: Euskera, like Irish, is quite
dissimilar to the dominant language (Spanish and English, respectively), and
therefore was not as widely used as Catalan. In addition, Euskera was still
primarily a rural language, and unlike Catalan, it did not undergo a major cultural
renaissance in the late 19th century, and it was not used by urban economic elites.
Subsequently, Arana's construction of the imagined community was not built
around the idea of Basques as a civic community, or a community united by
language and culture (as the Catalans were); rather, Arana's nationalism was built
on the idea of a separate, pure race that was increasingly sullied by the influx of the
Spanish language and people.
These new social groups that emerged and grew out of the process of
modernization began to organize themselves politically. It was in industrial and
mining towns like Portugalete and Gallarta where the UGT found a ready audience
and the PSOE developed a reliable voting bloc. The new economic elite of Biscay
threw their support behind the Liberals. Arana's emergent PNV found its base of
support among rural smallholders and conservative Catholics who were suspicious
of both big industry and the radicalism of the growing working class. In other
words, by the early twentieth century, Basque civil society looked a lot like other
modernizing societies where the bourgeoisie, working class, and rural reactionaries
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competed for primacy. 164 However, unlike Britain, France, or Germany the Basques
did not constitute an independent nation-state, and their internal political struggles
began to pale in comparison to the rising storm gathering across the rest of the
country.
Collapse and Centralization
The emergence of multiple, competing groups in Spanish politics drove cycles
of conflict and competition, as in the wake of El Desastre Spain made another
attempt at Liberalism, fell into dictatorship under the rule of General Miguel Primo
de Rivera from 1923 to 1930, and in 1931, established the Second Spanish Republic.
The principles of the Second Republic were largely a repudiation of a Catholic,
monarchist, centralized Spain, but the new institutions and decrees of the
government only served to deepen animosity between these competing groups,
eventually leading to systemic collapse.
The 1931 Constitution established under the newly formed Republic offered
liberal protections for individual rights in the wake of the Rivera dictatorship: it
guaranteed equality under the law regardless of gender, class, or political or
religious beliefs (Article 25), a right to peaceful assembly (Article 38), restricted
unlawful detainment (Article 29), and protected a free press and free speech (Article
34). The constitution also addressed the ongoing center-periphery conflict: Article
11 granted provinces the right of provinces to "organize themselves into an
autonomous region to form a political-administrative core within the Spanish state",
164 See Moore 1966.
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and Article 50 guaranteed these regions the right to develop educational systems in
their own language.
However, the constitution also took square aim at those groups deemed to be
a threat to the Republican regime. State subsidies to the Catholic Church were
ended (Article 26) and the activities of religious orders were restricted. The
legalization of divorce flew in the face of Catholic doctrine (Article 43). And Article
44's assertion that "All of the country's wealth, whoever may be its owner, is
subordinated to the interests of the national economy" terrified industrialists.
Not surprisingly, the new government alarmed the more conservative
elements of Spanish society, most notably the military and the Catholic Church.
The army feared that granting autonomy to Spain's peripheral regions was the first
step towards the dissolution of the country. Yet, with the new constitution, they
were deprived of their traditional 'circuitbreaker' tool of issuing pronunciamientos
that would trigger the fall of the regime. Instead, reactionary forces, taking their
cue from the Nazi Party in Germany, used the parliamentary elections of 1933 to
grab power for themselves.
Tensions escalated as well due to growing conflict between radical left-wing
organizations and the Catholic Church. Like the Spanish government, the
institutions of the Church were no longer fit for purpose by the early twentieth
century: mass urbanization in Madrid and Barcelona, and growing inequality and
poverty in Southern Spain meant that the clergy were unable to organize the
masses, either for religious purposes or for the distribution of aid. Instead, secular
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organizations filled the void: "As the twentieth century progressed, socialists, in
cities such as Madrid and Bilbao, and anarcho-syndicalists in the Catalan industrial
towns, far outdistanced Catholic syndicalists in their ability to organize the
workers" (Callahan 1989, pg. 411). Left-wing political organizations, and anarchists
in particular, loathed the Church hierarchy for its support of the Primo de Rivera
dictatorship in the 1920s, landless peasants hated the often close ties between the
Church leadership and large landowners who made life on the latifundos, the large
estates of Andalusia, a misery, and urban workers cast a skeptical eye on 'immoral'
parish priests "who 'everyone calls father, except for his own children who call him
uncle"' (Thomas 2013, pg. 76). Subsequently, attacks on Church property and
sacred sites, and acts of public blasphemy increased in the 1930s, further inflaming
tensions. During the summer of 1931 in Milaga (Andalusia), where poverty and
illiteracy remained rife and Spain's first Communist legislator was elected to office,
the episcopal palace was burned, convents and churches attacked, and the graves of
nuns were opened and their corpses left in the streets. 165 Mass disinterrments
became startlingly common in parts of Madrid and Barcelona during this time (de la
Cueva 1998). And in cities and towns across Spain, religious status and icons were
defaced.
In 1936, these tensions reached their boiling point, and the Spanish military
launched an uprising against the republican government. The multiple, competing
16 5 Alfonsi, Adela. "The Recatholicisation of Malaga, 1937-1966: Church and State in the
Spanish Postwar" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Adelaide, 1998),
http://digital.librarv.adelaide.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/2440/19227/1/09pha388.pdf.
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factions in Spanish civil society soon coalesced into two key coalitions: on one side
Nationalists, consisting of the military, the Fascist Falange, the Catholic Church,
monarchists, large landowners and industrialists, and on the other side
Republicans (also called Loyalists) largely consisting of trade unionists,
communists, anarchists, landless peasants, Liberals, and, by and large, regional
nationalists.
When the Spanish military rebellion against the Republican government was
launched in July 1936, many Basques - and Basque nationalists in particular - had
a terrible decision to make: should they side with the Nationalist forces, defenders
of the Church and the monarchy despite their ties to the fascist Falange, or side
with the forces of the Republic who, despite their secularism, granted the Basque
people the political autonomy they so desperately craved? Ultimately the PNV -
now under the leadership of Jos6 Antonio Aguirre, who was not as reflexively
hostile to Madrid and to non-Basques as his predecessor Arana - cast their lot with
the Republicans: regional autonomy was anathema to the military, and it was clear
from the beginning that, should the Nationalist forces prevail, Spain would revert to
being a highly centralized state, and Euskadi's political and economic autonomy
would be lost. This decision was also consistent with what was (and what would
continue to be) one of the core principles of Basque politics: the most important
factor in deciding what position to take on any given issue was the extent to which a
given course of action would further the cause of Basque autonomy - political,
economic and social.
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Aguirre was sworn in as the lehendekari, the president of the newly formed
Basque Autonomous Community, Euskadi, in October 1936. Although Gipuzcoa fell
quickly, and Alava and Navarre sided with the Nationalist forces, Bilbao and much
of Biscay remained under the control of the PNV government. However, the
Nationalist forces, in their slow advance on the capital, committed horrible
atrocities against the civilian population: the Spanish military allowed the German
Condor Legion to test its new bombing and military technology on Basque civilian
targets. The most famous incident was the April 1937 market day attack in
Guernica, a staunchly nationalist town in Gipuzcoa, where over 1,600 people were
killed in three hours of aerial bombing; to this day, Guernica stands out as one of
the most depraved acts of what was already a horrifically vicious civil war.
Unfortunately for the cause of Basque nationalism, and despite the famous
vow of noted labor organizer and anti-fascist Dolores Ibairruri that "No pasaran!"
('They [fascists] shall not pass!'), Nationalist forces swept into Bilbao in June 1937,
effectively ending the PNV's brief experiment with self-rule. Reprisals against the
Basques, and nationalists in particular, were swift, brutal, and immediate. Biscay
and Gipuzkoa were branded 'traitor provinces' by the Franco regime, and treated
accordingly: "The Basque language, both written and spoken, was prohibited in
public and in private, and its use punished even in the environment of the family.
All folklore or cultural demonstrations (dancing, music, literature, etc.), however
insignificant, were suppressed. In short, any identity with anything other than the
Spanish language was denied" (Jauregui 1986, 598-590). The PNV leadership fled,
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eventually settling in France after World War II where they established a Basque
government-in-exile. Interestingly, Basque industry was spared by both sides: the
retreating PNV-republican aligned forces decided not to destroy everything they left
behind because in their view they would need those mines and mills in the future in
order to rebuild the wealth of the Basque nation. Franco's forces spared Bilbao for
much the same reason: the city and its environs were too economically valuable to
destroy.
With the final success of the Nationalist forces in 1939, the dream of Basque
autonomy was seemingly crushed. However, despite their defeat, participation in
resistance to the nationalist forces had a profound effect on Basque national
identity:
It would be impossible to exaggerate the importance of the Spanish Civil War for
Basque national identity. One old soldier from those days told me that he first felt
that he was a Basque, and therefore different from the Spanish, on the day he stood
with his battalion in the plaza in Bilbao before the Hotel Carlton, where the Basque
government had its headquarters, and heard President Aguirre exhort them to the
defense of their homeland. What a decade of propaganda by Sabino de Arana y
Goiri, and a generation of organization by the Basque Nationalist Party had failed to
accomplish, the raising of the Basque national consciousness, Generals Mola and
Franco managed to achieve in a matter of months (Clark 1979, pg. 76).
Despite levels of post-civil war repression higher than anywhere else in Spain, the
nationalist spark refused to go out, and the violence that would be unleashed upon
the Basque population would eventually give this spark enough oxygen to - quite
literally - engulf the regime.
Legacies of War
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With the Nationalist triumph in 1939, Spain once again found itself under
the control of a dictatorship, one that would prove to be remarkably durable. But
even more durable than the regime would be the enmity wrought by a conflict that,
despite the international attention from both idealistic socialists and fascist fellow-
travelers of the Falange, was deeply personal and shockingly savage. This was a
war where unfathomable levels of violence and hatred touched every level of society,
even down to the smallest villages:
On 27 July, Carranza's [nationalist] column reached one such town, Rociana in
Huelva, where the left had taken over in response to news of the military coup.
There had been no right-wing casualties, but the premises of the landowners'
association (Asociaci6n Patronal) and two clubs had been destroyed, twenty-five
sheep had been stolen and the parish church and rectory had been burned, although
the parish priest, Father Martinez Laorden, had been saved by local Socialists and
given refuge in the house of the mayor. On 28 July, after Carranza's arrival, the
parish priest made a speech from the balcony of the town hall: 'You all no doubt
believe that, because I am a priest, I have come with words of forgiveness and
repentance. Not at all. War against all of them until the last trace has been
eliminated.' The women had their heads shaved and one was dragged around town
by a donkey before being murdered. Over the next three months, sixty people were
shot. In January 1937, Father Martinez Laorden made an official complaint that
the repression had been altogether too lenient. (Preston 2006, 109).
Although the figures are still hotly contested to this day, an estimated 200,000
people were killed in the course of the civil war, and another 300,000 died of hunger
or disease (Richards 1988; Tremlett 2006). In the aftermath of the Nationalist
victory, thousands more deaths were attributed to 'red' purges, namely the effort to
root out any vestiges of the political left in Spain; as one observer noted, "The scale
of repression claimed even in the most conservative accounts would mean that ten
individuals, on average, were shot each day through the entire period of seven years
from 1939-1945" (Richards 1988, pg. 31). Many of these victims were not buried in
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cemeteries, but in mass, unmarked graves, in fields or even along the side of
winding country roads. Thousands more fled Spain for the Americas or for France,
including the leadership of the UGT, the PSOE, and the PNV. Therefore, by 1945,
as the rest of Europe was clearing the debris of war in order to not only rebuild its
towns, roads, and bridges, but the foundational institutions of liberal democracy,
Spain had consolidated into a fascist regime.
Conclusion
The central problem of early twentieth-century Spain was the fact that rapid
socioeconomic change far outpaced political change: the forces of industrialization,
working-class mobilization, and urbanization overwhelmed a country where two of
the most important political institutions - the monarchy and the Catholic Church -
remained essentially unchanged. In essence, it was a classic case of modernization
gone awry, per Samuel Huntington's observation:
Social and economic change - urbanization, increases in literacy and education,
industrialization, mass media expansion - extend political consciousness, multiply
political demands, broaden political participation. These changes undermine
traditional sources of political authority and traditional political institutions; they
enormously complicate the problems of creating new bases of political association
and new political institutions combining legitimacy and effectiveness. The rates of
social mobilization and the expansion of political participation are high; the rates of
political organization and institutionalization are low. The result is political
instability and disorder. The primary problem of politics is the lag in development
of political institutions behind social and economic change. (1968,5).
By 1945, Spain had been utterly transformed. The institutions of the Second
Republic were largely reversed: political power was centralized, the use of regional
languages prohibited, independent parties and trade unions were banned, and the
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political leadership of the various groups united under the Loyalist umbrella were
exiled, jailed, and in some cases, executed. No political organizations were allowed
to exist beyond those affiliated with the Movimiento Nacional, General Franco's
coalition of monarchists, Carlists, fascists, militarists and conservative Catholics.
Spain's lack of involvement in World War II spared it the devastation of total war,
but it also meant exclusion from the process of rebuilding democratic institutions
from the ground up. Instead, isolated at the far southwestern corner of Europe,
Spain would languish for close to four decades under a regime that both
economically and socially fell further and further behind its rapidly changing
Northern neighbors. As we will see, however, how Spain broke out of its self-
imposed stasis would have profound implications for its future response to mass
immigration.
II. Democratization and Development
The noted historian of modern Spain, Paul Preston, characterized the
principles of the Franco dictatorship as "belligerent opposition to communism,
socialism and liberalism, to democratic pluralism and to any form of regional
devolution" (1986:1-2). Not surprisingly, the process of democratization focused
exactly on those points: re-opening political space for left-wing parties and unions,
committing to pluralistic politics, and the political status of Spain's cultural and
political minorities, most notably the Basques and Catalans. The 1978 Spanish
constitution, which was ratified by over 90% of the population, addressed these
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issues and more. However, the process of reopening Spanish public life to multiple
political actors and negotiating the content of the constitution did not occur in a
historical vacuum: the chaos and violence of the past acted as a constraint on
political behavior in the present. The need to accommodate competing visions of
Spanish state-society relations meant that the democratization process was fraught
with compromises, some of which were bitter pills to swallow, but the shared desire
to avoid the fractious politics of the past kept the process moving forward. These
formal and informal institutions would, quite unwittingly, have a significant effect
on how Spain's political elites would respond to the unprecedented migration of the
1990s and 2000s.
Spain, left behind
By the 1950s, Spain's economy was in dire straits and, not surprisingly, this
shaky economic situation fueled mass emigration: an estimated 2-3 million
Spaniards left to seek work in Northern Europe, an outflow that lasted through the
oil crisis of the 1970s (Arango and Martin 2005). However, this movement was in
addition to the millions of Spaniards who fled to Latin America prior to the civil
war. The large (and growing) Spanish diaspora forced the regime's attention on
issues of nationality: what could or should happen with the citizenship of Spaniards
and their descendants living abroad? In 1954, the government issued a decree
clarifying these issues: citizenship rights were extended to the third generation born
abroad, and those Spaniards who established citizenship in countries that were
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former colonies of Spain would be allowed to hold dual citizenship. The logic behind
the decree was less about connecting with the individuals in the Diaspora and more
about highlighting the special relationship that Spain had with its former colonies:
in other words, it suited the regime's wish to maintain ties to its 'lost empire'
(EUDO 2012).
When it came to economic reforms, however, Spain increasingly looked to
Europe. The 1960s "Spain is different" campaign opened up the economy to
tourism. A new technocratic class affiliated with the conservative Catholic lay
association Opus Dei was deeply interested in economic modernization and began to
take hold of the regime's administrative apparatus. However, liberalization of the
economy could only go so far: Spain's non-democratic regime prevented it from
joining the European Economic Community. Nevertheless, reforms drove
investment, and Spain experienced unprecedented levels of economic growth in the
1960s and early 1970s.
By the 1970s, it was becoming clear that any further economic modernization
would require political modernization as well. Spain was entering a new period of
turbulence: with the oil crisis, workers were no longer placated by a buoyant
economy, and took to the streets despite the risk of violent crackdown. Strikes broke
out across much of the country, facilitated by the still-clandestine Comisiones
Obreras (Worker's Commissions, or CCOO) and the reconstituted Partido
Comunista Espahol (Spanish Communist Party, or PCE). In the Basque Country,
young people frustrated both by the Franco regime and what they saw as timidity
291
from the PNV leadership in exile, led to the formation of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna,
better known as ETA, the Basque terrorist organization that gained rising support
in the 1970s for targeting key figures of the regime. With ETA's assassination of
Franco's prime minister Luis Carrero Blanco in 1974, and the death of Franco
himself in 1975, the time seemed ripe for change. But the questions for Spain were,
how much change, and how fast?
Moving Towards Democracy
One year after the death of Franco, the newly appointed premier, Adolfo
Sudrez, with the approval of Juan Carlos, the appointed King of Spain and
handpicked heir to Franco, worked to move a Law of Political Reform through the
still-single party Cortes, which would open up Spain to multi-party electoral
politics. Despite opposition from some within the military and the PCE, it was
approved in the legislature and put to a public referendum where it was approved
by over 90% of voters, thus officially opening the political system to competitive
elections. Old pre-civil war parties like the PNV, PSOE and the PCE were
legalized, and other groups scrambled to form new parties and coalitions in order to
contest elections in 1977, most notably Suar6z's Union de Centro Democrdtico
(Union of the Democratic Center or UCD), a coalition of Christian Democrats,
Liberals and other groups. Unlike the pre-civil war days, the Catholic Church
stayed out of party politics, and committed itself to non-partisanship in that and
future elections.
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The 1977 elections were a watershed moment, not only because they were a
huge step towards establishing Spain as a modern democratic society, but because
of the strong signal that voters sent to their politicians about the kind of democracy
that they wanted it to be. The vast majority of voters - over seventy percent - cast
their ballots for centrist parties, namely the center-right UCD and the left-wing
PSOE. The PCE, which had been one of the most militant and active political
organizations of the left during the dictatorship, only received 9.3% of the vote, and
the Alianza Popular (AP), which was made up of Franco loyalists, received 8.5%.
Both the far-right (0.6%) and far-left (3.1%) were rejected by voters (Maravall and
Santamaria 1986) - a sure sign that Spaniards were moving past the intense
polarization that marked their last attempt at electoral politics.
This spirit of centrism and compromise could also be seen in the way that
Spain's nascent democracy handled economic policy. Hard decisions needed to be
made about government spending and policy, but the street politics and protests
late 1960s and early 1970s showed that the CCOO and the PCE had the power and
the organizational capacity to be extremely disruptive and confrontational - exactly
what the situation did not call for, given the delicacy of the democratization process.
The decision was made to get all of the key actors on board with an agreement that
would both impose necessary austerity measures, but also pass much-needed
reforms to the tax and social security systems. Subsequently, and with the support
of the mainstream parties and unions, the Moncloa Pact went into effect in
293
September 1977.166 However, economic and social reforms paled before the major
task ahead of the new government: drafting a constitution. All of the old cleavages
of Spanish politics, namely religion, class, center-peripheral conflict, and the
institutions of the state, would need to be addressed while managing to keep a
majority of the parties - and the public - on board. Nevertheless, this process was
facilitated by the spirit of cooperation fostered by the careful inclusion of different
viewpoints and interests in the Moncloa process. Encarnaci6n credits the
generosity of the pact-making process - something that, given the depth of enmity
between these groups historically, was extraordinary - to "an accommodating and
consensus-driven style among politicians born out of political expediency and
political learning" (2005, 194). This new norm would be sorely tested during the
process of drafting and approving a new constitution.
The Spanish Constitution of 1978
The democratization process culminated in the successful passage of the
Spanish Constitution in 1978. While it did restore some of the key principles of the
Second Republic, it also had to take into account the significant interests of groups
on the Nationalist side of the civil war - especially since the Francoist bureaucratic
regime was still largely in place.
166 It is notable that the extremes of the right, left, and nationalist movement all rejected
Moncloa: the far-right Alianza Popular, the Fuerza Nueva, which represented the remnants
of the right-wing Falange, the anarchist trade union CNT, and the Basque terrorist group
ETA.
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First and foremost was a commitment to political pluralism. Emerging from
an authoritarian state, this is not surprising. However the Constitution explicitly
states that parties and trade unions have a right to exist and to be politically active
as long as they "respect the Constitution and the law. Their internal structure and
their functioning must be democratic" (sec. 6 & 7). The emphasis on not just having
active political associations, but active and democratic political associations was a
clear nod to both the chaos of the 1930s, and the anti-systemic parties and
organizations that still existed at the margins of Spanish political life - and in the
case of the Basque Country where ETA and its sympathizers were still active, in the
shadows, if not near the center of the region's politics.
However, the commitment to pluralism and political participation go beyond
guaranteeing rights for organizations to promoting the participation of individual
citizens in political life. Article 9.2 notes:
It is the responsibility of the public authorities to promote conditions ensuring that
freedom and equality of individuals and of the groups to which they belong are real
and effective, to remove the obstacles preventing or hindering their full enjoyment,
and to facilitate the participation of all citizens in political, economic, cultural and
social life.
This clause created space for government, at any level, to intervene in order to
support political engagement - yet like much of the constitution, it was also a
vague-ish statement of principle rather than a concrete guide to policy.
The constitution also guaranteed regional rights, something that remains one
of the most contentious issues in Spain to this day. Article 2 of the Introduction
notes that:
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The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the
common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards; it recognizes and guarantees the
right to self government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and
the solidarity among them all.
Article 2 had the distinction of both pleasing and enraging the two main
constituencies it was meant to address: the military and regional nationalists.
Many nationalists found Article 2's declaration about the "indissoluble unity of the
Spanish Nation" intolerable. It did not help matters that the PNV was not part of
the committee that negotiated the constitution; unhappy with both the process and
its outcome, it exhorted Basques to abstain from the constitutional referendum.
Despite these objections, the constitution passed in the legislature, the
Cortes, and was approved overwhelmingly by Spanish voters. One of the most
striking aspects of the democratization process was the emphasis on pulling - and
keeping - both the proposed institutions and the debate around them as close to the
center as possible. This was entirely consistent with the Moncloa process. However
this centrism was even more incredible considering that despite the fact that both
political leaders and the Spanish public were for the most part able to set old
hatreds aside for the sake of turning the page on dictatorship, party and ideological
allegiance were remarkably stable over time: the election results showed strong
correlation between party support in the 1930s and support for the UCD or PSOE in
1977. While people still held onto their general political orientation, and some of
the old cleavages were still visible, the exercise of those preferences remained
within the boundaries of electoral politics.
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Democratization and the Basques
Despite his loathing of their politics, Franco needed the Basques: their mines,
mills and banks were crucial to the economy. Therefore, while the state still kept a
tight rein on outwards expressions of Basque identity, it did allow the regional
economy to thrive, and the economic expansion of the 1960s led to another wave of
inward labor migration that was in many ways reminiscent of the influx of migrant
workers in the late 19th century: between 1950 and 1970, the population increased
from one million to two million people (Balerdi 1997). Once again, workers settled
in on the left bank of the Nervi6n, and although working conditions were not as dire
as they were in the heyday of Dolores Ibairruri and the UGT, with only government-
approved unions in place, they were not ideal.
While Basque society was undergoing demographic and economic change, the
dynamics of Basque nationalist politics, operating clandestinely in the churches and
universities of the region, and openly across the border in France, were changing as
well. For the PNV in exile, the normalization of US-Spanish relations in the 1950s
dealt a blow to Basque diplomatic efforts, and the death of Aguirre, the PNV's long-
serving leader, threw the party into disarray. In Euskadi, however, frustration
with both the Franco regime and the PNV was growing: for younger Basques, the
PNV was seen as too cautious. In 1959 a group of students founded the radical
Basque separatist group Euskadi ta Askatasuna ('Basque Homeland and Freedom',
heretofore referred to as 'ETA'). Like Arana, they saw Spain as the problem, and
this view was compounded by the repression foisted upon them by the Franco
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dictatorship. This distinction was furthered by the adoption of anti-colonialist
ideology and 'third world nationalism' that was increasingly popular in the 1960s
(Jauregui 1986): just as the Black Civil Rights movement in the U.S. gave young
Catholics in Northern Ireland both an ideological framework and a pathway to
action, the anti-colonial struggles of developing countries, most notably Algeria and
Cuba, and their legitimization of the use of guerilla warfare to break completely
with the colonial power, provided both a compelling narrative and path of action for
young Basques who felt that their nation was being 'occupied' by Spain (Ben-Ami
1991).
The young etarras also faced the old problem of rising numbers of non-Basque
workers, but by the 1960s, the kinds of racist discourse and 'bright' boundary
setting championed by Arana seemed anachronistic. Thus began a shift towards a
more civic and territorial view of Basque nationalism: the Basque language and
Basque residency were seen by a growing number as the markers for members of
the nation, rather than racial attributes. In addition, if nationalists hoped to have
significant political support, they could not, like Arana, claim that only those who
were of the pure Basque 'race' and could trace their families back for generations
were Basques, because the region's high levels of economic development demanded
a steady influx of outside workers. Therefore, even among the most radical
elements of the Basque nationalist movement, the criteria for 'Basque-ness" began
to undergo a subtle change: the definition of a Basque shifted from solely being
someone whose family was of the Basque Country to the possible inclusion of an
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individual who was born in the Basque Country and who spoke the language. In
other words, in the eyes of a growing number of radical nationalists, Basque
citizenship shifted from being based on principles of jus sanguinis towards a more
civic, jus soli conceptualization of membership. This began to open the Basque
'imagined community' to the children of this second wave of labor migrants - the
grandchildren of sunny Castile born under the grey skies and sirimiri of Euskadi.167
While the CCOO and the PCE organized strikes and protests, ETA organized
direct attacks on the state, including the assassination of state security forces and
political figures close to the regime. These attacks provoked a harsh response from
the regime, leading to broader public sympathy for ETA and another round of
attacks. The most spectacular strike against the regime came in 1973 when ETA
assassinated Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco's prime minister. By taking out one of
the more hardline officials of the Movimiento, ETA rather inadvertently made the
pathway to democracy somewhat shorter and less tenuous than it might have been.
When Suarez moved to legalize political parties, including the PNV, there
was a great deal of disagreement in the Basque Country over the extent to which
the democratization process should be supported. While the PNV, which identified
as a European-style Christian Democratic party supported the transition to
democracy, they were unhappy that they were not included on the committee that
negotiated the text of the Constitution and that there was no constitutional
mechanism for self-determination; subsequently they called for a Basque boycott of
167 Sirimiri is a Basque term for a certain kind of rain: more than drizzle, but less than a
shower, it seems to simultaneously hang in the air yet coat everything it touches.
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the constitutional referendum in December 1978. However, the next major political
initiative from Madrid dealt directly with the question of regional autonomy, and
offered a new statute of autonomy to the Catalans and Basques that surpassed the
rights granted to these regions in the 1930s. The so-called 'Statute of Guernica'
created the autonomous community of the Basque Country consisting of Biscay,
Gipuzcoa and Alava, and established a legislature for this community (with the
lehendakari as its president) that would have devolved powers over education,
taxation, and policing, among other policy areas. Despite their stance on the
Constitution, the PNV came out in support of the Statute, and once the Basque
government was established, went on to dominate the regional elections for the next
three decades; since the statute passed, there has only been one lehendakari that
was not a PNV representative.
For ETA, however, autonomy was insufficient: their end goal was an
independent Basque state. Subsequently, they continued their operations, not only
against the Spanish state, but against Basque politicians, journalists, academics,
and even artists who dated to criticize either ETA or the radical Basque left
organizations known as the abertzale izquierda ('patriot left'). Therefore, although
the modernization and democratization process opened up the Basque nation far
beyond what 19th century hardline nationalists like Arana could have imagined, and
the newly formed Spanish government along with Basque representatives were able
to develop institutions of autonomy beyond what Aguirre and the PNV were able to
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negotiate in the 1930s, in their moment of Spain's democratic triumph, Basque civil
society remained overshadowed by violence.
Conclusion
Spain spent most of the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century
ripping itself apart. By the 1970s, the great challenge for its political leaders was
figuring out how to stitch the country back together again. Despite the enthusiasm
for change in the wake of Franco's death, Spain was also a deeply tired country:
tired of extremism, of chaos, and of state control over every aspect of economic and
political life. Given the circumstances, it is not surprising that the democratization
process was notable for both its constraint on the part of political elites and voters,
and for the development of legislative and electoral institutions meant to ensure
access to political life for a diverse set of actors. However, this process really left
Spain with two institutional legacies: the formal institutions laid out in the
Constitution, and the informal institutions of political engagement, namely the
principles of constrain, compromise, and consultation. These informal institutions of
engagement arose directly from the historical memory of the chaotic Second
Republic and the fratricidal civil war.
This shift to a far more temperate form of politics was consistent with what
Huntington saw as the solution to the problem of political order identified at the
beginning of this section:
In a society of any complexity, the relative power of groups changes, but if the
society is to be a community, the power of each group is exercised through political
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institutions which temper, moderate, and redirect that power so as to render the
dominance of one social force compatible with the community of many (1968, 9).
There are two notable caveats, however. First was the situation in the
Basque Country. Second was the issue of the pacto de olvido, the pact of forgetting.
One of the most bitter pills the Spanish left was forced to swallow in the process of
democratization was the amnesty granted to former leaders and functionaries of the
Franco regime. There was no 'peace and reconciliation' process, or truth
commission - yet thousands of bodies remained buried in unmarked mass graves
across Spain. What made this situation particularly painful was the fact that in
small towns like Rociana, where even the local priest called for a merciless
crackdown on the left, everyone knew where the bodies were buried, and had a good
idea of who put them there, but nobody could say anything. This historical memory
is one that would remain locked away for over two decades before people decided
that they did not want to forget anymore, and in the 2000s, the debate over the loss
and exile experienced by the left in the past would eventually become part and
parcel of the citizenship and migration debate in the present.
Despite the still lingering issues of its painful past, the 1990s were a time of
tremendous outwards optimism. With its entrance into the European Community
in 1986 (the precursor to the European Union), the signing of the 1992 Maastricht
Treaty, and its announcement that it planned to join the euro, the once pariah state
of Western Europe no longer seemed so different. While unemployment peaked in
1994 at close to 24%, it steadily moved downwards for the rest of the decade, and by
2000 was down to just under 14% [Figure 6.1]. European transfer funds allowed
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Spain to invest in major transportation infrastructure upgrades, physically linking
what is not only a culturally but geographically diverse country.
Spaniards not only embraced the European project with both hands, but
moved to what it saw as its rightful place on the European and world stage.
Barcelona hosted the 1992 Summer Olympics, and the images of divers soaring in
the air against the backdrop of the sparkling Mediterranean and the unfinished
steeples of Gaudi's Sagrada Familia were not only spectacular, but sparked a
tourism craze that has yet to abate. Chefs in the Basque Country and Catalonia
were attracting the world's attention; San Sebastian, the capital of Gipuzkoa is said
to have more Michelin-starred restaurants per capita than any other city. Although
the cloud of terrorism still hung over the Basque Country, even gritty, industrial
Bilbao presented a new face to the world: the Frank Gehry-designed Guggenheim
Museum opened on the banks of the Nervi6n in 1997, its shining, silver fagade
attracting global attention to what was long an impossibly dirty city. A newly
confident Spain was, at long last, a place of interest for reasons beyond grinding
poverty, anachronistic government, or political oppression. Not surprisingly, among
the interested were migrant workers.
III. Migration and Political Incorporation in Spain
Up until the 1990s, immigration was virtually non-existent in Spain: most of
the foreign population at that time consisted of German and British retirees living
along the coast. This was not only due to the political situation, but the weakness of
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the economy: double-digit unemployment has long been a problem for the Spanish,
and therefore there was little to entice foreigners to the country long-term besides
sunshine and a low cost of living.
In the 1990s, however, this began to change. First, the unemployment rate
began to fall: while it peaked at nearly 24% in 1994, it was down to 14.8% in 2000,
and by 2005 was in single-digits for the first time since democratization [Figure
6.1]. As the unemployment rate began to fall, migration picked up [Figure 6.2]. In
1998, immigrants were still less than 2% of the country overall [Table 6.1] - not
surprising given that unemployment was still around 18%. However, if the entry of
immigrants was a trickle in the 1990s, it turned into a flood in the 2000s. Between
1998 and 2001, the immigrant population doubled, to 3.3% of the overall population,
and two years later, it had nearly doubled again. In 2007, this figure broke double-
digits, reaching 10.6% of the population, before maxing out in 2009 at 11.7% of the
population. In absolute terms, the number of immigrants in Spain went from
637,085 in 1998 to just under 5.3 million in 2008, a remarkable increase by any
measure.
Where did these immigrants come from? This too changed over time. Before
migration took off in the late 1990s, most foreigners were Northern Europeans. By
2002, this had changed: 36.4% of Spain's immigrants hailed from Central and South
America, while only 24.8% came from the European Union [Table 6.2]. An
additional 21.4% were from Africa, with the majority hailing from Morocco.
However, over the course of the decade, the distribution of sending states changed,
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as Eastern Europeans began arriving en masse: in 2002, Ecuadorans were the
largest immigrant group, but by 2012, they had fallen to fourth overall, with
Romanians taking over the top spot [Table 6.3]. Bulgaria was not even in the Top
10 in 2002, but by 2012, the number of Bulgarians living in Spain (151,475)
surpassed the number of Portuguese (121,271) - a population that is historically,
geographically and linguistically much closer to Spain.
These changes in migration flows were not always followed by changes to
migration policy. The biggest issue was the fact that it was not only difficult to
obtain a work permit, but even more difficult to maintain legal status: several
studies of migration in the 1990s note that the temporary work permit system for
non-EU immigrants created a situation where people slid in and out of legality;
subsequently, despite the permit system - or, perhaps more accurately, because of it
- they cycled in and out of the black market for migrant labor (Calavita 1998; Watts
2002).
With a large number of undocumented migrants, and a seeming inability to
streamline the immigration system, the Spanish government turned to periodic
regularizations - i.e. amnesties - for undocumented workers. However, once inside
of Spain, there was a second key policy question at hand: would - or could - new
immigrants become a part of civic life?
Citizenship
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Here, a clear distinction needs to be drawn between immigration law and
citizenship law. Because Spanish immigration law, like most EU countries, has
made freedom of movement among EU member states easier while making it
harder for outsiders to enter the country, it has come under fire for marginalizing
non-European immigrants. Kitty Calavita argued that Spanish immigration laws
"systematically marginalized Third World immigrants but do not stem their
immigration" (1998, 538). But in the 1990s, most of the Third World immigrants in
Spain were Moroccan migrant workers, and their numbers were still quite low. In
the 2000s, however, the composition of migration changed: Latin Americans came to
dominate immigration flows until the mid 2000s when Eastern Europeans began
arriving in large numbers. This distinction is important, because while migration
laws clearly favor Europeans, citizenship laws are not so black and white, and have
dramatically different implications for different groups of immigrants from poor
countries.
However, another distinction needs to be drawn here because it comes up in
the administration and debate around citizenship and residency laws in Spain: the
distinction between legal citizenship and political citizenship. Legal citizenship at
its most basic level is the right to carry the passport of a specific country. Political
citizenship refers to the right to participate in politics either as a voter, as an
elected official, or as a member of organized interest associations (Marshall 1964).
This distinction is key because unlike Ireland's universal approach to electoral
participation whereby any foreigner can register to vote, access to political life in
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Spain is contingent on migration status and country of origin. Therefore, I take a
more expansive view of citizenship when analyzing the Spanish case than the Irish
case because in Ireland - with the exception of national elections - legal citizenship
has no bearing on the exercise of political citizenship.
Incredibly, and despite both the restoration of democracy and an
unprecedented influx of foreigners over the last two decades, the changes to Spanish
citizenship laws have been minimal, and some of the few changes that made it into
law were not targeted at Spain's new arrivals, but rather addressed the issue of
Spaniards and their descendants living abroad. Like so much else, this turn to the
past was, in part, driven by civil war politics. However, migration flows were such
that they could not be ignored, prompting a number of regularizations. As
migration patterns began to change, the opportunities for citizenship that emerged
as part of Spaniards' attempts to reconcile their history began to converge with the
regularization of immigrants from beyond the European Union, thus opening a
pathway to citizenship for many - not all, but many - of Spain's new immigrants.
Citizenship, migration 'policy', and amnesty, 1982-2005
In Spain, citizenship-related issues were traditionally managed not through
constitutional law but civil law, with the Civil Code of 1889 guiding policy since its
inception. The two cornerstones of the legislation were 1) access to Spanish
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citizenship through one's parents (jus sanguinis) - critical, given Spain's high levels
of emigration - and 2) the ability of a child born on Spanish soil to foreign parents to
claim Spanish citizenship when they reached adulthood (a form of jus soli). Spanish
civil law also carried a residency requirement of ten years for immigrants to qualify
for Spanish citizenship. This state of affairs remained relatively unchanged for
most of the twentieth century, other than a Franco-era reform that allowed
emigrants to maintain their Spanish citizenship if they took dual citizenship in a
former colony of the Empire (EUDO 2012).
Not surprisingly, given the multiple issues at hand, citizenship was not high
on the agenda of Spain's political parties during the transition to democracy, and for
the first few years of its existence, Spain's nascent, modern democracy relied on 19th
century civil codes for its citizenship and migration laws. It was not until 1982 that
Spain underwent its first round of reforms aimed at nationality and citizenship
laws. It maintained the ten-year rule of residency in order to acquire citizenship,
but shortened this period to two years for citizens from places that had historical
ties to Spain: Andorra, Equatorial Guinea, and Latin America (Ley 51/1982, Art.
22). This was consistent with the established practice of treating countries with
which Spain had long-standing historical relationships differently when it came to
citizenship issues. In addition to the extension of citizenship rights outwards,
under the new law, anyone born within Spanish territory was entitled to citizenship
after one year. Therefore, the first reforms reflected principles of both jus soli and
cultural affinity in citizenship policy.
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In 1985, the PSOE proposed the Ley Organica sobre Derechos y Libertades de
los Extranjeros en Espana (Organic Law of Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in
Spain). At the time, Spain was under pressure from its neighbors for being a rather
porous entry point into the European Community. Subsequently, the PSOE's
immigration reforms were surprisingly harsh: visa requirements were imposed for
most non-European immigrants and undocumented workers would not have the
same right of assembly, access to education, or ability to join a union as natives or
even immigrants with papers (article 7, 9, 9 and 10). Interestingly, that same year,
and in the spirit of concertation, the Spanish government established the Consejo
General de la Emigracidn (General Council for Emigration) that was designed to
represent the interests of the over five million Spaniards (and their descendants)
that had left the country over the course of the twentieth century. For the Spanish
government, the biggest migration-related issue was still people leaving, not
entering.
Between 1985 and 2000, there were no major changes to Spanish citizenship
and nationality laws. However, there were major changes in the immigrant
population, which more than doubled during this time to just under a million
people. With few guidelines and few restrictions on movement, the undocumented
population grew, and in 1991, the Spanish government passed an amnesty whereby
108,000 people were granted residency permits. However, the same year, the
government also imposed visa requirements on the citizens of key sending states,
including Morocco. Spain also became a signatory to the Schengen Agreement,
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allowing freedom of movement within the European Union. Therefore, over the
course of the year, the government both opened access to the labor market and
residency for those already there, yet closed off access for 'non-favored' groups, a
process that would remain a common tension in negotiations over citizenship and
residency requirements.
Despite the lack of major legislative changes, the debates about the migration
issue, and the policies that were proposed (and rejected) were somewhat useful in
that they began to draw out the parties' different positions on migration. For the
PSOE, once EU requirements were met, the most important issue was that
immigration policy encouraged integration, and for them the best way to do that
was to insure that immigrants had legal standing. With legal residency,
immigrants could register on the Padron of the local Ayuntamiento (municipal
government), a process in Spain called empadronamiento. To register oneself
('empadronarse') meant that an individual could have access to local state-run
medical services and could register their children for school. Being on the padr6n
also gave local officials a headcount with which to make budget decisions, and gave
national officials an idea of population changes between census periods. However,
even more important than municipal registration was the fact that proof of
residency was required for citizenship, and appearing on the Padrdn was a way to
log the reality of one's presence in the eyes of the state. While much of the public
debate around amnesties was about immigrants and the labor market, the ability to
establish residency was essentially the first step on the pathway to citizenship -
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hence why it was so contested. Finally, in addition to Spain's new labor migrants,
the PSOE was concerned about the citizenship rights of Spaniards who had left the
country since the 1930s, many under political or economic duress.
The Spanish right had a different view on immigration, but they were also in
a period of transition. Under Franco, nationality law mattered insomuch as it
maintained cultural and legal ties to the countries of the former empire. However,
the modern realities of Spain's modernizing economy refocused the right's attention
inwards. In 1989, the Partido Popular (Popular Party, heretofore referred to as the
PP or 'Populares'), was formed out of the remnants of Adolfo Suirez's now-defunct
UCD, and it quickly staked out its position on both the citizenship and the
migration issue. Like the Republican party in the United States, the PP faced
internal tension between the law-and-order wing of the party and the business
wing: undocumented migration was bad for state security, but good for securing
cheap, pliable workers. The PP was also mindful of EU directives: having ushered
Spain into the euro zone, its leaders often looked to see what their neighbors were
doing in regards to immigration, and then used these practices as a model for
incorporative activity (or restrictive policy) at home.
The smaller parties also staked out their positions during this time. Notably,
the IU and the PNV were very supportive of both immigration and access to legal
and political citizenship, and during the 1990s, both parties issued legal
propositions in the Congreso in order to address their concerns about migration.
These propositions - officially listed as a "Proposici6n de ley de Grupos
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Parlamentarios" are a particularly useful tool for gaining insight into the political
thought process of Spanish parties because they require an "explanation of motives"
at the start of the Proposition, followed by a detailed proposal of changes to the law.
For the IU, the fundamental problem with Spanish migration and citizenship law
was the issue of equal rights:
Equal rights are what ought to be the fundamental base of a democratic society. To
deprive fundamental rights to people who live in a stable way in our territory for
reasons of origin would be to put in question one of the basic principles of the
democratic system... 168
Subsequently, the IU proposed in 1998 that immigrants with three years of
residency be allowed to vote in municipal elections.
The recognition of the right to active and passive suffrage for the municipal elections
for those people that demonstrate their willingness to continue living in one of the
Spanish municipalities would be the greatest demonstration of affirmation that
citizens and foreigners belong to the same community, demonstrating, in this way,
the intention to be guided by the principle of integration of all inhabitants of the
territory of the Spanish state. 169
The PNV and the IU also both called for a reduction in the residency period
in order to qualify for citizenship (Marin et. al. 2012).
On political and ideological grounds, this convergence would appear to be
quite puzzling: the IU is a left-wing party composed of the remnants of the PCE and
other groups with historical ties to the far-left radicals of the 1930s Republican
movement, while the PNV is a Christian Democratic party that has maintained
close ties to the Catholic Church and Basque businessmen. In other words, these
two parties are on opposite sides of some of Spain's historic cleavages. Yet there are
168 Cortes de Espaia, Proposici6n de Ley (1998), 175-1.
" Cortes de Espaia, Proposici6n de Ley (1998), 176-1.
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two key factors that unite these parties. First was their support for the short-lived
Republican government in the 1930s. Second was their experience of repression
under the Franco regime: the Basques were crushed and their language and culture
outlawed, while the ranks of the far left-wing were decimated by "red purges", with
partisans subject to ritual public humiliation, forced labor, and death squads. For
the IU, support for the political equality of immigrants was entirely consistent with
both the current mission of the party and its historic ties to the republican
movement of the 1930s:
The United Left is a Social and Political Movement that is formed in a legal
organization and politically sovereign, whose objective is to gradually transform the
capitalist system into a democratic socialist system, based on the principles of
justice, equality, solidarity and respect for nature and organized in accordance with
a social and democratic State of federal and republican law.17 0
Therefore, having been the victims of some of the worst intolerance of the
twentieth century, the PNV and IU did their best to put a tolerant face on policies
affecting Spain's new outsiders, namely immigrants.171 And not only did they
support thee policies in the Cortes, but the PNV and IU also worked closely together
on developing institutions within the Basque Country to facilitate incorporation,
including a multi-party forum (foro) to discuss migration-related policy and an
observatorio, an independent statistical agency linked to a local university with a
170 The party mission statement is available on its website: http://www.izguierda-
unida.es/laorganizacion [accessed July 2013].
171 For an in-depth discussion of incorporative activity within the Basque Country, see
Sanjay Jeram, "Immigration and Minority Nationalism: The Basque Country in
Comparative Perspective." PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2012.
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mandate to 1) monitor migration flows and issues in a non-partisan way and 2)
issue reports that could then be used by policymakers to respond to issues.172
While none of the main proposals of the 1990s made it into law, the public
debate around them did lead to some administrative changes. In 1996, a royal
decree allowed for the regularization of over 25,000 applicants and lengthened the
time period for work permits, thus making it easier for immigrant workers to
maintain their legal status. In 1997, the government issued a resolution clarifying
that municipal governments (ayuntamientos) should register immigrants,
regardless of their migration status (BOE 1997 117/97). The main objective of the
resolution was to "dictate technical instructions to the municipal government", in
order to enhance data collection procedures for the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica
(INE), the National Institute of Statistics (Spain's census bureau), which was a
signatory.
The next major changes to citizenship and migration law happened in 1999
and 2000. In 1999, the PP was in the unfortunate position of being the largest
party in the Cortes, but unable to form a government majority. Therefore, the
PSOE was able to move a legal reform through the legislature in April of 2000 that
both made it easier to gain residency and join political organizations - in other
words, they widened the pathway to political citizenship. This legal overhaul
focused less on migration laws, and more on the process of integration, which was
now the main concern of the party. First, the law granted political citizenship to the
undocumented: the right to assemble, join a union, or strike to anyone, was granted
172 Both a foro and an observatorio were established at the national level in the 1990s.
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to all foreigners in Spain "sin necesidad de autorizaci6n" ("without the need for
authorization", Articles 7, 8, 11). In addition, it took an expansive view of family
reunification, making allowances not only for spouses, but for whatever other family
member whose presence in Spain could be justified 'for humanitarian reasons'
(Article 17.e).
The PP was strongly opposed to the new law, and after winning an absolute
majority in the Cortes that year, they set about overturning key aspects of it. The
first objection was to granting universal political citizenship; for the PP, these were
rights that should be reserved for those who had legal status. Subsequently,
Articles 7, 8 and 11 were revised to add that the rights of individual immigrants
"could be exercised when they obtain authorization or residence in Spain". 173
Second, in changing some of the text, the revised legislation made note of Spain's
obligations to its European partners: reminders that Spain was subject to "the
provisions of special laws and international treaties" were emphasized throughout
the text [Article 1.2]. Finally, the extension of family reunification was restricted to
more immediate family members. Yet despite these limitations, the PP made a
clear commitment to political and social incorporation: it reaffirmed the
constitutional clause that the state had some responsibility for the promotion of
civic participation, and the PP took this to mean that "public authorities" should try
to strengthen immigrant NGOs in order to "promote social integration" (Article 69).
It also explicitly recognized the role of the Foro (Forum for the Social Integration of
173 Ley Organica, 8/2000, Article 7.
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Immigrants) in the process of political incorporation, and dubbed it "the organ of
consultation, information and advice on the integration of immigrants" (Article 70).
The PSOE was not impressed. First, the Socialists were upset because they
thought that the restrictions in the law would create a situation that would require
another massive amnesty in the future. However, they were also disturbed by the
fact that Aznar refused to work with the PSOE in order to form a social pact on the
immigration issue - a clear deviation from the approach to big social problems in
the 1970s and 1980s (PSOE 2002). While they did not have much of a leg to stand
on for the latter, given their changes pushed through in the 4/2000 version of the
legislation, they were right about the former: the PP approved two amnesties: one
in 2000 that regularized 200,000 immigrants, and another a year later that
regularized 230,000 (Sabater and Domingo 2010).
In 2004, in the wake of the Madrid bombings, the PSOE made a surprise last-
minute surge and won the general elections. 174 That year alone, the number of
immigrants in Spain increased by an additional 500,000, and the government came
under growing pressure from a variety of political and social actors to enact another
mass amnesty. The Guardian reported that both trade unions and employers
supported the amnesty program, with one employer telling the paper that "he was
174 On March 11, 2004, several bombs went off across the Madrid commuter rail like, killing
191 people and wounding over 1,800 more. The attacks were initially attributed to ETA,
but Moroccan Islamic extremists were later charged with the crime. The bombings are
widely credited with changing the course of the general elections, which took place three
days later: while the PP was polling ahead of the PSOE before the bombings, the PP's
handling of the bombing, and Aznar's insistence that the perpetrators were Basques,
despite growing evidence to the contrary, swung the elections to the PSOE in the last hours
before ballots were cast.
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pleased to be taking his workers out of the black economy. 'I'm very happy with
them,' he said. "I'll hire as many immigrants as possible... they are punctual and do
what they set out to do"'.17 5 The PP, now in opposition, bitterly opposed a further
regularization despite the fact that they themselves had legalized close to 500,000
workers during their eight years in power. Over their objections the amnesty was
approved, and in 2005 over 700,000 immigrants applied to regularize their status.
Garcia Lorca's dead and the citizenship question
With the amnesty behind them, the focus of the citizenship debate - to the
extent that one existed - again shifted outside of Spanish borders. In 2006, the
government passed the Estatuto de la ciudadania espahola en el exterior (Statute of
Spanish citizenship in the Exterior) that granted a series of social and political
rights to Spanish emigrants, including the right to participate in elections, access to
pensions, and assistance to return to Spain. A report by the European Union
Democracy Observatory notes that the government took up the issue at the behest
of the General Counsel for Emigration (the organization established in the 1980s).
While this statute addressed how to help Spanish citizens and their descendants
living abroad, it did not really address the question of how or where their
citizenship rights could or would be exercised, or why they left in the first place.
And as Spain's democracy consolidated, and its citizens grew more confident in its
durability, fewer people were willing to maintain the pacto de olvido regarding the
175 Giles Tremlett, "Spain grants amnesty to 700,000 migrants", Guardian (UK) 8 May
2005.
317
conditions under which hundreds of thousands of people fled the country in the
1930s and the early years of the dictatorship.
In late 2006, the PSOE government proposed a Ley de Memoria Histdrica, the
Law of Historical Memory. The law was meant to address issues relating to the
Spanish civil war and the victims of the Franco regime, and it included a citizenship
component: anyone whose family members were forced to flee the country due to
political persecution after the fall of the Second Republic was eligible to apply for
Spanish citizenship. Informally dubbed the Ley de Nietos ('Law of the
Grandchildren'), the legislation explicitly referred to the need to make whole those
families that had "lost their fatherland". Whereas any movement to offer redress -
in any form - to victims of the Franco regime and their families was always going to
be controversial due to the pacto de olvido, the Ley de Nietos was particularly
radical because it granted citizenship on the basis of historical political
membership, rather than simple blood ties. It also granted this citizenship without
the applicant ever having set foot in Spain.
The proposal caused a firestorm. The Partido Popular was outraged, arguing
that the PSOE, and in particular the party leader Jos6 Luis Rodriguez Zapatero,
was reopening old wounds at the risk of dividing the country. Jos6 Maria Aznar,
now out of government, complained that the PSOE was violating the "constitutional
pact" that was the basis for the last thirty years of Spain's progress (EFE 2007).
However, the PNV and the IU (along with the CiU and the Canary Coalition, or CC)
supported the legislation in the Cortes, and with the passage of the law, over
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500,000 people applied for Spanish citizenship. 176 However, the strong reaction to
the proposal suggested that the scars of the civil war still ran deep; the question of
immigration, while contentious, carries nowhere near the level of emotion or anger
that these old battles spark amongst Spaniards.
Conclusion
Despite significant social, economic and political changes over the years,
Spanish citizenship laws have been remarkably consistent: the government -
whether run by the PP or the PSOE - favors those who have historic ties to Spain,
and everyone else has to be a legal resident for a number of years to be able to
apply. Most attempts to lessen the residency requirement - pushed primarily by the
IU - have not received support from either the PSOE (when in government) or the
PP, and have therefore not made it through the Cortes to become law. Where the
PSOE has decided to taken up the issue of easier access to citizenship, it has been
in opposition to the PP.
On the other hand, Spain's migration laws have been quite turbulent.
Spain's immigration 'policy' - whether proposed by the PSOE or the PP - has
essentially been to run a mass regularization every few years, with the party in
government arguing that the best way to integrate immigrants into Spanish society
is to bring them out of the shadows, and the other party arguing that this amounted
to an open-door policy and would just lead to chaos. Even when they seem to be on
176 Miguel Gonzalez, "Espafia suma casi 250.000 nuevos nacionales gracias a la 'ley de
nietos'," El Pats March 30 2012, online at:
http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2012/03/30/actualidad/1333132776 885506.html.
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opposite sides of the same issue, the PSOE and PP often reach a similar outcome:
the special treatment of Latin Americans under Spanish citizenship law (and
conversely, Spaniards and their descendants living in Latin America) has been
maintained because it has at varying times suited the political objectives of both the
political right (ties to the former empire, cultural compatibility of the immigrant
population), and of the political left (reparations for the Civil War and exile).
This stability has seemingly locked non-'favored' immigrants out of a
pathway to citizenship. However, the implications of this approach have changed
over time as the composition of migration flows has changed. Since 1986, Spain
has approved six amnesties. To the extent that immigrants could avoid falling into
undocumented status again (a serious problem in the 1990s), amnesties provided a
pathway to citizenship. But this pathway depended largely on an immigrant's
country of origin. As Spanish parties on the right and left moved to tighten their
relationship with Latin America, the pathway to citizenship for immigrants from
this critical sending region eased considerably, from five years to two years - the
length of some work permits. Over time this meant that a rising number of
immigrants were eligible for citizenship: while immigration figures in the 1990s
were dominated by retired Europeans, and North African agricultural workers were
the second-largest immigrant group, in the 2000s Latin Americans came to
dominate, and by 2006, they made up close to a third of all immigrants in Spain
[Table 2]. Therefore, in comparison to the 1990s, when studies of migration law in
Spain lamented the fact that people from'Third World' countries were being
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excluded, changes in both citizenship law and the composition of migration flows
mean that immigrants from the largest group of developing country sending states
will have access to Spanish citizenship - as long as the labor market is stable
enough to support the maintenance of a work permit and residency.
These changes were not universally popular. The frequency of government
amnesties and the shortening of the pathway to citizenship for some of Spain's
largest sending states for migrants deeply alarmed the PP. However, they also
alarmed migrant rights organizations. The automatic right to residency and access
to the labor market for European immigrants, and the relative ease with which
Latin Americans could gain access to citizenship meant that there were clear
emerging - and hardening - hierarchies of migration status. In 2006, the year after
the last major amnesty, EU and Latin American immigrants were almost 70% of
the migrant population. EU citizens do not need Spanish citizenship to work or
gain residency, and Latin Americans have an accelerated naturalization process.
This still leaves a large chunk of the immigrant population who face a long road to
citizenship: Spanish law still requires ten years of residency for 'non-favored'
immigrants in order to be eligible for citizenship. Sub-Saharan African immigrants
are particularly disadvantaged, even by the amnesty system: because so many of
them make a living as manteros, the street vendors who sell bootleg DVDs and fake
designer handbags on blankets laid along the sidewalks of Spain's major cities, they
find it difficult, if not impossible, to collect and provide the kind of documentation
necessary to qualify for the amnesty programs. The one bright spot in this situation
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is the fact that the children of immigrants who are born in Spanish territory are
eligible for citizenship after one year. Therefore, while the road to citizenship may
be long for the parents, there will not be legal or institutional barriers to the civic
inclusion of their children - a problem that plagues many other European countries.
That said, what makes the citizenship debate in Spain interesting,
particularly in comparison to other European countries, is that it has by and large
been more about who immigrants are, rather than who they are not. Unlike
Austria, Switzerland, or France, you will not hear mainstream political parties in
Spain making claims that equate to "Spain for the Spaniards". This is in part due
to the fact that it is not clear what this would even mean in a country that has such
a contested history over this very question. But it is also in part attributable to
historical memory, and the dangerous path that acting 'in the name of the Spanish
nation' - or more recently, acting in the name of the Basque nation - led to: in one
case, a civil war and four decades of dictatorship, and in the other, a violent
separatist movement that not only carried out appalling murders in the name of
Euskal Herria (the term for the greater Basque community in both Spain and
France), but dampened free speech and full engagement in Basque civil society for
decades. In a country where there is still a living memory of the fascist chant
"Espafia! Una! Espafia! Grande! Espafia! Libre!" ('Spain, one, great, and free'), there
is not a great deal of political tolerance for an overtly nationalistic approach to
citizenship and immigration policy - or the unilateral imposition of these policies
without consultation.
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To some extent, this may be changing. Both the PSOE and the PP accuse
each other of violating the norm of consultation that was traditionally central to
addressing major policy issues. But despite their bickering, neither of Spain's two
largest parties have been able to make radical changes to either citizenship or
migration policy while in office, and it is not clear why or how this would change in
the future, especially as citizenship law is civil rather than constitutional, meaning
that it would be quite easy for whoever won the next election to quickly overturn
any change that had not been made with full buy-in and support from the other
parties (as proven by the PP in 2000). In addition, Spain's system of proportional
representation means that the PP and PSOE usually have to go into coalition with
one of the smaller parties in order to form a government - and as we have seen, two
of the three smaller parties, the IU and the PNV, are relatively liberal on
immigration matters. While it is hard to imagine that the left-wing IU would ever
go into government with the right-wing PP, the PNV has gone into government with
both the PSOE and the PP; therefore both parties have to deal with the likelihood of
a moderate partner in government when it comes to immigration policy.
Electoral Politics and Incorporative Activity
By 2006, the foreign-born population of Spain had reached over 4.5 million
people - nearly 10% of the population - and there were growing questions about the
role of Spain's immigrant population in civic life. This was a particularly timely
issue coming on the heels of the massive 2005 regularization. Some provisions
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existed to allow migrant access to electoral politics: like all EU member states,
Spain granted local voting rights to other EU citizens. With large numbers of
Germans and British retirees along the Mediterranean coast, and a growing
number of Romanians across the country, this meant that approximately 34% of the
foreign-born population was eligible to vote in municipal elections. 177 However,
Spain's largest immigrant groups, Latin Americans and Moroccans, were still shut
out of electoral politics if they did not have citizenship.
With these demographic changes in mind, in 2006 the lU-ICV178 filed an
official proposition in the Congreso, the lower house of the Spanish legislature, to
extend local voting rights to non-EU immigrants as well. Surprisingly, this proposal
was not so far-fetched: Article 13 of the Spanish constitution makes reference to the
political rights of non-citizens:
1. Aliens shall enjoy the public freedoms guaranteed by the present Title,
under the terms to be laid down by treaties and the law
2. Only Spaniards shall be entitled to the rights recognized in Article 23,
except in cases which may be established by treaty or by law concerning the
right to vote and the right to be elected in municipal elections, in accordance
with the principle of reciprocity.17 9
At issue, however, was the question of 'reciprocity': this seemed to suggest that if
other countries granted voting rights to Spaniards, their citizens would have the
same rights in Spain. Because there are few countries outside of the European
177 Here I use the number of EU-27 citizens over the age of twenty as the pool of eligible
voters. The data is from 2007 and from the INE website.
178 The IU-ICV is the coalition of the Izquierda Unida (United Left) and the Iniciativa per
Catalunya Verds (Catalonia Greens Initiative).
179 [Article 13.1-2, italics added. Article 23 states that: "Citizens have the right to
participate in public affairs, directly or through representatives freely elected in periodic
elections by universal suffrage. They likewise have the right to access on equal terms to
public office, in accordance with the requirements determined by law".
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Union that allow for non-citizen voting - New Zealand, the best-known example, is
not a major sending states for immigrants to Spain! - this meant that the Spanish
government would have to negotiate bilateral agreements with key sending states
to ensure that their citizens could vote in Spain and vice versa.180
Given these parameters, and the uncertainty around how far these rights
could actually be extended, the IU-ICV asked for the legislature to 1) secure
bilateral agreements with the largest sending states, 2) obtain legal clarification on
the reciprocity issue, and 3) sign and ratify a 1992 European convention that
supports the participation of immigrants in civic life.181 Yet even this proposal
mentioned the special position of Latin Americans, noting that the government
should not only pursue bilateral agreements with the major sending countries, but
"especially with those like the Latin American countries, with whom we have
greater historical, cultural and affective ties" (pg. 18).
The IU-ICV proposal found enormous support among immigrant-serving
NGOs, and many launched public campaigns in support of the right to vote for all
immigrants. The trade unions not only supported voting rights for immigrants, but
went beyond the proposal to demand voting rights regardless of reciprocity. The
UGT went so far as to call for local voting rights after two years of residency and
national voting rights after five years of residency; the latter would allow 'non-
180 New Zealand and Uruguay both allow for universal non-citizen voting rights for all
elections, but Uruguay has a fifteen year waiting period.
181 Congreso de los Diputados, "Proposici6n no de Ley presentada por los Grupos
Parlamentos Socialista del Congreso y de Izquierda Unida-Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds,
sobre la extension del derecho a voto, en last elecciones municipals, a los extranjeros
residents legales," 162/000509, num. 428 (2006).
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favored' immigrants that had to wait for ten years to naturalize to have access to
political citizenship while waiting for legal citizenship. 182 However, there were
concerns among NGOs that the government would not be able, for constitutional
reasons, to sign agreements with all major sending countries: the structure of
Article 13 meant that citizens of non-democracies living in Spain would not ever be
eligible for voting rights as a non-democratic government was unlikely to grant
Spaniards local voting rights. Given the composition of Spain's immigrant
population, this was no minor omission: almost 15% of Spain's immigrants were
from Morocco alone, and close to 30% of the immigrant population hailed from
African or Asian countries where these kinds of reciprocal agreements were unlikely
for political reasons.183 Given all of the concern in Europe about alienation and a
lack of incorporation amongst second-generation Muslim immigrants, it seems odd
and counterproductive that Spain's second-largest immigrant group, which also
happened to be Muslim, did not have the right to vote.
After some dithering before the 2007 round of municipal elections where
they decided that there was not enough time to make the necessary arrangements,
in 2008 the PSOE government announced the appointment of a Special
Ambassador, Gonzalo de Benito Secades, to negotiate the necessary bilateral
agreements with key sending states whose constitutions made them eligible to
grant non-citizen voting rights. However, because the Spanish constitution was so
182 'CCOO y UGT piden que puedan votar los inmigrantes con 5 anlos en Espafia," El
Periddico de Cataluha, August 22 2006.
183 For example, the majority of Asians in Spain are Chinese, and as China is not a
democracy, reciprocity would be impossible. According to the INE, the Chinese were the
sixth largest immigrant group in Spain in 2012, with a population of 170,839.
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vague on the issue, there was some concern that the PSOE initiative was
unconstitutional. Jesus QuilIjano, a PSOE spokesman, admitted that the
government's interpretation of the law was "amplia y flexible" ("broad and flexible"),
but insisted that the main motivation of the party was to insure that political
inclusion in Spain's democracy was maximized.184
This move was met with some skepticism. The IU, normally close working
partners with the PSOE on migration-related matters, grumbled that the Socialists
were just rehashing their proposal that they put forward two years ago. Back then,
the largest Catalan nationalist party, CiU, was adamantly opposed to the proposal,
arguing that Catalonia "is not in a position to give political rights" and that the plan
was "irresponsible"; in contrast, the ICV (Catalonia's Green Party), called this
position "xenophobic and ethnocentric". 185 The response from the PP was mixed,
largely for political reasons. On a trip to Berlin to meet with Angela Merkel ahead
of the Spanish general election scheduled for March 2008, Mariano Rajoy, the
national leader of the party, stated that he opposed extending the right to vote to
anyone, but would be open to some kind of common plan of integration with the rest
of Europe to allow for immigrant political rights.186 However, this was contrary to
what some PP officials were saying at the municipal level - i.e. the level at which
184 "El Congreso ratifica nueve de los convenios que podrian sumar 650.000 electores
inmigrantes en las municipals de 2011," Europa Press online, October 29 2009. Available
at: http://www.europapress.es/epsocial/politica-social/noticia-congreso-ratifica-nueve-
convenios-podrian-sumar-650000-electores-inmigrantes-municipales-20 11-
20091029152736.html.
185 "Para CiU, el voto inmigrantes amenaza el proyecto de pals Cataluia," 20minutos.es,
August 21 2006.
186 Carlos E. Cu6, "Rajoy rechaza que los inmigrantes puedan votar en las municipales," El
Pais, February 14 2008.
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elections with migrant voters would be contested. Notably, Rajoy's great party rival
Esperanza Aguirre, the President of the Comunidad (Autonomous Community) of
Madrid, voiced her support for migrant voting rights when the original IU-ICV
proposal was launched in 2006.187
Why did the Socialist government choose to expend political energy on
extending migrant voting rights to these new groups? The PSOE insists that their
interest in migrant voters is because they see electoral participation as part of the
process of integration. Others have speculated that this was a political move on
their part, as British and the newly arrived Romanian immigrant populations - i.e.
EU citizens who were allowed to participate in municipal elections - were more
likely to vote for the PP due to their social conservatism (Zapata-Barrero and
Zaragoza 2009). However there was no way to know how Latin Americans would
actually vote before the elections, and some members of the PSOE worried that
after making a huge effort to grant migrant voting rights, socially conservative and
religious Latin American immigrants would then turn around and vote for the
right. These sentiments echoed those of left-wing parties in Ireland: although they
(like the IU) were extremely supportive of immigrant residency and citizenship
rights, and they also supported anti-racism efforts, some Irish party officials were
very worried about the religiosity of the immigrant population and the potential
effect on social policy should conservative migrants begin voting en masse.
Therefore, immigrant mobilization, especially after a recent change in the
187 This was likely no accident: in 2006, immigrants were 17% of the population of the
Comunidad de Madrid, compared to 9.4% of the overall population in Spain.
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population can be seen a relatively high risk, potentially low reward endeavor for
local parties, as they have little information at that point about immigrant voter
behavior. And in cases like Ireland and Spain, the stakes are even higher if the
historical tensions between religious groups and the secular left are still politically
salient. Therefore, it is difficult to attribute the behavior of the PSOE solely to the
attempt to seek political advantage vis-a-vis the PP, because at that time the PSOE
had no information on how new immigrant voters would behave.
After several months of negotiating, the PSOE was able to sign agreements
with Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Norway, New Zealand, Paraguay and Peru.
The PSOE also wanted agreements with Argentina and Uruguay, but there were
concerns that voting rights in these countries were not truly reciprocal: Uruguay
requires fifteen years of residency before non-citizens can vote, and Argentina does
not have universal non-citizen voting laws; instead, these rights are decided at the
regional level. The new agreements allowed for citizens of states with the newly
signed reciprocal agreements to vote in municipal elections if they had five years of
residency in Spain and were on their municipal Padr6n. 188 With the issue of
migrant voter eligibility set, the parties set out in order to recruit immigrant voters
and candidates.
The 2011 Local Elections
With the rules established, and over 68,000 city councilor positions up for
grabs, parties began recruiting both candidates and voters. Under Spanish
188 Citizens of the EU do not have this waiting period.
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electoral rules, voters had to register for the May 22nd elections by January 15th.
This split party efforts into two phases: voter registration efforts and then the
electoral campaign.
The PSOE distributed a series of pamphlets featuring close-ups of the faces of
immigrant voters. Inside, they laid out their rationale for why immigrants should
vote:
Register yourself in order to fight against racism and xenophobia!
Spain is also your country. Today you have the same obligations and rights. You
are able to vote. That is why you have to register in the electoral census and this
way to combat those who offer racism and xenophobia in order to try to win elections
You have to be inscribed in the census to vote! 189
According to party press releases, it registered over 50,000 new immigrant voters
for the 2011 cycle.
Unlike the PSOE, the PP was far less visible in terms of migrant voter
registration. However, once voter registration was complete, the PP kicked off its
election campaign with an April 2011 press conference in Madrid introducing many
of its immigrant candidates. The party simultaneously launched a video where an
array of candidates from different countries introduced themselves and talked about
why they joined the PP.190 In its press release announcing the event, the PP noted
that it "advocates a stable and orderly policy of immigration, whose basic principle
have to be legality, migration that accesses our country through legal channels and
with legal permission, an immigration related to employment, and maintaining
189 See Illustration 6.1 for an example of a voter registration pamphlet.
El PP presume candidatos inmigrantes," El Mundo, April 29 2011, video and article available online at:
htt ://wv.edmim d O.es/Clmundo/2(1/04/28/cspana /1304008184.itml.
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control of flows as a competency of the state".191 Yet despite this mano dura ('firm
hand') rhetoric, the press release goes on to call for a circular system of migration
whereby immigrants can move to and from Spain depending on economic conditions
without losing their residency and work permits - a huge issue for migrant workers
during the economic crisis. Therefore, the press release summed up the political
position of the Populares towards immigration: it needs to be legal, orderly, and
controlled by the state, but it must also serve the needs of the economy - which
requires that surplus migrant labor can seamlessly move in and out of the country
without too much bother once they have legal status.
In comparing the two major parties, whatever 'European Advantage' the PP
allegedly seemed to hold over the PSOE before the elections did not show up in the
candidate pool. Of the 430 immigrant candidates for the PP, 137 were British, 69
were Romanian, and 42 were German - collectively, that means that approximately
57% of the PP immigrant candidate pool consisted of EU citizens who had a right
both to run and vote under EU, not just Spanish law.192 However, according to
Pedro Zerolo, the PSOE's director of social mobilization for the Electoral Committee,
55% of their 586 candidates were European as well.193
191 "Rajoy presentari el pr6ximo jueves a diez candidatos inmigrantes del PP par alas
municipals", press release April 24 2011.
192 This is not to say that British and German support for the PP is universal - in 2007,
several British media outlets noted the rise of small political parties dominated by British
and German expats in coastal areas where there was a great deal of frustration with local
development run rampant and corruption (Wood 2007)
193 PSOE, "Zerolo: El PSOE es el partido que mas candidatos de origen extranjero
presenta," 11 May 2011 (Accessed online August 2013).
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Although the figures for immigrant candidates seemed quite low, the figures
for immigrant registration were much lower than expected. El Mundo reported that
only 45,554 of more than 350,000 potential voters from countries with reciprocal
agreements had registered to vote, a participation rate of 13%. By comparison
40.9% of eligible Europeans registered by January 28th (the extension deadline).
The low figures among 'treaty voters' were attributed to a number of factors,
including excess bureaucracy, modest voter registration campaigns, and a lack of
planning. Therefore, given both the relative novelty of migrant voting beyond the
British and German expat communities, and the low number of registered
immigrant voters, it is not surprising that there were not huge numbers of
immigrant candidates. The actions of the PP and PSOE should not be dismissed,
however: given that the Spanish economy in 2011 was in free fall, and
unemployment was at 21%, it is surprising, especially considering the regularity
with which European political parties make political hay out of demonizing
immigrants during economic downturns, that they so publicly supported migrant
candidates.
Interestingly, despite their support for migrant voting rights, Spain's smaller
parties were not as actively involved in migrant voter registration. This was
especially true in the Basque Country where there was a much bigger issue
looming: the inclusion of the newly formed abertzale political party Bildu in the
2011 elections. Although the PNV has dominated Basque politics since
democratization, parties affiliated with the izquierda abertzale have consistently
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garnered around 20% of the overall vote, with higher concentrations in Gipuzcoa. 194
However, these parties were not just linked to the abertzales, but to ETA, and
subsequently have been banned by the Spanish judiciary for being unconstitutional.
When the Constitutional Court initially ruled that they could not participate in the
elections, the Court reversed its decision on the first day of the campaign, and
despite this late start, Bildu went on to win over a quarter of the open seats.
Bildu was not the only new party on the scene. The Basque branch of the
group SOS Racismo, an anti-racism organization that is active across Spain and
France, launched their own party, Origi Etorri with the a central platform of
extending universal voting rights to all immigrants. Although they did not garner
electoral support, they did make their point: the Basque Country has a
disproportionately high percentage of African immigrants who, under current law,
have little hope of citizenship and no hope of local voting rights.
C. Capacity-building and Incorporation
Beyond citizenship and electoral issues, however, native Spanish actors were
also involved in capacity-building initiatives, both through direct financing of and
direct partnerships with migrant organizations.
State agencies and capacity-building
Here, the government has played a central role in establishing deliberative
bodies involving both natives and immigrants, and in financially subsidizing
194 Data on election outcomes comes from the INE.
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migrant-led and migrant-serving organizations. The 2007 Strategic Plan:
Citizenship and Immigration, developed by the office of the Minister of Labor and
Social Affairs, clearly lays out the government's position on both the goals of
immigration policy and the obligations of the state:
The central objective of the Strategic Plan is to contribute to the construction of a
just, inclusive, and cohesive society, in which the coexistence of all develops common
norms and values while respecting the diversity of individuals and social groups
(185).
The plan also specifically references Article 9.2 of the Spanish constitution which
states "It is the responsibility of the public authorities to promote conditions
ensuring that freedom and equality of individuals and of the groups to which they
belong are real and effective, to remove the obstacles preventing or hindering their
full enjoyment, and to facilitate the participation of all citizens in political,
economic, cultural and social life". Notably, the constitution does not specify which
public authorities should promote these conditions, it just offers that they should.
Interestingly, although the constitution refers to citizens, the PSOE government
chose to extend the constitutional remit to immigrants as well in the 2007 plan, and
the PP echoed Article 9.2 in its 8/2000 immigration law. Given both the
constitutional directive, and the structure of the Spanish state, perhaps it should be
no surprise that we see the emergence of a variety of consultative partnerships
involving state agencies, elected officials, social services and migrant-led
organizations at every level of the Spanish government (particularly at the
comunidad and municipal levels) that have bi-partisan support.
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In 1995, the PSOE government passed a decree forming the Foro para la
Integracidn Social Inmigrantes (Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants,
heretofore referred to as the 'Foro'). According to its website, the main objective of
the Foro is to "promote the participation and integration of immigrants in Spanish
society". 195 The forum brings together a number of migrant-led and native
organizations to 1) evaluate any piece of legislation that comes before the Cortes
related to migration, and 2) to issue a dictamen (opinion) on these proposals. There
are three groups with ten members in each group: 1) public administrators drawn
from both government ministries and the governments of the two largest
autonomous communities in terms of immigrant population (Madrid and
Catalonia), 2) immigrant associations from the largest non-Western European
sending states, and 3) social service organizations, including NGOs such as the Red
Cross, religious organizations, and labor unions.
The Foro seemingly has broad political support. Although the Socialists were
the ones who originally established it, when they tried to cut the budget in 2009, the
PP released a press statement criticizing the government for failing to maintain
spending that promoted integration, particularly given the economic crisis. 196 Given
its bipartisan support, it therefore appears that the Foro is a clear example of the
consultative approach still favored by Spanish political elites, despite the occasional
strains related to civil war issues.
195 Available at: http://extranjeros.empleo.gob.es/es/ForoIntegracion/2010-2013/.
196 "El PP exige la restituci6n del Fondo de Integraci6n de inmigrantes," press release March
24 2009.
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Bridge-building incorporative activities have not only been facilitated by the
creation of government deliberative bodies, but have been directly subsidized by it
as well. In 2005, the PSOE government set up the Integra program. Integra is a
part-forum, part-grant clearinghouse for community organizations that are either
migrant-led or that target migrant communities. Using a web-based platform,
immigrant or immigrant-serving organizations and municipalities, can apply for
government funding for integration programs. However, they can also use the
website as an information exchange: there are multiple chat rooms and forums
where groups can exchange information or tactics or just ask questions. Over the
years, the number of programs supported by Integra has increased significantly,
from 152 in 2005 to 307 in 2010. Although their funding was reduced in 2010 due
to the economic crisis, the program has remained in place, with an annual budget of
just under seven million euros.
Worker Organizations and Capacity-building
Spain's trade unions have, since the early days of migration, been interested
in the incorporation of immigrants. Sensing that opposing migration would be a
losing battle given that the state did not have complete control over migration flows,
Spanish unions decided to support more open migration policies in the hopes that
this would keep migrant workers out of the black market economy where they could
undercut Spanish workers (Watts 1998). Subsequently, both the CCOO and the
UGT have supported worker amnesties and migration reform.
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However, this assessment of the Spanish government's control over migration
flows raised a second, important issue for the unions: how could these workers be
channeled into labor organizations? Under the 1985 migration reforms,
undocumented workers were not allowed to be union members. In response, the
CCOO began to establish worker outreach centers called CITEs (Centros de
Informaci6n a Trabajadores Extranjeros). These centers offer advice on the labor
market, immigration, and other matters of importance to migrant workers, and
today there are over 130 throughout Spain. 197 According to their website, the
CCOO supports the CITEs because it seeks to improve the lives of workers
"independent of their national origin, ethnicity, ideology or beliefs".198 However,
archival records show that when the CITEs were established, the CCOO had hoped
that they would act as a gateway to union membership (CCOO 1998).
Unfortunately for the union this did not happen as immigrant membership still lags
far behind native membership in the union: only 6% of immigrants versus 16% of
citizens are unionized (Gorodzeisky and Richards, forthcoming). However, it speaks
well of the CCOO's commitment to immigrant incorporation that, despite the failure
of the CITEs to generate widespread membership, they have continued to both
expand and fund this program. It also speaks to their experience: for many years,
the CCOO also handled social services and offered transition assistance to Spanish
migrant workers outside of the country. Unfortunately, due to the economic
197 The UGT established a similar migrant outreach program through its 'Centros de
Informaci6n y Asesoramiento Sociolaboral para Inmigrantes'. However, their reach has
been more limited, with only 12 locations.
198 Available online at: http://www.ccoo.es/csccoo/Areas:Migraciones:CITEs.
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situation, it has resumed some of these activities, and in February 2012, it
announced that the CITEs would offer assistance to Spaniards looking to work in
other EU countries. 199
Despite these outreach programs, there is still some frustration in immigrant
communities over the unions' level of engagement. At a 2009 roundtable on
migrant workers in Madrid, several CCOO activists and non-union affiliated
migrant worker organizations stood up and berated union officials for not doing
more to both organize and protect migrant domestic workers. 200 Interestingly, the
anger of the native membership that is increasingly shared by immigrant workers
is in a way a form of integration: two months after the showdown over domestic
workers, union militants began launching counter-protests at CCOO and UGT-
sponsored marches and rallies in and around Madrid, with the objective of forcing
the unions to take a stronger position against the government austerity program. 201
Perhaps these shared frustrations among foreign and native workers when it comes
to Spain's trade union leadership is a sign that immigrants are indeed adopting the
values of their Spanish counterparts and directly integrating into combative union
politics.
Conclusion
199 "CCOO orientara a empleados que quieran marcharse a trabajar a Europa," El Pats
February 20 2012.
200 Field notes, October 2009.
201 I observed this phenomenon firsthand at a series of strikes and protests in Madrid
between November 2009 and February 2010. They are described in detail in the following
chapter.
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Incorporative activity in Spain is visible across multiple areas and from
multiple actors. While citizenship policy has remained relatively stable and closed
off to immigrants from countries that are not former colonies of Spain, both the
delayed jus soli birthright laws and the admittedly haphazard regularization
campaigns have opened up some opportunities for these 'third country' immigrants
to gain access to residency and citizenship. Despite the fact that a relatively low
number of immigrants registered, the extension of voting rights to non-EU
immigrants represented a very public effort to include immigrants in electoral
politics. Finally, both Spanish government agencies and worker organizations were
early adopters of consultative institutions that linked new immigrants to
policymakers, and gave immigrants a change to have their grievances heard by
political actors who were in a position to actually listen to and address their
problems.
Why has there been so much support for incorporative activity? The first
answer seems to lie in the structure of Spain's post-transition political institutions.
The formal institutions, in the form of the 1978 Constitution, gave the state the
mandate to support civic participation, and gave parties the means to pursue
incorporation: despite its relative silence on legal citizenship, the Constitution had
plenty to say about political citizenship - not surprising, given that this was the
primary concern of its architects. However, the informal institutions that arose
from the transition - political restraint and concertation - have also played a role in
shaping incorporative activity: not only is there little tolerance for political
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extremism (and this includes xenophobia), but the first instinct of parties and
unions in the early days of migration was to set up consultative institutions, linking
new immigrant communities to policymakers, bureaucrats, and political activists.
However, the second part of this equation seems to lie with the political
actors themselves. The groups that both suffered under the fascist government
and/or took on that government directly, at great risk, are the ones that today,
sometimes surprisingly, are the most vocal advocates for migrant civic inclusion:
the IU and its left-wing coalition partners and the center-right PNV. While pro-
immigrant left-wing parties are neither new nor surprising, the fact that a center-
right nationalist party can move in lockstep with former communists on
immigration matters speaks to their common commitment to inclusion borne of
their past experiences with exclusion. While left-wing Basque nationalist parties
have also been vocal in their support for migrant civic inclusion, their voices have
carried less weight in the policy process due to their relatively tenuous political
status. 202
The thread that binds these two mechanisms of incorporation - open
institutions and interested actors - together is historical memory. Spain's post-
Franco institutions are a direct result of the historical memory of the chaotic Second
Republic and fratricidal violence of the Civil War (Aguilar 1998). The historical
memory of repression, exclusion, and state violence shapes the outlook of Spain's
indigenous minority groups, most notably the Basques, and it acts as a check on the
202 This was the case until 2011. Given ETA's alleged cessation of activities, it would seem
that the Spanish judiciary would not have the grounds to ban abertzale parties from
electoral politics.
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behavior of the two largest parties. It also inoculates the general public against the
kinds of xenophobic political discourse so common across much of Western Europe
today. To reference the Garcia Lorca quote at the beginning of this chapter,
perhaps it is true that the dead in Spain are more alive than in any other country in
the world - and this living memory of the past political excesses that led to
thousands of roadside graves and shattered families scattered across the country,
acts as a firewall against the kind of rising extremism in response to migration that
is frighteningly common across much of the Mediterranean today.
This is not to say that the process of incorporation in Spain has been easy or
perfect. The biggest challenge to incorporation is the legal exclusion of Asian and,
in particular, African immigrants from straightforward access to residency and
citizenship. This is an urgent issue: young men from sub-Saharan Africa are by and
large politically, socially, and economically excluded from Spanish life, only entering
public consciousness when spotted playing cat-and-mouse with the police while
trying to sell pirated DVDs in the streets, or when photos of desperate young men
washed up on the shores of the Canary Islands are splashed across the front pages
of the newspapers. Given the experience of other marginalized immigrant groups in
Northern Europe, the current state of affairs seems to be a recipe for disaster. To
their credit, several parties and trade unions have pushed to extend both
citizenship and voting rights to these groups, but as of yet, to no avail. The fact
that they are even trying, however, once again speaks to Spain's difference when it
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comes to immigration - especially considering how their Irish counterparts have
made things increasingly difficult for African immigrants and their children.
IV. Conclusion
Given its astronomical unemployment rate, the rapid rate of change in the
level of migration, and its significant number of Muslim immigrants, Spain,
perhaps more than any other European country, would seem to be a prime breeding
ground for immigrant political exclusion and the rise of the kinds of far-right
parties that have enjoyed recent success in Greece, Austria, Switzerland and,
increasingly, Scandinavia. Yet this is not the case - quite the opposite in fact.
Clearly, 'Spain is different' - but why?
As with Northern Ireland, Spain shows that incorporative activity is possible,
even under difficult circumstances. Like Northern Ireland, Spain's formal political
institutions are the result of compromise after decades of violence and hatred. It
has native political actors who, having been past victims of discrimination,
repression and violence for their minority political beliefs or status, make a
particular effort to support policies that are both welcoming to and supportive of
Spain's new minorities, namely immigrants. And, as in the North, the weight of
history acts as both a guide for and constraint on political behavior. In other words,
through their own internal experiences with trying to accommodate minority
political demands and competing visions of state-society relations, Spanish political
actors developed a "toolkit", namely their "repertoire... of habits, skills, and styles
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from which people construct 'strategies of action' (Swidler 1986: 273) that they
were both willing and able to draw from in order to address a previously unknown
social and political challenge: the political incorporation of new immigrants. This
toolkit was developed independently of any experience with immigration, yet in
practice, Spain as a 'new destination' looks and behaves surprisingly like an 'old
destination'.
Despite these similarities there seem to be interesting and important
differences between Spain, Northern Ireland, and the Irish Republic. Why, despite
their origins as rural, conservative, Catholic political parties rooted in nationalism
did the PNV and Fianna Faiil end up so far apart on the immigrant question -
especially given the racist origins of the PNV? Why is it that the experience of
emigration seems to be more present in the political approach to immigration in
Spain rather than Ireland - especially given the scale of emigration in Ireland?
Why does the historical memory of violence in Spain act to constrain political actors,
while in Northern Ireland it seems to embolden extremists? And why, just as their
leaders are embracing the incorporation of immigrants into political life, are native
citizens of Spain and Northern Ireland increasingly rejecting the politics of said
leaders? These questions, and other puzzles that emerge from comparing
incorporative activity across these cases, will be addressed in the next and final
chapter.
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Table: 6.1
Immigrants as a Percentage of the Population, 1998-2012 (INE online
database)
Registered Migrants as a % of the
Year Migrants Population
1998 637,085 1.6%
1999 748,954 1.9%
2000 923,879 2.3%
2001 1,370,657 3.3%
2002 1,977,944 4.7%
2003 2,664,168 6.2%
2004 3,111,401 7.3%
2005 3,712,043 8.5%
2006 4,158,912 9.4%
2007 4,790,606 10.6%
2008 5,265,454 11.5%
2009 5,430,184 11.7%
2010 5,402,579 11.6%
2011 5,312,441 11.4%
2012 5,236,030 11.2%
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Table 6.2:
Key Sending Regions for Immigrants to Spain (INE 2005; MTIN 2007)
Region of Origin 1995 2002 2006
Central and South
America 18.6% 36.4% 35.1%
Western Europe 49.8% 24.8% 22.1%
Africa 19.1% 21.4% 23.6%
Rest of Europe 1.2% 10.7% 12.0%
Asia 7.7% 5.0% 6.5%
North America 3.2% 1.6% 0.6%
Rest of the World 0.4% 0.1% 0.1%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Top-10 Sending
Table 6.3:
Countries, 2002 and 2012 (INE)
Top Sending Countries
2002 2012
Country Population Country Population
Ecuador 390,297 Romania 798,970
Morocco 378,979 Morocco 771,632
United
Colombia 244,684 Kingdom 312,959
United
Kingdom 161,507 Ecuador 309,777
Romania 137,347 Colombia 245,835
Germany 130,232 China 170,839
Argentina 109,445 Bolivia 180,681
France 69,930 Germany 153,568
Italy 65,396 Bulgaria 151,475
Portugal 56,672 Portugal 121,271
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Figure 6.1:
Unemployment, 1976-2013 (INE)
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Figure 6.2:
Unemployment and Immigrants as a % of the population, 1998-2012 (INE)
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Illustration 6.1: Election Materials
6.1a: Voter registration instructions, produced by the MTIN
I nscribete
en el censo electoral
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6.1b Voter registration pamphlet produced by the PSOE
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion
And if a stranger sojourn with thee in your land, ye shall not vex him. But the stranger that
dwelleth with you shall be unto you as one born among you, and thou shalt love him as
thyself; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt: I am the LORD your God.
- Leviticus 19:33-34
Over the last two decades, patterns of migration both to and within Europe
have changed significantly - today, countries that were labor-exporting states are
now countries of immigration. Despite the similar socioeconomic context of
migration and the timing of migratory flows, there has been significant variation in
the response to migration from native political actors, most notably parties: in some
cases, the pathway to citizenship has been widened, migrant votes have been
courted, and both governments and NGOs have established strategic and financial
partnerships in order to help build the capacity of migrant communities to make
their own demands directly on the state. In other cases, however, access to
citizenship has been restricted, migrant voters ignored, and partnerships have been
both limited and unstable. What accounts for this variation?
Using Spain, Ireland and Northern Ireland as comparative cases, and
focusing on the historical political development of these new destination societies, I
find that differences in how native political actors in receiving countries respond to
immigrants in the present are due to how they have settled internal social conflicts
over the political exclusion of native minority groups - whether ethnic, religious, or
political - in the past. In Ireland, open civic institutions were not the result of
broader social and political debates, but rather were largely administrative
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maneuvers to manage the Republic's relationship with the United Kingdom and
Northern Ireland, the British minority living in post-independence Ireland, and the
free movement of people within the British Isles. Subsequently, when confronted
with new immigration, the Irish government curtailed many of these open
institutions. And although migrant-serving organizations and institutions were
established early on, without a powerful mobilized domestic constituency deeply
vested in their survival, they were vulnerable to budget cuts and retrenchment,
leaving new immigrants with limited state support for access to civic life, and
increasingly limited access to citizenship. Therefore, despite its (accidently) open
civic institutions that were in existence when immigration began to gain steam in
the 1990s, by the end of the 2000s, many Irish political actors had sharply retreated
from taking on the task of incorporation.
Given Spain's astoundingly high levels of unemployment and Northern
Ireland's history of bloody sectarian violence, at first glance we would not expect to
see much incorporative activity at all, particularly in comparison to relatively
prosperous and stable Ireland. However, it is this history of past conflict that
explains present-day incorporative activity. Past conflicts over the demands by
political and ethnic minorities for greater political inclusion led to violence and
repression, but eventually reform. These reforms codified into law many of the
demands from these previously marginalized groups, namely equal access to
political life for all and protection of minority political rights. With new
immigration, these open institutions inadvertently created opportunities for
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immigrant newcomers to be included in political life as well. In contrast to Ireland,
however, they stayed open because the groups that originally fought for their
adoption continued not only to keep a watchful eye over their maintenance for their
own self-benefit, but moved to repurpose them in order to offer protection to
immigrants, who were seen as a fellow marginalized group.
Taken together, my findings suggest that societies with a legacy of social
conflict may be better positioned than their more tranquil counterparts to take on
the task of incorporation. Social conflicts involve disagreement over not only laws,
but our understanding of those laws, and therefore can become a clash of competing
social and political narratives. The resolution of these conflicts, and the codification
of a new narrative into law, leaves societies with both formal (legal structures) and
informal (social narratives) institutions with which they can both understand and
address minority political exclusion. However, it also leaves societies with well-
organized and politically savvy minority rights advocates. These groups benefit
directly from the existence of open civic institutions, and are willing to take action
to defend them. However, their past experiences with political marginalization
means that they are also willing to defend the interests of other marginalized
groups - in this case, new immigrants. Therefore, social conflict may leave new
destination societies with minority-friendly institutions, advocates for marginalized
minority groups, and dominant social narratives that legitimize the inclusion of 'out'
groups in civic life - the very attributes that facilitate political incorporation in 'old'
destinations. Without these institutional and behavioral legacies of conflict and
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compromise, new destinations may struggle with immigrant political incorporation,
for political elites may have no real 'toolkit', namely the "repertoire... of habits,
skills, and styles from which people construct 'strategies of action"' (Swidler 1986:
273), to draw from in order to address the incorporation of newcomers into civic life.
These findings, and some of the questions they raise, also suggest
opportunities for a future research agenda that turns our attention from the
behavior of natives to the behavior of newcomers who face numerous obstacles to
political and economic incorporation in the twenty-first century, including a growing
number of restrictions on the movement of labor across international borders
(particularly from developing to post-industrial economies) and rising income
inequality and declining social mobility in receiving societies that may have a
disproportionate effect on low-skill immigrants in the service economy.
This chapter proceeds in five sections. Section one provides an overview of
my empirical findings. Section two outlines some of the theoretical and policy
implications of the argument. Section three discusses some of the limitations of the
study, and Section four highlights future areas of research. Section five offers a
brief conclusion.
I. Empirical Findings
The main empirical findings for this project support the theoretical argument
I put forth in Chapter 3. At first glance, Ireland, with its immigrant-friendly
electoral laws and jus soli citizenship policy, seemed to present a best-case scenario
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for incorporative activity. However, these open civic institutions were a historical
legacy of British rule and partition: they were either left in place after
independence, or implemented in order to deal with the remaining Anglo-Irish in
the Republic or the remaining Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland. In addition, the
largest minority group in Ireland in the run-up to independence, namely
Protestants, was largely "drawn away" in the 1920s, with Ireland's partition into a
predominately Catholic south and a predominately Protestant north. Subsequently,
when confronted with new immigration in the late 1990s, and its acceleration in the
2000s, it was relatively easy for the government to roll back many of the
institutional and organizational initiatives that either inadvertently benefited new
immigrants (jus soli citizenship rights) or that were deliberately set up in response
to migration in order to both monitor migration and to help facilitate incorporation
(the NCCRI and the Office of the Minister for Integration being the two prime
examples). In Ireland's case, open civic institutions were not enough to facilitate or
maintain incorporative activity: without powerful and vested native actors who
could protect them from budget cuts and retrenchment, and no broader historical
narrative that legitimized the inclusion of immigrants in civic life, the Irish
government was able to both restrict the pathway to citizenship and eliminate
capacity-building organizations and institutions with surprising ease.
Northern Ireland's reputation as a hotbed of intolerance, sectarianism, and
political violence make it a seemingly unlikely case for observing incorporative
activity. Yet it is this very legacy of conflict that has equipped parties, unions, and
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voluntary associations to reach out to new immigrants. In Northern Ireland,
demands from the beleaguered Catholic minority for greater political inclusion in
the 1960s presented a clear challenge to Protestant political and economic
hegemony. Rising tensions led to months of escalating skirmishes between
Catholics and Protestants and between Catholics and the police until in 1969 the
region collapsed into three decades of bloody sectarian conflict. As the fighting
dragged on, it became increasingly clear to many of the key protagonists that the
existing civic institutions were neither fit for purpose nor sustainable in the long-
term, and that there would need to be changes that would allow for the political
inclusion and representation of the Catholic minority. There was also a need to
establish a democratic means to settle broader political disputes over Northern
Ireland's political status and its relationship with both the UK and the Republic of
Ireland. The Good Friday Agreement of 1998, and the Northern Ireland Act (1998)
institutionalized a new legal and electoral framework that made cross-community
policy consultation mandatory, and that allowed for the formation and
representation of multiple political parties, both sectarian and neutral, in the
legislature. However, these agreements also institutionalized the dominant social
narratives of the civil rights movement: the idea that all people in Northern
Ireland, regardless of their religious or ethnic background, should have parity of
esteem before the law. Therefore by the late 1990s, Northern Ireland had some of
Europe's strongest laws protecting the rights of minorities, and its legal and
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administrative codes emphasized good community relations and equal treatment of
all as fundamental values of both the state and the political system.
The conflict in Northern Ireland not only affected institutions, but it also had
an impact on individuals and communities. When confronted with exclusion in the
1950s and 1960s, Catholic civil rights activists adopted the 'toolkit' of the civil
rights movement in the U.S., deploying a narrative of inclusive political citizenship,
and using the repertoire of non-violent protest as the means to press their demands.
During the peace process, community activists demanded that the state have a
statutory duty to provide equal access to public services and assistance, and this
demand became law through the implementation of the Northern Ireland Act
(1998). Subsequently, when immigrants began arriving en masse in the 2000s,
community workers were able to take the so-called "equality agenda" of the peace
process that had come to dominate state-society relations between Protestants and
Catholics, and apply it to new immigrants: sections of the Northern Ireland Act
were cited in order to demand state-funded translation services for new arrivals,
and both strategic and financial resources set aside to promote programs for 'good
relations' between Protestants and Catholics were extended to migrant-serving
organizations as well. Activists were also able to draw on their own experience with
exclusion and discrimination to both empathize with the situation of new
immigrants, and to make demands on their behalf; indeed, direct references to the
civic exclusion faced by Catholics in the past are frequently used to justify the civic
inclusion of new immigrants today. The behavior of these activists is consistent
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with what we have seen in much of the social movement literature: people who
engage in high-risk political activism are more likely than their peers to remain
engaged in activist politics over time and those groups that have themselves been
the victims of state repression are more sympathetic to other 'out' groups (McAdam
1990). In addition, recent research on crime and violence finds that crime
victimization is a strong predictor of civic engagement (Bateson 2012); it is not
surprising then that it is in some of the most deprived inner-city areas that saw
some of the worst violence during the Troubles that we see some of the most
engaged, committed community activists working to help bring immigrant
communities into political and civic life. 2 03
Taken together then, we see why and how incorporative activity varies
between Ireland and Northern Ireland: Northern Ireland's inclusive institutions are
jealously guarded by natives because natives benefit from them and are therefore
vested in their survival - this was not the case in Ireland. 204 And native political
actors in Northern Ireland, particularly in the voluntary sector, are willing and able
to use the narratives they developed to voice their concerns and frustrations about
their own civic exclusion in the past to justify the civic inclusion of new immigrants
203 To clarify, Bateson does not make claims about the type of political activity that crime
victims participate in, and in fact finds that in some parts of the world, heightened
participation in civic and community affairs can include support for anti-system parties and
groups, or vigilantism. That said, her analysis is completely consistent with the experience
of Catholics in Northern Ireland: state repression and Loyalist paramilitary violence led to
heightened political activity, but while some Catholics protested or formed political parties,
others joined the IRA.
204 It is both notable and consistent with my argument that one of the key parties in the
DAil opposed to the 2004 Citizenship referendum was republican-affiliated Sinn F6in,
whose political and ideological base is still in the North, even though it operates in the
South.
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in the present. Therefore, despite the fact that Northern Ireland is a 'new
destination', it displays many of the key characteristics that facilitate incorporative
activity in 'old destinations': inclusive civic institutions, embedded and invested
native political actors that see immigrants as constituents, and a historical
narrative that helps to justify migrant civic inclusion.
The case of Spain underscores the main points of the argument. Spain, like
Ireland, was a late developing state in Western Europe, and it too struggled with
poverty, emigration, and political violence. However, like Northern Ireland,
Spaniards were unable to balance the competing demands of different political
groups, leading to system collapse. In Spain's case, decades of skirmishes over the
political and social role of the Catholic Church, the political autonomy of the Basque
Country and Catalonia, rising class struggles, and questions over the Liberal versus
monarchic structure of government led to rising political extremism and a bloody
civil war in the 1930s that ended with a fascist victory and nearly four decades of
dictatorship. By the 1970s, it was clear that Spain's moribund political institutions
were not compatible with the rising social, economic and political expectations of
the population, especially at a time when state bureaucrats outside of Franco's
inner circle were desperately trying to promote economic growth and build stronger
ties to the rest of Europe. Weary of conflict and still scarred by the historical
memory of the political extremism of the 1930s, Spanish political leaders came to a
compromise whereby the new Constitution of 1978 formally guaranteed the political
rights of Spain's cultural, linguistic and political minorities, groups that saw
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significant state repression during the Franco dictatorship. However, the memories
of past conflict also saw the emergence of strong informal institutions: Spanish
party and union officials - the key groups that negotiated the transition to
democracy - were committed to concertation and cooperation when it came to
tackling tough political and social issues as nobody wanted a return to the chaos
and hatred of the early twentieth century.
Therefore, when immigration pressures rose in the late 1990s and early
2000s, Spain, like Northern Ireland, had at its disposal - quite by accident - a toolkit
developed in order to address the past political exclusion of natives that could be
readily picked up and applied to the situation of newly arrived immigrants - the
'new minorities. The inclusive institutions of the 1978 Constitution, the norms of
restraint and consultation, and the commitment of formerly excluded native
political actors to the inclusion of all groups within Spanish society meant that
despite its status as a new destination, the organizations, institutions, and
dominant social and political narratives of the Spanish civic sphere led to the kinds
of incorporative activity we might expect to be limited to old destinations.
Ultimately, out of the three cases explored in this thesis, Ireland may have
entered this latest era of European mass migration with the most immigrant-
friendly legal and political institutions. But its native political actors had no toolkit
with which to approach the migration issue or to consider migrant political
incorporation. Northern Ireland and Spain, on the other hand, had each - with
much bloodshed and heartache - developed a rather large and sophisticated
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repertoire in order to address contentious issues around competing political claims
and minority political inclusion. These 'toolkits' consisted of both formal and
informal institutions, namely the establishment of consultative organizations and
political structures, as well as closely held historical narratives and historical
memories that drove the behavior of native political actors. Subsequently, with the
advent of mass migration, natives in Spain and Northern Ireland were able to use
the tools of the past in order to fix the challenge of the present: the incorporation of
new minority groups, namely immigrants, into political and civic life.
II. Implications of the Argument
These findings have several interesting theoretical and policy implications.
First, as the case of Ireland shows, the existence of inclusive institutions are a
necessary but not sufficient facilitator of immigrant political incorporation: if these
institutions do not have native constituencies interested and invested in their
survival, then they may be subject to change or outright elimination. The 2004
Citizenship Referendum is a case in point: as immigrant families were the primary
beneficiaries of the policy, they were in no real position to defend it - or even vote
against it - as most were not themselves citizens. The Irish government was also
quick to eliminate some of the quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations
("quangoes") that it established in order to serve as both migration observatories
and advocates for immigrant communities. Migrant's rights organizations howled
in protest, but because the quangoes were solely focused on migrant-related issues
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and not broader social issues, it was quite easy for the government to eliminate
them during the first austerity budget in 2008 - unlike their attempts to cut
medical cards or pensioner benefits, cutting immigrant quangoes did not draw the
ire of a well-mobilized politically powerful native constituency. The Irish situation
suggests that policymakers that are interested in establishing migrant-serving
institutions or organizations would likely be better off doing so under the remit of
some broader program or institution that could better fend off retrenchment. For
example, in the United States, where affirmative action programs for college
admissions have been scaled back considerably, legislators in Texas were able to
protect minority access to the state's top-tier universities through replacing race-
based affirmative action with a program that reserved a slot at one of the state's
flagship universities for any student that graduated in the Top 10% of their high
school class. One of the architects of the plan noted that it was only possible
because supporters of affirmative action whose base of support was in poor urban
areas joined forces with legislators from poor, rural areas, as researchers found that
students from both of these groups were the least likely in the state to attend its
flagship schools (Guinier and Torres 2003). In essence a race issue had to be turned
into a class issue in order to meet the ultimate ends of greater minority
representation in higher education. My findings suggest that a similar strategy
may be in order for those activists and legislators invested in furthering immigrant
political incorporation.
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The most startling theoretical implication, however, is that societies with a
history of social conflict may be better positioned to take on the task of political
incorporation than their more tranquil counterparts. This seems terribly
counterintuitive: in a place like Northern Ireland where seething sectarian hatred
led to a thirty-year conflict that still, fifteen years after its formal conclusion,
occasionally rears its head, why would we expect to see more incorporative activity
than in other more peaceful countries, including its closest neighbor, Ireland?
The notion that social conflict matters for incorporative activity is one that
was recently discussed in a comparison of immigrant political incorporation in the
United States versus Europe. Mollenkopf and Hochschild (2010) argue that one of
the reasons why the US has incorporated its new immigrants much more rapidly
than its European counterparts is because of its legacy of slavery and Jim Crow.
The reasons they outline are both institutional and organizational: the institutions
that came out of the Civil Rights movement, namely anti-discrimination and
affirmative action legislation, can help new immigrants - many of whom are non-
white - confront racial prejudice and gain access to education and job training. On
the organizational front, the same groups that were involved in the fight for black
civil rights have turned their attention to immigrants; subsequently new arrivals
get access to advocacy networks that not only have decades of experience but a
deep, abiding interest in social and racial justice. However, the authors note that:
In contrast, European countries have little experience with robust affirmative action
laws, voting right laws, minority advocacy groups, litigation against job
discrimination, minority business set-asides, and all the other policies and
organizational strategies intended to help mitigate the consequences of centuries of
racial hierarchy. These policies have not always worked in the United States, they
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are not always appropriate for immigrants, and they may even have been
detrimental or unfair at times - but at least they have provided a scaffolding upon
which migrants and their supporters have been able to hang some policy
innovations. Migrants to European countries have lacked such scaffolding and find
it difficult to construct one from scratch (pg. 28).
This 'scaffolding' process as described by the authors is a perfect explanation of
why and how we see incorporative activity in Spain and Northern Ireland.
Northern Ireland, through its civil rights movement, conflict, and peace process, has
developed a series of 'inclusive institutions' including legislative procedures that
mandate cross-community consent before pushing through contentious legal
changes, requirements to include representatives from both sides of the sectarian
divide plus neutral actors on public consultation boards, and minority quotas for the
police service - one of the most contentious institutions in Northern Ireland.
Through the long years of conflict when many communities were no-go zones for the
state, Northern Ireland also developed a network of community associations and
advocacy groups dedicated to ending inequalities in housing and social service
provision and discrimination in electoral politics. When unexpectedly confronted
with new immigrants, these pre-existing advocacy networks extended their remit to
newcomers, and new immigrants benefitted from the legal umbrella constructed
primarily to protect Northern Ireland's native minority group, Catholics. Much of
the same can be seen in Spain where constitutional clauses meant to ensure that all
citizens had the capacity to participate in civic life have been extended to justify
both government capacity-building partnerships with and subsidies for migrant
organizations. Therefore, the Mollenkopf and Hochschild assertion that "European"
countries lack experience with having to mitigate past minority exclusion may have
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to be qualified. Perhaps it would be more accurate to state that in European
countries with a more settled political history, there is little modern experience with
this kind of thing, but along Europe's periphery where issues of native minority
civic inclusion and democratic representation are still politically salient, political
institutions and organizational structures and networks may be surprisingly well-
suited for native political actors to take on the task of incorporation.
Is social conflict then a necessary condition for immigrant political
incorporation? I do not want to go so far as to state that societies need to experience
the kind of trauma suffered by the people of Northern Ireland during the Troubles
or of the Basque Country during the darkest days of the Franco dictatorship in
order to have the capacity to engage in incorporative activity. But social conflict, if
resolved amicably, has several observable effects that facilitate incorporative
activity: a commitment to pluralist, inclusive politics (and strong legal backing for
this commitment) the empowerment of formally marginalized groups, and a greater
social sensitivity to and awareness of political and social exclusion. As Mollenkopf
and Hochschild point out, it is very difficult to build this kind of political eco-
structure from scratch.
Finally, my findings suggest that minorities that are past victims of
discrimination are open to being the future allies of new minority groups also facing
exclusion. The implication is that we should expect to see other previously
marginalized groups that were able to successfully achieve both institutional
change and political recognition step forward in support of 'new' minorities today.
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In light of the trans-Atlantic comparison drawn above, let us consider the case of
African-Americans: having fought for equal standing before the law and full
political citizenship, successfully won the implementation of new laws and
institutions meant to both redress pass wrongs and monitor present and future
progress, and served as the inspiration for civil rights movements of repressed
people around the world, the implication of this theory is that black political leaders
with ties to the civil rights movement should in fact be proponents of both
immigrant's rights and the rights of other marginalized groups. Does this hold
true?
First is the question of immigrant's rights, in this case, access to permanent
residency and a pathway to citizenship. Given their experiences with political and
economic marginalization, do black political elites engage in incorporative activities
targeting the latest wave of immigrants to the U.S.? At the national level this
seems to be the case. Members of the Congressional Black Congress (CBC) have
been generally supportive of immigration reforms: most co-sponsored the DREAM
Act (HR1751), which would regularize the status of undocumented immigrants
brought to the U.S. as young children, and of creating a pathway to citizenship that
does not rely on employer-sponsored visas and recognizes the importance of family
reunification (Levey 2013; Waters 2011). The CBC also supported Mexican-
American leaders during the debates over the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA) in the 1980s (Fuchs 1993). That said, we do see differences between those
members of Congress with closer ties to the civil rights era and those without: those
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with closer ties are not only quite vocal advocates for migrants rights, but they
explicitly tie their past experiences with racial marginalization to the present-day
marginalization of immigrants, and in particular, Latinos. Georgia Congressman
John Lewis, the only leader of one of major civil rights organizations of the 1960s to
serve in the Congress has consistently supported immigration reform and access to
citizenship on civil rights grounds. Former Black Panther Bobby Rush (D-IL) has
also been a strong advocate of not only immigration legal reform, but for changing
the way that politicians even talk about immigration: in 2013, he filed a Resolution
(HR155) in the U.S. House of Representatives to get members of Congress to stop
using the term "illegal immigrants" in political debate. Rush referred to his
background as an advocate for racial equality to justify his position:
America is and has always been a country of immigrants (80% of this country was
founded by immigrants), so it is unacceptable to just now start referring to the
status of immigrants as "illegal." I grew up in a time where people of color were
given numerous labels and called horrific names. I have worked though my youth
into the present to fight against all of those negative labels. Because of this, I cannot
stand aside while other groups are marginalized by the labels placed on them by
others, so I will join with them to prevent such atrocities from continuing. 205
Outside of the Congress, we see a similar dynamic. Ben Jealous, the current
president of the NAACP, wrote an op-ed in the midst of the 2013 debate over
immigration reform:
African Americans have spent much of our history fighting for equal treatment. Just
two generations ago, our parents and our grandparents were banned from eating at
certain restaurants, attending certain schools, and working in certain professions.
So it is not difficult to empathize with the struggle of immigrants in our country.
Like our ancestors who migrated from the former slave states of the Deep South,
millions of undocumented immigrants move to the United States each year to find
work and a decent education for their children. But when they arrive, they are
205 "Congressman Bobby Rush on HR155," by Andrea Plaid, colorlines.com, July 9, 2013.
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confronted with blatant discrimination and racial profiling -- with hardly any legal
recourse and little public outrage.. .As Dr. King said, injustice anywhere is a threat
to justice everywhere. African Americans have spent much of our history fighting for
fair treatment and equal opportunity. We must also offer support to our immigrant
brothers and sisters. If we want to escape the sins of our past, we must ensure there
are no second class families today. 206
While so-called 'black-brown coalitions' have not been frictionless,
particularly at the local level, African-American political elites at the national level,
and particularly those with the most direct ties to the civil rights struggles of the
1960s, have been broadly supportive of opening a pathway to citizenship for
immigrants - including undocumented immigrants - and this is consistent with
what we would expect, given the importance of both the civil rights narrative and
experience to this generation of political leadership.
More recently, another minority group in the US has stood up to fight for a
different set of civil rights: the LGBT community. Marriage equality has been a
major political issue in the U.S. for the last several years, and the political battles
in California and the 2013 Supreme Court decision have put gay marriage rights on
the national political agenda. While gay civil rights are not covered by the same set
of race-based anti-discrimination legislation that can be extended to post-1964
immigrants, my theory implies that black political elites should, by virtue of their
past experiences with exclusion, be supportive of LGBT rights. However, public
opinion data shows that blacks are generally less supportive of gay marriage rights
than whites (Brumbaugh et al 2008; Abrajano 2010). Where do black political elites
fall?
206 "No Second-Class Families," Huffington Post: Black Voices, May 10, 2013.
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While support for marriage equality has not been universal, black political
leadership with the strongest ties to the civil rights movement have been the most
opposed to restrictions on gay marriage. The Urban League response was mixed,
with some of the larger branches (such as Chicago) jumping on board, while others
reserved comment. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) came out in support of marriage equality, despite some
reservations from the clergy on its board. However, what does stand out in the
debate is how those with the most direct ties to the civil rights activism of the 1960s
have been some of the earliest and most vocal proponents of gay marriage rights.
Julian Bond, the former chairman of the NAACP, linked his civil rights experience
to the marriage equality debate today:
Well, I think you could not be in the civil rights movement without having an
appreciation for everybody's rights. That these rights are not divisible - not
something men have and women don't and so on.. .You don't have to be gay or
lesbian to say, "These people need some kind of help. They are involved in trying to
get rights for themselves, and I ought to be supportive of that. Because they were
supportive of me"'. 207
Like Bond, Congressman John Lewis (D-GA) was an early opponent of gay marriage
restrictions. In 1996, during Congressional debates on the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), which (among other issues) banned federal recognition of same-sex
couples, Representative Lewis voiced his opposition on the floor of the House:
207 "Roe at 40 Podcast Series: Interview with Julian Bond," interview with Heidi
Williamson, Center for American Progress, February 22, 2013.
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Let me say to the gentleman that when I was growing up in the south during the
1940s and the 1950s, the great majority of the people in that region believed that
black people should not be able to enter places of public accommodation, and they
felt that black people should not be able to register to vote, and many people felt that
was right but that was wrong. I think as politicians, as elected officials, we should
not only follow but we must lead, lead our districts, not put our fingers into the wind
to see which way the air is blowing but be leaders...
I will not turn my back on another American. I will not oppress my fellow human
being. I have fought too hard and too long against discrimination based on race and
color not to stand up against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Mr. Chairman, I have know racism. I have known bigotry. This bill stinks of the
same fear, hatred and intolerance. It should not be called the Defense of Marriage
Act. It should be called the defense of mean-spirited bigots act.
I urge my colleagues to oppose this bill, to have the courage to do what is right. This
bill appeals to our worst fears and emotions. It encourages hatred of our fellow
Americans for political advantage. Every word, every purpose, every message is
wrong. It is not the right thing to do, to divide Americans. 208
Representative Lewis's comments were consistent with civil rights-era rhetoric,
which made demands for civil rights based on constitutional principles. However,
they were also consistent with what we might expect given his activist background:
Lewis was a founding member of the Student Nonviolence Coordinating Committee
(SNCC), and famously suffered skull fractures after being beaten by the
Birmingham police when trying to cross the Pettus Bridge in Selma Alabama in
1965. His comments were not, given all of the public opinion data on attitudes
towards gay marriage, what we would expect from an elderly, religious black man
from the Deep South. In Lewis's case, his past experience with the civil rights
movement clearly influenced his views on an issue that he would not otherwise be
expected to take a liberal position on.
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208 Cong. Rec. H7444 (1996).
III. Limitations of the study
This dissertation offers a theory of incorporative activity for new
destinations, places where we would expect to see limited, at best, attempts to bring
new immigrants into civic life. However, this study does have three key
limitations. First, the focus is on political elites, not mass publics. For any study
that focuses on elite behavior, there is always a question as to how representative
their views are - not just for parties, but in particular, community organizations,
which do not have electoral figures to show as evidence of having a mandate from
the population they claim to represent. As the Lewis case, and the case of Sinn F6in
show, political elites may take positions on contentious issues that are out ahead of
their constituents; Congressman Lewis's assertion that political leaders ought to
"lead our districts, not put our fingers into the wind" is admirable, but it does raise
questions about the nature of representation. Much of the frustration around
immigration in Europe, particularly in working-class communities, is that there is a
growing sense that politicians are disconnected from their constituents, as
politicians do not have to deal with overcrowded housing, schools that struggle with
a large influx of children who do not speak the language, and competition for
increasingly scarce jobs and stingy public benefits (Fetzer 2000; Swank and Betts
2003). This frustration is in part responsible for the rising popularity of far-right
parties that address the fears of white, working-class communities directly and
promise to both end immigration and restore the lost sense of economic stability
(Ford and Goodwin 2010). Therefore, a focus on elites may create a falsely positive
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view of the political situation, for if there is too large of a gap between the beliefs of
elites and the beliefs of their constituents, this may create opportunities for far-
right parties to not only get into government, but pull other parties further to the
right (Meguid 2005;). While far-right parties have not gained traction in either
Spain or Northern Ireland, and the fact that the far-right in Spain has not been
able to capitalize on an unemployment rate that tops 20% overall and close to 50%
for young people is promising, the fact that this thesis is primarily focused on elite
behavior is something to be mindful of, especially if one tries to extend the
argument to other cases, or make predictions about future incorporative activity.
Second, the bulk of this analysis focuses on the political behavior of elites at
the national level. Given that laws regarding citizenship and electoral rights are
made at the national, rather than the local level, drawing comparisons at this level
is logical. However, at the local level, where fights over scarce public resources
(schools, housing, and health care, in particular) may be more immediate, these
same dynamics of inclusiveness and solidarity may not hold: for example, while
Bobby Rush may take a very liberal view of immigration in the Congress, in his
home district in Chicago, there has been rising conflict between black and Latino
communities over control of the Board of Education and other key local
bureaucracies, as well as conflict over the reallocation of resources from
undersubscribed schools in black neighborhoods to overcrowded schools in Latino
neighborhoods. While most black leaders on the south and west sides of Chicago
are not openly hostile to immigration - many are themselves the sons and
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daughters of labor migrants from Mississippi - as the city continues to slash its
budget, conflicts over increasingly scarce public resources are likely to continue, and
given Chicago's high levels of residential segregation, these are likely to carry racial
and ethnic overtones. 209
Finally, there is the issue of external validity: can this argument be extended
to other societies? While this project focuses on late developing European states, it
is not clear that we can extend this argument to countries that are still struggling
with the process of social and economic development. If material want is
extraordinarily high, accepting an influx of newcomers may be too much political
and economic stress for a relatively fragile system, even for societies that have a
strong legacy of mass movements for minority representation. One example of this
would be South Africa: the image of the "Rainbow Nation" has in recent years been
marred by terrible violence targeting immigrants from neighboring Zimbabwe and
Mozambique: in 2008, anti-immigrant riots swept the country, displacing thousands
and leaving over sixty people dead. Although many ANC officials and public figures
tied to the anti-apartheid movement, including Archbishop Desmond Tutu, voiced
their condemnation of the 2008 attacks, one observer noted, "Although state
institutions have never condoned violence against migrants and have regularly
condemned it, they have provided an environment wherein such xenophobic
violence has effectively been legitimized by the state" (Neocosmos 2008). The same
209 For an ethnic map of the Chicago area, see Paul John Higgins' map available on the
Chicago Reader website:
http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/ImageArchivesoid=3223749&by=1231787 [accessed
30 August 2013].
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report went on to note that a key source of anti-immigrant activity was within the
police force, which regularly shook down migrant street vendors and stood aside and
watched when civilians attacked migrant businesses and households - a clear sign
of weak state capacity to maintain civil order. While there are voices in South
African society that explicitly point to both the legacy of apartheid, and to
Zimbabwe and Mozambique's histories as places of refuge for South African
activists as reason enough to support and welcome immigrants - for example, the
Centre for Human Rights at the University of Pretoria called out President Jacob
Zuma for not being more vocal about anti-immigrant violence, given that he, like
many, fled to neighboring countries as an anti-apartheid activist 2 1 0 - in South
Africa's case, and in the cases of other countries struggling with political
modernization, there may be neither the economic leeway nor the state capacity to
maintain social solidarity - or political order, for that matter - when confronted
with new immigration.
IV. Future areas of research
In her study of peasant politics in rural France, Suzanne Berger observed,
"The modern European state has lived upon a reservoir of soldiers and electors
provided by the peasantry, but peasants have remained the object of politics and not
its master" (1972, pg. 1). Much the same could be said of Europe's immigrants: they
make up a significant percentage of the population in most European countries, but
210 "SA desensitized to Xenophobia," Sowetan June 7 2013, available online at:
http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2013/06/07/sa-desensitised-to-xenophobia.
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still remain largely an object of politics. This is particularly true where native
actors have tried to make political lemonade out of the sour economic conditions
plaguing many post-industrial Western European countries. Laws regulating the
religious expression of Muslim immigrants and the status of immigrant workers are
imposed upon immigrant populations - many well into the second and third
generations - with little recognition of or input from the very communities affected
by these decisions. Therefore, the clearest area for future research is to shift the
focus from native political actors to immigrant communities, in order to better
understand how immigrants themselves choose to become engaged in - or sit out of
- civic life in their newly adopted countries. To what extent are immigrants - can
immigrants? - in new destinations demand their seat at the table of power? To
what extent are there differences in immigrant community mobilization along
ethnic lines? And how - if at all - does the process of incorporation differ between
old and new destinations?211
My preliminary takeaway from interviews conducted with both immigrant
and community activists during the course of my fieldwork is that immigrants in
Europe's new destinations do have a rising interest in using politics to better their
condition. In Ireland, the most socially and economically marginalized group of
immigrants - namely sub-Saharan Africans - is also the most vested and outwardly
interested in politics, a phenomenon so pronounced that other migrant community
activists remarked upon it frequently in interviews. Ironically, the situation of
211 For example, Polish immigrants arrived simultaneously in Ireland (new destination) and
the UK (old destination) after 2004. How have their experiences differed?
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Africans in Ireland in the 21st century is somewhat analogous to the situation of the
Irish in America in the 19th century: largely locked out of skilled work and
marginalized as an inferior race, the Irish in America used political mobilization to
claw their way up the socio-economic ladder. 212 For African immigrants in Ireland,
many of whom spent long years prohibited from taking gainful employment while
waiting for their asylum applications to be processed, electoral politics presents an
opportunity for a crack at both politically controlled resources and social acceptance.
However, it also seemed that many immigrants are still straddling two
worlds, politically. In Ireland, more Poles went to the Polish consulate in 2007 to
cast their ballots in the Polish national elections than went to the polls in 2009 to
cast their ballots in the Irish local elections. In Madrid, colorful billboards appeared
in Metro stations in the fall of 2009 exhorting Bolivians living in Spain to register to
vote in the Bolivian national elections. The tagline was "Vota con tu gente", which
translates as "Vote with your people" - a clear signal where the Bolivian
government saw the political obligations of its citizens living abroad. Similar
billboards appears in 2011 in time for the Peruvian national elections - yet both the
Peruvian and Bolivian governments signed bilateral agreements with the Spanish
government that would allow their citizens to vote in Spanish local elections. These
dynamics raise tantalizing questions for future research: to what extent do
governments in immigrant-sending states see immigrants as valued constituents?
How do parties see immigrant ex-pat communities - do they campaign abroad as
212 In the late 19th and early 20th century, Irish immigrants, most notably in Thomas Nast
cartoons in the U.S. and Punch Magazine cartoons in the UK, were depicted as ape-like,
violent, or ignorant.
374
well as at home? And what is the position of sending states towards immigrant
engagement in the politics of their new countries? The "Vota con tu gente" appeal of
the Bolivian government seems at odds with their agreements to open up non-
citizen voting rights for Bolivians living in Spain: how do they balance these
competing - or complementary - political agendas and memberships?
Second, the caveat that this project is fundamentally concerned with
dynamics at the national level sparks the question: what about the dynamics of
incorporative activity at the local level? How are native political actors adjusting?
To some extent, local dynamics are touched upon in the discussion of local elections
and of capacity-building efforts, particularly in the Northern Ireland case.
However, a shift to the local is also a potentially fruitful line of research because of
the wider array of local actors that can be potential partners in the incorporative
process: churches, local school boards, and block associations, to name a few. For
example, in my fieldwork, I noted that at the local level, church membership
seemed to play a role in how immigrants were anchored within local communities.
Across much of Europe, church attendance has declined over the last several
decades, and this is particularly true for the Roman Catholic Church (RCC), which
is struggling to manage many half-empty buildings. For the church, immigration
presents an opportunity to bring old parishes back to life again, and for immigrants,
the availability of church facilities, and the openness of the church leadership to
newcomers, has meant that new arrivals have a ready-made social network - a
privilege not necessarily afforded to non-Catholic immigrants who may struggle to
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find or establish places of worship. What remains to be seen, however, is if that
social network can become political - while Catholic bishops are generally very
vocal about migrant rights, it remains to be seen if immigrant church networks can
be transformed into a mobilization network in the same way that black churches in
the U.S. have come to play an important role in black political mobilization.
Finally, another interesting question that emerged during the course of this
project is one that may be more relevant beyond Western Europe: to paraphrase an
earlier quote, how are immigrants supposed to integrate into a disintegrated
society? The case of Northern Ireland (and to a lesser extent, the Basque Country)
presents an interesting theoretical and political challenge to the idea that political
incorporation is both desirable and necessary, for in a country where restive regions
or populations demand independence or are openly hostile to the state one must
ask: incorporation into what? The example of the West Against Racism Network
(WARN) in republican West Belfast is instructive. Their public statements against
racism, their use of public art to take a stance against racism and xenophobia, and
their production of a "Welcome Packet" for new immigrant residents would certainly
be considered incorporative activity. WARN's interest in immigrant political
incorporation seems rational, given republican West Belfast's history as a site of
anti-Catholic violence and a hotbed of both political organizing and IRA volunteer
recruitment during the Troubles. Also, the dominance of historical narratives that
link the plight and aspirations of Northern Ireland's Catholics to other
marginalized political and ethnic minorities (the Basques and Catalans of Spain,
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African-Americans, and Palestinians) and that are reinforced by the use of murals
and public art along the Falls Road, which cuts through the heard of republican
West Belfast, serve to legitimize the practice of migrant outreach on the part of
native local organizations. Therefore, on all counts the behavior of WARN is
consistent with my theory of incorporative activity, and presumably this type of
outreach is exactly what politicians who are deathly afraid of second-generation
political and social alienation among immigrants want to see from native
communities.
The problem, of course, is that Northern Ireland is not a normal society.
WARN's welcome packet, which asked new residents not to call the police into the
area if they had a problem, was entirely consisted with militant republicanism, but
was anathema to Unionists and a cause of despair for everyone else. The
oppositional position that WARN takes towards the state is entirely consistent with
hardline republican values, but it is not clear that hardline republican values are
consistent with maintaining the peace in Northern Ireland. Therefore, the British
and Irish governments (like the Spanish government with the Basques, and the
Canadian government with the Quebecois) are confronted with a conundrum: they
want to see immigrant political incorporation in the present in order to prevent
migrant antipathy towards the state in the future, but there is a real likelihood that
some immigrants will incorporate into political movements that are, by their very
nature, hostile toward the state. In this sense then, we can see interesting parallels
with the debate around "segmented assimilation": most governments express an
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interest in immigrant assimilation, but some immigrants may assimilate into
oppositional, low-achieving subcultures that reject dominant social values, rather
than assimilating and adopting mainstream values (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes
and Rumbaut 2001). While the downward/segmented assimilation debate is highly
contested (see Kasinitz, Mollenkopf and Waters 2010; Waldinger and Feliciano
2004), the issues raised in this debate serve as a warning to governments professing
the desirability of immigrant political incorporation: be careful what you wish for.
To date, immigrants have not been deeply involved in hardline republican or
loyalist politics in Northern Ireland, or in abertzale politics in the Basque Country,
but that is not to say that it cannot or will not happen, particularly with the second
generation. In Belfast, two of the more notorious paramilitary commanders of the
late 1990s/early 2000s were the Shoukri Brothers, sons of an Irish mother and an
Egyptian father who were so thoroughly integrated into Loyalist politics that they
were willing to attempt to murder Catholics and plot against the state in order to
defend what they saw as 'their' culture. On the other side of the sectarian divide,
Tim Brannigan, the child of an African immigrant father and an Irish Catholic
mother, grew up along the Falls Road during the worst of the Troubles and
identified strongly with the republican movement: in the 1990s, he was sent to
prison for allowing local IRA gunrunners to use the family car as a temporary
weapons depot. In his autobiography, he recounts an exchange with another
republican prisoner:
One day, sitting bored in a cell a prisoner from a rural area said: "I just think it's
unfortunate that a guy like you ended up in the Blocks."
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"What do you mean a guy like me?" I asked.
"Well, it's not really your fight," he stated, like it was a self-evident truth.
"I grew up on the Falls Road and I've probably had more abuse from the Brits than
most people on these wings. I have a fair idea of what's going on politically," I said.
"But it's not really your fight," he said. (Brannigan 2010)
The title of his book? Where are you really from?213
IV. Conclusion
The fundamental issue that concerns this thesis is the question of
imagination: when, how and why can natives of a given country re-imagine their
political community in a way that includes outsiders? As Benedict Anderson (1991)
noted, nations are essentially 'imagined communities': "It is imagined because the
members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members,
meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their
communion" (pg. 6). He also notes, however, that the nation "is imagined as limited
213 Brannigan later clarified his position in a 2010 op-ed for the British newspaper The
Guardian, where he wrote "I was born in Belfast and I am black. I endured a barrage of
racist abuse over decades from British soldiers and the police. With a Falls Road
upbringing in a republican family and a seven-year jail term spent in the H-Blocks during
the 1990s, I'd have thought my bona fides as an Irishman were pretty impeccable. To this
day, though, the question I hear most is: "Where are you from?" When I tell people I'm
from Belfast, they invariably throw in the supplementary: "Where are you really from?"
There's no way an Irish person could possibly be black is the unspoken subtext." In his
view, this was what a true Irishman did: be willing to accept prison as part of the cost of
establishing a united Ireland. This provoked no small amount of consternation in the
comment thread of the article, with one reader drily noting, "Interesting argument that
getting a seven year-stretch proves your bona fides as an Irishman". See "Ethnic minorities
make easy scapegoats in Belfast," Guardian, June 24 2010, online edition available at:
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/jun/24/ethnic-minorities-easy-scapegoats-
belfast. (accessed October 2011).
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because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human
beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations" (pg. 7). The
question that motivates this thesis then is: where exactly are those boundaries, and
why do native actors sometimes try to shift them?
It is easy to be pessimistic when considering the elasticity of the nation. The
weight of history seems to limit the imagination of modern nation-states: modern
citizenship policies are described as the legal manifestation of deep-rooted notions of
nationhood and identity, and these are considered to be 'sticky' over time (Brubaker
1992). Some would even question the capacity of humankind to fully embrace all
existing members of a given community, not just newcomers; the theologian
Reinhold Niebuhr, whose work had an enormous influence on Martin Luther King
Jr., wrote that, "The social impulses, with which men are endowed by nature are
not powerful enough, even when they are extended by a growing intelligence, to
apply with equal force toward all members of a large community" (1932, 13). Yet
despite this pessimism, we do see time and time again that both the internal and
external boundaries of the imagined community can be stretched: while they were
often sent off to war to defend the physical boundaries of the nation, the poor and
working classes did not have full and equal political citizenship in many Western
democracies until the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; women were
similarly excluded. If we look to the United States as an example, blacks only
attained full political citizenship in the 1960s, a century after the end of slavery, yet
in 2008, a black man was elected President.
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The ties that bind the nation are not limited to blood or the annals of history:
shared civic norms, language, and even modern experiences of conflict and
repression can both awaken old and create new ideals of citizenship and norms of
belonging. This process can be disruptive, or even violent, and may be painful for
all involved, but ultimately, the process of re-imagining the political community to
include new groups can create the space - and indeed, the inspiration - for
expanding the boundaries of that community in the future.
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Appendix A: Methods
For this project, I took an inductive approach. While I selected cases based
on their similar socioeconomic characteristics, I did not start this project with a
theory that I meant to test; rather I began with a set of observations based on my
analysis of rapidly changing economic and demographic data in Western Europe,
and a series of expectations informed by the literature on immigrant political
incorporation, trade union revitalization and the broader (American) literature on
political mobilization.
Between June 2009 and September 2011, I made a series of research trips to
1) Dublin, Ireland, 2) Belfast, Northern Ireland, 3) Madrid, Spain, and 4) Bilbao,
Spain. The trips lasted between eight weeks to five months, and I made at least
two trips to each location. For these cases I used the initial longer trips to build
contact lists and to get a better sense of what was happening on the ground.
Subsequent trips were used to collect additional archival data or to follow up with
contacts that I'd missed on previous visits.
Research Visits
Dublin June - July 2009
Madrid September 2009 - February 2010
Dublin March - May 2010
Belfast June - July 2010
Bilbao October - November 2010
Belfast December 2010
Madrid June 2011
Bilbao July - August 2011
Belfast August - September 2011
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Interviews
I conducted 102 formal interviews overall. My strategy across cases was to
approach the same set of actors: 1) party officials and activists, 2) government
bureaucrats tasked with managing immigration-related issues, 3) trade union
officials, and 4) both native and migrant-led NGOs. Because of the sensitivity of
some of the issues discussed around immigration, and the reliance of many
organizations on government funding, I have kept all interview responses
anonymous.
Most interviews lasted between ninety minutes to two hours, although they
were generally longer in Ireland than in Spain. Irish political organizations, and
Northern Irish organizations in particular were generally far more open than their
Spanish counterparts, with the exception of trade unions. In addition, nationalist
organizations were more open to interviews and were easier to gain access to than
non-nationalist parties and organizations.
Subject Ireland Northern Ireland Spain All
Party & Elected
Officials 9 4 5 18
Government Officials 4 4 1 9
Trade Union Officials 6 5 8 19
NGOs 17 25 15 57
TOTAL 36 37 29 102
Because I chose to live in immigrant gateway communities when possible,
and I regularly attended community meetings, strikes, and other protests, I
conducted countless additional informal interviews during the course of my
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fieldwork.21 4 I talked to workers on picket lines, angry protestors outside of
government offices, both native and immigrant small business owners, and other
people who lived and worked in areas that had undergone enormous social and
demographic change over a very short period. Many of these informal conversations
were initiated by the other party: my appearance as a relatively tall, biracial female
attracted attention in the communities in which I embedded myself, and I was
regularly approached by strangers who were curious about my ethnic background
and why I was there. This curiosity included both natives and immigrants; often
immigrants were even more surprised than natives to find out that I was an
American, and the question "But where are you REALLY from?" was not
infrequent. All of these encounters were recorded in field notes or in a daily journal
I kept during my field research.
Archival research
My conversations with informants in parties, unions, community
organizations and government bureaucracies guided my document collection. In
addition to collecting pamphlets and reports from organizations that I interviewed,
I noted and researched the background of key legislation that they mentioned as
being useful. This background research included press releases and statements
from key stakeholders, media reports, and original legislative transcripts. In
214 In Madrid, I lived in Lavapi6s, and in Belfast I lived off of the Lower Ormeau Road in
South Belfast. The immigrant population in Dublin is relatively dispersed, and in Bilbao I
was unable to find short-term housing in San Francisco, the key gateway neighborhood that
is somewhat similar to Lavapi6s in Madrid.
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addition, I used legislative records in order to determine for myself how different
parties viewed issues of migration and citizenship before legal changes and in the
middle of political debates, rather than relying on recollection after the fact. Where
possible, I used organization archives (this primarily applied to Spanish unions),
but also the legislative records of the Spanish Cortes, the Irish Oireachtas, and the
British Parliament. Finally, in Northern Ireland, I was able to use the archives of
the Linen Hall Library, which kept many original documents from the Northern
Ireland peace process, including original posters, mimeographed flyers and
pamphlets distributed in neighborhoods, and press statements.
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Appendix B: Census Data and Government Statistics
Ireland
Central Statistics Office. 1926. Number of persons of each religion in Saorstat
Eireann at each census year from 1861, the first year for which figures are
available.
. 1986. Table 21A: Persons, males and females in each Province classified
by country of birth.
. 2006.
. 2008. Census 2006. Non-Irish Nationals Living in Ireland. Dublin:
Stationary Office.
__ 2010a. "Union Membership." Quarterly National Household Survey.
http ://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/releasespublications/documents/labourmark
et/2009/qnhsunionmembership g22009.pdf.
.__ 2010b. "Chapter 8: Economy." Statistical Yearbook. Dublin: Stationary
Office.
. 2012. Profile 6: Migration and Diversity. Dublin: Stationary Office.
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland Statistical Research Agency. 2008. Long Term International
Migration Statistics for Northern Ireland (2006- 7), by Gillian Fegan and
David Marshall. Occasional Paper Series no. 26. Belfast.
.2010. Migration Statistics for Northern Ireland (2009). Press release.
. 2010
. 2011.
Office for National Statistics. 2009. Report: Demographic Trends in Northern
Ireland. Prepared for the 'Population Trends' series, no. 31, pg. 91-97.
.2011. Regional characteristics of foreign-born people living in the United
Kingdom, by Alice Reid and Caroline Miller. Prepared for the 'Regional
Trends' series, no. 43, pg. 3-30.
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Spain
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica. 2004. "Extranjeros en Espafia," Boletin
Informativo del Instituto Nacional de Estadistica.. Madrid. Available at:
http://www.ine.es/ss/Satellite?c=Page&cid=1254735116567&pagename=Prod
uctosYServicios%2FPYSLayout&L=en GB.
.Encuesta Nacional de los inmigrantes: Una monografia. Madrid.
Available online at:
http://www.ine.es/ss/Satellite?L=1&c=INEPublicacion C&cid=125992495758
5&p=1254735110672&pagename=ProductosYServicios%2FPYSLayout&para
ml=PYSDetalleGratuitas.
. 2012. "Extranjeros en la UE y en Espafia," Bolettn Informativo del
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica. Madrid. Available at:
http://www.ine.es/ss/Satellite?c=Page&cid=1254735116567&pagename=Prod
uctosYServicios%2FPYSLayout&L=en GB.
. 2013. "Evoluci6n de la poblaci6n de Espafia entre los Censos de 2002 -
2011"
Historical census data was also available through the INE website at:
http://www.ine.es/en/inebmenu/mnu cifraspob en.htm.
International
OECD. 2010. "Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics." OECD Fact book
2010. Online database.
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